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Abstract  
 
Research consistently supports the notion that terrorists are rational actors. 
However, there has been a tendency to focus on distal factors associated with 
involvement in terrorism, and there is a distinct lack of empirical research on 
aspects of attack commission at the individual level. Little has been done to 
identify proximal factors associated with attacks. This thesis uses multiple 
paradigms from environmental criminology, including journey-to-crime analyses, 
various spatial and temporal statistics, risk terrain modelling and discrete choice 
modelling, to examine the target selection for two of the current national security 
threats to the UK: lone-actor terrorism and Northern Ireland related terrorism. 
 
Collectively, the findings indicate that target selection is guided by an inherent 
logic, and that terrorists are rational in their spatial decision making. The first 
piece of analysis demonstrates that lone-actor terrorists behave in a similar way 
to group terrorists and urban criminals. Their residence-to-attack journeys display 
a classic distance decay pattern. The second empirical chapter shows how 
attacks by violent dissident Republicans in the period studied were spatially and 
temporally clustered. The following chapter identifies differences between risk 
factors for bombings and bomb hoaxes, and suggests that dissident Republicans 
may select less ideological targets for bombings relative to bomb hoaxes. The 
final empirical chapter demonstrates that the locations of attacks by the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army were influenced by characteristics of the target 
areas as well as the properties of their likely journey to the target.  
 
In the concluding chapter, a new framework for target selection is presented and 
assessed using illustrative examples of recent attacks in the U.K. Important 
insights are provided that could guide and improve the efficacy of preventative 
and disruptive measures.  
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Chapter 1    Introduction  
 
On 16th June 2016, British Member of Parliament Helen Joanne ‘Jo’ Cox was 
fatally shot and stabbed multiple times in a targeted attack outside Birstall library 
in West Yorkshire, where she was due to hold an afternoon constituency surgery. 
The attacker, Thomas Mair, was a white supremacist who was fascinated with 
Norwegian extremist Anders Breivik. He had some ties to British nationalist and 
neo-Nazi groups, but seems to have been almost completely socially 
isolated. Just under a year later, on 2nd May 2017, Salman Abedi detonated an 
improvised explosive device (IED) packed with nuts and bolts in Manchester 
Arena’s foyer. The attack took place after an Ariana Grande concert with over 
14,000 people in attendance. 22 were killed. When taking into account 
psychological trauma and minor injuries, the estimated number of those injured 
is over 800. A few days later, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed 
the attack was carried out by a “soldier of the Khilafah”. Though these attacks 
differed in sophistication, lethality, and motivation, the same questions arise from 
these events. Why did Abedi choose Manchester Arena, of all the potential 
targets in the city? Why was Jo Cox the subject of Mair’s attack?  
Simply: opportunity. Abedi was born in Manchester in 1994 and lived 4 miles 
away from the arena. Old Trafford, the home stadium of the premier league 
football club Manchester United, is also around 4 miles from Abedi’s home 
address. Abedi decided against targeting Old Trafford due to situational security 
measures in place such as metal detectors (Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament, 2018). At the time of Abedi’s attack at the arena bag checks were 
no longer being conducted in the foyer. Mair lived just 1 mile away from the library 
where he attacked Cox. The library is easily accessible to the public and had no 
security measures in place. Mair had links to far-right extremism, including the 
National Front and English Defence League, and believed individuals who were 
liberal and left-wing were the cause of the world’s problems. He targeted Cox as 
he believed her to be a ‘passionate defender’ of the European Union and a 
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“traitor” to white people. A witness stated that during the attack Mair shouted, 
“This is for Britain. Britain will always come first”.  
In the field of terrorism1 studies there appears to be a distinct lack of empirical 
research on aspects of attack preparation and commission. There has been a 
recent increase in research regarding the prevention and interdiction of terrorist 
attacks, most likely due to the increase of frequency and lethality of attacks in 
Europe. However, this topic remains understudied, which is a critical oversight in 
this field. Many recent incidents, such as the 2017 attacks in London2  and 
Manchester3, have been highly publicised lone-actor terrorist attacks. This adds 
increasing pressure to policy makers and intelligence services from the public. 
Although there has been a noticeable increase in interest in the study of lone 
actors, in the field of terrorism research there has previously been a 
preoccupation with terrorist organisations as a whole. This approach has limited 
utility for the study of decision making regarding target selection at the individual 
level. Target selection research tends to focus on distal factors (i.e. the steps 
leading to an organisation to consider civilians as legitimate targets), rather than 
proximal causes. What has been done is largely anecdotal and yet to be 
empirically tested. 
It can be argued that terrorists, be it group or lone actors, have an unlimited 
number of targets they could target. However, they do not all offer the same 
opportunity for attack. If terrorists are selecting targets in a rational manner, then 
the spatial patterns of attacks should be non-random. When examining group 
terrorist acts it is evident that, just like urban crimes, attacks do not occur 
randomly across time and place: they are spatially clustered (i.e. Berrebi and 
Lakdawalla, 2007; Townsley et al., 2008; Johnson and Braithwaite, 2009; 
                                                             
1 Terrorism is defined according to Gill et al.’s 2014 study: "the use or threat of action where the use or threat 
is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and/or the use 
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Terrorism can 
involve violence against a person, damage to property, endangering a person’s life other than that of the 
person committing the action, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or facilitating any of the above actions."   
2 Westminster, 22nd March, 2017  
3 Manchester Arena, 22nd May, 2017 
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Siebeneck et al., 2009; Medina et al., 2011; Behlendorf et al., 2012; Mohler, 2013; 
Tench et al, 2016).  
Terrorist strategies are continuously changing in response to increased counter-
terrorism capability. Rather than being high-level attacks on hard targets, 
contemporary attacks demonstrate a lower level of sophistication that can go 
undetected. Attacks tend to be of lower risk and on softer targets. From a rational 
perspective, soft targets may be value maximising due to the ease of operation 
and decreased risk of detection. Al-Qaeda used their publication ‘Inspire’ to 
promote simple attacks using common items for weapons (i.e. ‘How to make a 
bomb in the kitchen of your mom’) as opposed to traditional tactics. One issue in 
2010 specifically encouraged the use of cars to run over individuals in public 
places. The use of easily obtainable weapons such as knives and vehicles are 
now common in attacks committed or inspired by ISIS.  
Environmental criminology focuses on the proximal determinants of crime, i.e. 
the situational aspects of the crime event, as opposed to the distal causes that 
shape the offender’s disposition towards crime (Wortley and Townsley, 2016). 
Proximal causes are easier to alter, for example through the use of situational 
crime prevention (SCP) techniques, and have the most direct influence on 
behaviour (Wortley and Mazzerole, 2016). This means crime reduction effects 
can be produced relatively quickly. There is a growing literature that suggests 
environmental criminology is applicable to terrorism (Cothren et al., 2008; 
Townsley et al., 2008; Legault & Hendrickson, 2009; Wilson et al., 2010; Rossmo 
& Harries, 2011; Gruenewald et al., 2015; Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015; Tench 
et al., 2016; Gill, Horgan and Corner, 2017). Empirical research examining the 
efficacy of this approach is a developing area. Studies cover a wide range of 
subjects, such as victimology (Wilson et al., 2010), attack characteristics such as 
target and weapon choice (Gruenewald et al., 2015; Legault & Hendrickson, 
2009), spatial and temporal characteristics such as clustering (Townsley et al., 
2008; Rossmo & Harries, 2011; Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015; Tench et al., 2016), 
journey to attack distances (Cothren et al., 2008; Gill, Horgan and Corner, 2017) 
and displacement (Hsu & Apel, 2015). Clarke and Newman’s (2006) ‘Outsmarting 
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the Terrorists’ applies methods from environmental criminology to terrorism, 
however they acknowledge that, due to a lack of empirical data, the way in which 
they do so is largely anecdotal. Successful empirical application of these 
paradigms could be extremely useful for the prevention and interdiction of 
terrorist acts. 
Characterised mostly by the identification of spatial patterns, this thesis uses 
paradigms from environmental criminology to examine the target selection for two 
of the main current national security threats to the United Kingdom (U.K.): the 
threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism and the threat from lone-actor 
terrorism. The thesis expands on the little research that exists, using detailed data 
sets where it is evident that factors of target selection were dependent on the 
decision making of the individual who implemented the attack. Micro-level 
(individual-level) analyses will be employed to examine the behaviour of 
individuals to better understand the proximal (rather than distal) decision making 
surrounding a terrorist attack.  
An exploration of the spatial decision making of terrorists provides important 
insights into terrorist attack strategies, thus providing knowledge to guide and 
improve the efficacy of methods to counter violent acts of terrorism. This empirical 
knowledge will enable intelligence services to make better informed decisions 
regarding preventive and disruptive measures.  
Three datasets are used in this thesis. The first contains all lone-actor terrorists 
attacks that fit the specified inclusion criteria4 spanning the period January 1990 
to July 2016. The second contains violent dissident Republican (hereafter, VDR) 
incidents committed in Northern Ireland between January 2007 and December 
2016. The third consists of attacks committed by core active members of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (hereafter, PIRA) in Belfast, from 1969-89, 
where both the attack location and an accurate home location of the offender 
could be identified. 
                                                             
4 This will be fully discussed in the methods section of the associated chapter. 
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1.2   Chapter outline 
This thesis contains seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents the thesis’ theoretical 
basis and provides guidance for the subsequent chapters. Spatial research from 
environmental criminology and their relevant application to terrorist events, as 
well as the existing literature regarding terrorist threats, are discussed. This 
section exposes the gaps in literature surrounding this topic, highlights limitations 
of existing studies, and provides a suitable knowledge base for the subsequent 
analyses.  
Chapter 3 analyses the residence-to-attack distances of lone-actor terrorists in 
Western Europe and the United States (U.S), under the assumption that the 
decision-making processes of these actors are like those of urban criminals when 
selecting suitable targets. Distance decay patterns that have been found for 
urban crimes and group terrorism are reflected in the results. The findings 
demonstrate that the application of environmental criminology is appropriate and 
beneficial in the study of lone actors, providing a starting point for further 
environmental criminological analyses of lone-actor attacks beyond this thesis. 
Chapter 4 builds upon this line of argument by analysing the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of a campaign of violence (as opposed to the sporadic individual 
attacks characterised by lone-actor terrorists). In particular, it focuses on 
contemporary VDR activity from 2007 to 2016. The results demonstrate that, like 
urban crimes, VDR incidents were spatially and temporally clustered during the 
period studied.  
Chapter 5 extends on chapter 4 by applying risk terrain modelling to VDR 
bombings and bomb hoaxes in the city of Belfast to identify physical and social 
features of the environment that are correlated with hotspots of activity. The 
models identify specific areas that may be more vulnerable to VDR incidents than 
elsewhere in the city and should therefore be prioritised in security measures. 
The results suggest that terrorist offenders assess risk and select targets 
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rationally. They may seek less ideological but more realistic targets for bombings 
relative to bomb hoaxes.  
To overcome limitations of target based or offender based studies in previous 
research, as well as the preceding chapters of the thesis, chapter 6 applies 
discrete choice modelling to PIRA attacks in Belfast. This method allows distance 
to be treated as an explanatory variable and for several other choice criteria to 
be examined. As well as considering areas of a city that were chosen for an 
attack, it simultaneously examines those that were not. The results suggest that 
areas that are closer to the offender’s home, more accessible, and contain 
entities that can be considered symbols of ideology are more likely to be targeted.  
The final chapter, 7, summarises the findings of these analyses and discusses 
the practical implications. A new framework for target selection is presented and 
assessed using illustrative examples of recent attacks in the U.K. Guidance for 
policy makers and potential future avenues for research are considered.   
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Chapter 2     Literature Review  
 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the general themes of research in the 
field of terrorism studies, with a specific focus on studies relevant to terrorist 
target selection. Environmental criminological paradigms and quantitative 
analyses will be applied throughout this thesis and will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections. The three overarching theories which provide the 
theoretical foundations for this work are a) the rational choice perspective 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986), b) routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) 
and c) crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). These 
paradigms have been widely researched when considering urban crimes such as 
burglary, but their usefulness for explaining patterns in terrorism remains 
understudied. Then I provide an overview of the two threats to U.K. national 
security that are primarily analysed in this thesis: lone actor terrorism and Irish 
Republican-related terrorism.  
 
2.2   Background  
The overwhelming focus of most studies within the field of terrorism studies has 
been to identify distal rather than proximal causes, with the aim of explaining the 
‘terrorist’, rather than the ‘terrorist act’. Terrorism studies emerged in the early 
1970s within the fields of history, political science and sociology, with the aim of 
explaining the emergence of politically violent campaigns within their socio-
political context. Many of the first analyses of terrorism aimed to identify 
dispositional traits of terrorist group members. These approaches emphasised 
psychopathy and other personality traits, claiming terrorists to be ‘irrational’ 
actors (Morf, 1970; Hassell, 1977; Pearce, 1977; Cooper, 1978).  
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Scholars then attempted to determine the aetiology of terrorism, with the aim of 
identifying ‘root causes’ of terrorist grievances (Jenkins, 1974; Hyams 1975; 
Wilkinson, 1977; Cooper, 1978). Individual and group agency in decision-making 
was emphasised in these approaches. These studies sought to identify the 
conditions of a social environment, such as poverty and social inequality, that 
could result in the emergence of terrorist groups. This kind of approach is 
problematic, as these ‘causes’ can produce many different kinds of social 
outcomes and have both positive and negative effects (Bjorgo, 2005), and the 
majority of individuals in the same settings will not turn to terrorism. Further, this 
approach ignores any immediate circumstances of events that amplify support 
for the cause or provoke the terrorist act.  
After the September 11th 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon (hereafter, 9/11) there was a dramatic increase in terrorism research. 
Analyses tended to focus on understanding the ideology of terrorists and 
processes of radicalisation, counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
(Wiktorowicz, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Moskalenko and McCauley, 2011; 
Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2011; Richards, 2011; Jones, 2014). Desmarais et al’s 
(2017) systematic review of the scientific knowledge regarding risk factors for 
terrorist involvement found that terrorism was treated largely as a homogenous 
construct, and that the existing literature has mainly focused on distal 
explanations, such as factors associated with socio-demographic characteristics, 
criminal history, religiosity and mental health. Studies examining the association 
between proximal factors, such as personal experiences, and terrorist 
engagement were depicted as ‘rare’ and ‘infrequently examined’ (Desmarais et 
al. 2017: p. 190).  
No consistent ‘terrorist profile’ has been found (Horgan and Taylor, 1997) and 
descriptive indicators are unstable over time and geography (Horgan et al., 
2016). Even if one could be found, the utility a profile could offer is limited. 
Certainly, there are several process variables which need to be considered and 
should not be overlooked. However, risk factors for involvement in terrorism 
cannot explain differences between two individuals with the same ‘risk factors’, 
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where only one of them will be recruited into a terrorist organisation, or commit 
an attack.  
To date, most approaches have focused on the radicalisation and recruitment 
process as opposed to the attack commission process. Little has been done to 
explore the reasons why a terrorist act was committed at a specific place and 
time. Why are some targets more vulnerable than others and how are they 
chosen? There have been very few attempts to develop specific models that give 
a better understanding of why targets are selected by terrorists. Most notable is 
Clarke and Newman’s ‘EVIL DONE’. This model is based on situational crime 
prevention (SCP), examining the situational characteristics that allow the 
perpetrator to successfully complete an attack. Clarke and Newman propose that 
targets that are exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near and 
easy are considered to be more at risk.5 The application of SCP measures to 
terrorism was introduced in Clarke and Newman’s 2006 book entitled 
‘Outsmarting the Terrorists’. A limitation of this work is that much of it is anecdotal 
and not guided by empirical evidence. In a recent review of published works 
pertaining to situational crime prevention and terrorism, Frielich et al. (2018) also 
found that less than half of the sample were based on empirical observation, and 
only 28% used a quantitative approach.  
It can be argued that one of the most effective ways of preventing terrorism is to 
disrupt the opportunity structure. All types of terrorist attack depend on a 
combination of multiple opportunities. In turn, each specific attack type offers its 
own set of environmental opportunities that can be manipulated with the intention 
of impacting the offender’s cost–benefit calculus and disrupting the terrorist act. 
For events such as criminal damage acts committed by domestic extremists, the 
effects of situational crime prevention measures may be less of a deterrent. This 
may be because this is a low risk event, and the individuals involved believe that 
the rewards outweigh the risk. A recent analysis demonstrated that the presence 
                                                             
5 EVIL DONE is an adaptation of the acronym CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) - concealable, removable, 
available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable - that is used to assess the attractiveness and 
suitability of targets of urban crime.  
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of lighting and CCTV did not deter domestic extremists from committing criminal 
damage (Robinson, Marchment and Gill, 2018). It is also possible that the target 
selected was one of many targets, and that the one selected was the one 
perceived as the least risky (or most convenient). How offenders perceive the 
effectiveness of proximal security measures is important. Criminological studies 
generally highlight that offenders’ perceptions of how security is deployed as 
opposed to solely their presence is what matters in their risk calculus (i.e. Taylor 
and Nee, 1988; Butler, 2005; Nee and Meenagham, 2006; Bernasco and 
Jacques, 2015).  
The focus on terrorism as a political, rather than criminal, problem has led to a 
tendency of explaining the terrorist attack in terms of a group’s ideological 
position (Drake, 1998) or strategic orientation (Abrahms, 2008). Whilst the 
rationality of the adoption of terrorism as a strategy or tactic has been considered, 
the rationality underpinning actual attack commission is yet to be studied 
extensively. The lack of empirical research into proximal factors of target 
selection is a critical oversight in this field. Studies on the subject have been 
largely anecdotal or descriptive in nature (see Clarke and Newman, 2006). 
However, these studies taken in combination with the paucity of empirical 
research has led to the consensus that terrorist target selection is not 
indiscriminate and follows contextual logic (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 
2006; Asal et al., 2009; Røislien and Røislien, 2010). This contextual logic can 
be defined by factors such as ideology, proximity, capability, accessibility, and 
feasibility. 
Ideology, defined by Drake (1998: 2-3) as “beliefs, values, principles, and 
objectives – however ill-defined or tenuous - by which a group defines its 
distinctive political identity and aims… and provides a motive and framework for 
action”,  has been a prevalent focus in target selection studies. A group’s ideology 
is important when considering target selection as it provides a framework by 
identifying the ‘enemies’ and legitimate targets of the group. For example, 
Gruenewald et al. (2015) found that eco-terrorists in the U.S. most commonly 
selected targets that could be considered as legitimate, i.e. commercial 
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businesses or individuals they considered to be responsible for causing harm to 
the environment. However, as Drake (1998) highlights, ideology is not the sole 
determinant of whether a potential target is attacked. While ideological beliefs 
play a fundamental role in targeting behaviour, they are difficult to test empirically 
and research should not be restricted by solely considering these factors 
(Crenshaw, 1981; 1988). 
Proximity to the target has been considered a key feature of terrorist target 
selection (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Terrorists are limited by the same 
geographical constraints as urban criminals and tend to keep the distance 
travelled from their home to the target minimal to increase the utility of their attack. 
LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw (2009) found that most domestic anti-U.S. attacks 
between 1970-2004 involved local targets which were close to the terrorist’s 
home. Cothren et al. (2008) found around half of group attacks in the US took 
place within 30 miles of the home location. Gill et al. (2017) found that nearly two 
thirds of PIRA members travelled less than 4 miles to commit their attacks. 40% 
of all attacks occurred within 1 mile of the offender’s home location. Eby (2012) 
found that many of the 53 lone actors in his analysis stayed within their home 
towns to commit their attacks.  
Target selection can also be affected by capability. Damphousse et al. (2002) 
examined actual and intended targets of terrorist attacks in the United States 
(U.S.) between 1980 and 1998. They found that although 57% intended to target 
government or military buildings or personnel, only under 20% of the attacks 
actually hit these types of targets. Transnational terrorists have changed their 
target choices in response to target hardening (Brandt and Sandler, 2010). 
Success in preventing attacks against officials and military has motivated 
terrorists to change their tactics, with an increasing preference towards softer 
targets. Brandt and Sandler (2010) found an increasing tendency to target people 
over property since the 1990s. Asal et al. (2009) looked at the factors leading to 
terrorist group’s decision to turn to softer targets such as civilians, tourists or the 
media. They found that groups with a religious ideology were more likely to attack 
soft targets than other types of groups. Røislien and Røislien (2010) found that 
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attacks carried out by Palestinians within Israel tended to occur in significant but 
poorly guarded public places, such as shopping malls.  
Target accessibility and feasibility may be other crucial components of target 
selection. Berman and Laitin (2008, p. 144) highlight the importance of 
accessibility in the target selection process: “Settlers and soldiers use roads that 
pass through heavily populated areas or through terrain that is easily attacked. . 
. . The result is that an attacker can fire a weapon or detonate a bomb remotely 
in such a way that makes escape relatively easy afterwards. . . . In contrast, 
targets on the Israeli side of the ‘green’ line are much ‘harder’, posing much 
greater risks for the attacker.” Ozer and Akbas (2011) suggest the reason one of 
the major police stations in Istanbul is targeted by terrorists is because this station 
is connected by major streets. Using Clarke and Neman’s EVIL DONE 
framework, they found that all of the buildings targeted by the Partiya Karekeren 
Kurdistan (PKK) during the period studied were easily accessible. Using the 
same framework, Gruenewald et al. (2015) found a preference for ‘accessible’ 
and ‘easy’ targets for eco-terrorists in the U.S.  
Research activity surrounding terrorism in the field of criminology has increased 
in recent years. There have been major advances in a variety of areas, although 
there are still notable gaps in the literature. Although the field of terrorism is 
becoming increasingly more empirically oriented, a major problem that remains 
is a distinct lack of reliable and detailed data due to the clandestine nature of the 
subject. In his review of data and methods utilised in terrorism research 
Schuurman (2018) found that the use of primary data has increased considerably 
since the early 2000s and continues to do so. However, over 78% of the articles 
studied did not use any kind of statistical analyses. Another main limitation of 
previous studies is the tendency to treat different types of terrorist incident as 
homogeneous in nature. Differences in attack types are also rarely considered. 
Likewise, terrorist actors are treated as monolithic, and studies consistently fail 
to effectively distinguish between different member types, both across groups 
and within them. 
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Terrorism research increasingly covers issues such as target choice, weapon 
choice, the spatio-temporal clustering of terrorist attacks, the distances travelled 
to commit a terrorist attack, victimology, and the displacement of incidents 
(Cothren et al., 2008; Townsley et al., 2008; Legault & Hendrickson, 2009; Wilson 
et al., 2010; Rossmo & Harries, 2011; Gruenewald et al., 2015; Braithwaite & 
Johnson, 2015; Tench et al., 2016; Gill, Horgan and Corner, 2017). These 
findings show great promise and reinforce the argument that when we focus on 
terrorism from a preventative angle, we should focus on terrorist behaviours – 
what they do – rather than remain preoccupied with concerns about who they are 
or why they have become terrorists. Distal approaches have limited utility in the 
prevention of terrorist acts, however proximal factors of the immediate 
environment shaping decision making regarding target selection are yet to be 
examined fully.  
 
2.3   Theory  
Traditional criminology seeks to identify and explain why individuals engage in 
criminal activity, with a focus on sociological, psychological and developmental 
perspectives. There is a focus on criminality and the criminal disposition, and the 
factors underlying why an individual would engage in crime. However, this 
emphasis on the distal causes of crime offers little insight to the proximal 
determinants of criminal activity, such as why a particular target is chosen 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Clarke, 2004). To address these 
limitations an alternative framework, environmental criminology, was introduced 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). Environmental criminology emphasises 
the importance of the crime setting and the role of person-situation interactions. 
It posits situational factors and the environment as key in determining spatial and 
temporal distributions of crime. Environmental criminology is focused on where, 
when and how crime events occur, as opposed to why they occur.  
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The following section discusses the three main perspectives within environmental 
criminology: the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986); routine 
activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and crime pattern theory 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). These theories influence the 
understanding of ‘crime and place’, are mutually compatible, and provide the 
theoretical foundations for this thesis. 
 
2.3.1   Rational choice perspective  
The modern rational choice perspective of crime, as proposed by Cornish and 
Clarke in 19866, assumes that offenders are rational and purposeful in their 
decision making. The perspective denotes that an offender acts in their own self-
interest while calculating the costs and benefits of each possible alternative, 
before making a choice that offers the greatest benefit and lowest cost (Cornish 
and Clarke, 1986). This decision-making process can then be subdivided into: a) 
decisions regarding criminal involvement, and b) decisions regarding criminal 
events. As mentioned previously, most terrorism research focuses on 
involvement. This thesis focuses on the latter process: the proximal decision 
making that defines the criminal event, in this case a terrorist attack.  
When a rational actor makes a choice, there is the assumption that they will be 
utility maximising (making a decision that offers the best perceived utility) based 
on expected rewards, effort and risk (Phillips, 2011; Phillips and Pohl, 2012). 
Rationality is subject to limits and is guided by time, effort, experience and 
knowledge (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Beauregard et al., 2005). This led Cornish 
and Clarke7 to posit that offenders act with bounded rationality. This concept, 
relating to the criminal event, posits that crime is influenced by opportunities, and 
                                                             
6 This work stemmed from economist Gary Becker’s 1968 paper, in which he argued that choices 
regarding crime are not dissimilar to other non-crime related decisions. Cornish and Clarke’s 
model differs from Becker’s economic model as it emphasises that utility is not always dictated 
by monetary gain. 
7 As well as Simon, 1957;1986. 
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that the opportunities are dependent on the individual’s environment. Although 
their knowledge of the associated effort, rewards and risks is imperfect, an 
offender will still maximise utility based on what they do know.  
2.3.2   Routine activities theory 
Cohen and Felson (1979) introduced routine activities theory to describe the 
circumstances in which crimes occur. The perspective extends the concept of 
bounded rationality into the physical world and expresses that crime occurs when 
a motivated offender, a suitable target and a lack of a capable guardian, come 
together in time and space. Capable guardians include the police and other 
security professionals (formal guardians), but also extend to ordinary citizens 
(informal guardians) and implied guardianship e.g. systems such as closed circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras and burglar alarms. Cohen and Felson propose that 
these three factors come together naturally, as individuals go about their daily 
routines.  
Since its introduction, there have been many extensions upon routine activities 
theory (including but not limited to: Felson, 1986; Eck, 1994; Felson and Clarke, 
1998; Sutton, 1998; Sampson et al., 2010), and it has been applied extensively 
alongside the rational choice perspective in the study of urban crimes including 
burglary (e.g. Wright and Decker, 1994), and shoplifting (e.g. Schlueter et al., 
1989). From the early 1990s the perspectives began to be successfully applied 
to other volume crimes such as drug dealing (e.g. Jacobs, 1996), white-collar 
crime (e.g. Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Simpson et al., 1998), gang 
membership and violence (e.g. Spano et al., 2008), organised crime (e.g. 
Kleemans, 2012), and carjacking (Jacobs et al., 2003). Further, it has been 
applied to non-acquisitive offences such as sex offending (e.g. Beauregard & 
Leclerc, 2007; Deslauriers-Varin and Beauregard, 2010) and violent offences 
(Topalli, 2005), with the consensus that offenders ‘read’ their immediate 
environment to guide their decisions in the commission of their offence. 
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2.3.3   Crime pattern theory  
Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) extended upon rational choice and routine 
activities theories to understand crime events with a spatio-temporal approach. 
As an individual navigates their city or town on their journeys to and from their 
daily activity nodes (including places such as their home, places of work and/or 
education, and leisure and recreation venues) they will become more familiar with 
certain areas than others. Over time, their increased knowledge and familiarity 
with these areas means they become part of an individual’s awareness space. 
Offences will occur when this awareness space overlaps with an opportunity for 
criminal activity. This leads to clear and consistent patterns in which individuals 
commit crime in areas that are known to them (such as White and Clyde, 1932; 
Harling 1972; Georges-Abeyie & Harries, 1980; Rhodes and Conley, 1991; 
Warren et al., 1998; Barker, 2000; Rossmo, 2000; Costello and Wiles, 2001; 
Lundrigan and Canter, 2001; Laukkanen and Santtila, 2006; Santtila, Laukkanen 
and Zappalà, 2007; Bernasco and Block, 2009). To travel further beyond their 
awareness space to commit an offence would mean increased time and effort for 
the offender, as well as an increased level of perceived risk due to their 
unfamiliarity with the area. Offending in areas they are familiar with reduces the 
individual’s risk of detection and interception.  
Crime pattern theory also highlights the environmental backcloth, i.e. elements of 
the physical environment which guide an offender’s spatial decision making and 
facilitate crime distribution. The physical infrastructure of the environmental 
backcloth, and the influence this may have on an individual’s awareness space, 
needs to be considered when examining terrorist target selection. Crimes within 
an offender’s awareness space are not equally distributed. This is due to 
variances in the presence and concentration of suitable targets, which add bias 
to an individual’s awareness space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995). 
These may include places known as crime generators, which attract large 
numbers of individuals for reasons that aren’t related to crime (i.e. shopping 
centres), and crime attractors, which specifically attract criminals (i.e. drug 
markets) (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995). Areas that do not attract large 
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numbers of individuals, in any respect, are known as crime neutral areas. The 
environmental backcloth also varies across time, and some locations may only 
be suitable targets at certain times of day, or certain days of the week. For 
example, shopping centres attract large crowds, but tend to only do so during the 
day, whereas the converse is true for bars and nightclubs (Eck and Weisburd, 
2015). 
There is widespread research based on these theories regarding spatial, 
temporal, and spatio-temporal patterns for traditional urban crimes, which has 
had important implications for policing and crime prevention (Johnson et al., 
1997; Bowers et al., 1998; Ratcliffe and McCullagh, 1998a, 1998b; Ratcliffe, 
2000, 2002, 2004; Townsley et al., 2000; Townsley and Pease, 2002; Townsley 
et al., 2003; Bowers et al., 2004; Johnson and Bowers, 2004a, 2004b; Bowers 
and Johnson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Johnson, 2008; 
Ratcliffe and Rengert, 2008). The literature consistently demonstrates that crime 
is spatially concentrated. Urban crimes, such as burglary and robbery, occur most 
often near common routine activity nodes (Bowers, 2014) and in places that 
would be known to a large number of people (Johnson and Bowers, 2010; Davies 
and Johnson, 2015), for example the roads most travelled on in a city. There is 
also a substantial literature regarding spatial patterns for violent crimes. For 
example, the spatial behaviour of serial killers shows logic in spite of the motives 
being guided by emotion (Lundringan and Canter, 2011) and similar spatio-
temporal patterns have been found for shootings (Ratcliffe and Rengert, 2008). 
Much of the contemporary criminological research focuses on identifying patterns 
at the local level, with micro-level (individual-level) analyses being at the forefront 
of emerging research (Weisburd, 2015).  
2.3.4   Applications to terrorism  
Treating the terrorist as a rational actor is not a new approach. Although the goals 
of a terrorist may be irrational, their actions will be guided by rationality. The 
rational choice perspective has been useful in understanding political violence 
including terrorism (Pape, 2005; Clarke and Newman 2006) and literature 
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consistently supports the presumption that terrorists are rational actors (Sandler 
et al, 1983; Enders et al., 1990; Enders and Sandler, 1999; Crenshaw, 2000; 
Silke, 2001; Pape, 2005; Taylor and Horgan, 2006; Caplan, 2006). Committing 
an act of terrorism, whether under the guidance of a wider network or as a lone 
attacker, is a purposeful behaviour that is guided by rationality. Although the ‘best’ 
choice may not be taken, a deliberative process of thinking will have been 
engaged with.  
Terrorists make carefully calculated choices that are value-maximising (Asal et 
al., 2009) with the intention of increasing their probability of success (Hoffman, 
2006). There is evidence to suggest that there is a calculation of perceived risks 
in the selection of targets at the group and individual level (Mickolus, 1980; 
Sandler et al., 1983; Sandler and Lapan, 1988). Airline hijackings and chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, which are associated with 
high risk, are among the lowest level occurrences amongst terrorist activities, 
whilst low risk incidents such as bombings and shootings are amongst the highest 
(Sandler et al., 1983; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2016). This implies that there is some consideration of 
risk by the offenders. Dugan et al. (2005) used a rational choice model to analyse 
the rewards, risks and costs associated with airline hijackings. They found that 
hijacking frequencies decreased after the installation of metal detectors and an 
increased presence of law enforcement in airport checkpoints, due to the 
increased risk of detection. When applying the rational choice perspective to 
terrorist incidents in Israel, Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) found that 
initial Israeli retaliations against terrorism led the terrorists to change their 
strategies as they expected further retaliations.  
Considerations of issues like security, avoiding detection, and ease of access 
and escape are regularly engaged upon. Jenkins (1985) observed that terrorists 
spent a lot of time deliberating over targets and deciding which were the most 
vulnerable. This cost-benefit consideration was demonstrated in a recent analysis 
of terrorist autobiographies providing further support for the rationality of terrorists 
(Gill et al., 2018). One finding particularly relevant to this thesis was that “terrorists 
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often keep several potential targets in mind and choose the one with relatively 
fewest risks” (p. 5). The factors considered encompassed both subjective and 
objective factors and, in many ways, mirrored criminological findings related to 
criminal cost–benefit decision making. There were many depictions of how fear 
and nerves negatively impacted the decision-making processes in planning and 
carrying out an attack, which were reflective of findings from studies of urban 
criminals including street robbers, shoplifters, and burglars. These appeared to 
be most intense during the commission of an attack. Another prominent finding 
was the consideration of situational security features. They found the offender’s 
evaluation of security features at the target necessitates hostile reconnaissance. 
This awareness of security factors often led to doubts and irregular behaviour at 
the target, increasing the risk of the terrorist being detected. Consistent with 
findings from studies of urban crime (Taylor and Nee, 1988; Butler, 2005; Nee 
and Meenagham, 2006; Bernasco and Jacques, 2015), perceptions of how 
effectively deployed security was important in this process. 
Spatial analyses in the field of terrorism research do not fully reflect the advances 
made in the study of general crime. This thesis attempts to bridge that gap. Like 
urban crimes, terrorist attacks do not occur randomly in time and space. Both 
criminals and terrorists are subject to geographical constraints and other 
limitations associated with access to resources. Although the ideological 
underpinnings of their actions may be irrational, a terrorist’s decision-making 
process will follow some form of logic, and the locations they choose to attack will 
not be arbitrary. Therefore, analyses of this kind can inform strategies by 
identifying areas that may benefit from disruptive and preventive measures, such 
as SCP. 
The first applications of spatial analyses to examine the distribution of urban 
crimes were mostly concerned with identifying patterns at the macro level, e.g. at 
state or nation level. This has been true too for the study of terrorism. For 
example, studies have analysed whether there is a contagious diffusion like 
element of terrorism (Midlarsky et al., 1980; LaFree, 2018), the transnational 
displacement of terrorism following 9/11 (Enders and Sandler, 2006),  and the 
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clustering of attacks cross-nationally (Midlarsky et al., 1980; Braithwaite & Li, 
2007; LaFree et al., 2012). The main limitation of studies at the macro level is 
that they assume that all space within each delimited geographic area is equally 
likely to experience the same amount of terrorism risk. This means the impacts 
of these attacks at a finer aggregation cannot be estimated. Whilst the results of 
macro-level studies have limited practical use, their findings of spatial clustering 
at the country level provide a great starting point for further spatial analyses at 
finer spatial resolutions within these countries (Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008).  
Most research on the spatial patterns of terrorism has focused on meso-level 
analyses. Meso-level analyses are concerned with examining the space in 
between macro-level (national or international) and micro-level (individual) 
factors, and typically focus on sub-national regions and communities. In an 
analysis of group attacks in Israel, Berrebi & Lakdawalla (2007) found four key 
determinants of risk variation according to space, the most useful being that of 
proximity of terrorist operational bases. Similarly, Rossmo and Harries (2011) 
found that terrorist cell sites were clustered and found evidence for distance 
decay in a study of organisations in Turkey.  
Most geospatial research is guided by the least effort principle (Zipf, 1965) which 
expresses that when considering a “number of identical alternatives for action, 
an offender selects the one closest to him in order to minimize the effort involved” 
(Lundrigan and Czarnomski, 2006, p.220). When considering urban crimes an 
offender’s journey to their crime location typically demonstrates a distance decay 
function, where the frequency of offences decreases as the distance from the 
home increases. Proximity to a terrorist’s home location has shown potential to 
be a useful predictor of where an attack may take place for group-based 
terrorism. Cothren et al., (2008) found that just under half of group-based attacks 
occurred within 30 miles of the offender’s home location, while Clarke and 
Newman (2006) argue that “proximity to the target is the most important target 
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characteristic to terrorists” (p.154).8  However, within these studies, there have 
been very few attempts to disaggregate the data, meaning that all types of attacks 
are treated as a homogenous construct.  
There is also a crucial temporal element to criminal activity. Whilst it has been 
long noted that victimisation increases the probability of future victimisation 
(Farrell, 1995; Pease, 1998), spatial and temporal analysis has provided the 
means to model the subsequent variations in risk. With regard to residential 
burglary, research shows that following one offense there is a temporary 
elevation in risk of further offenses at the same home and those nearby 
(Townsley et al. 2003; Johnson and Bowers, 2004a). In other words, the risk of 
burglary displays a contagious quality in terms of its space-time distribution. 
Further research shows such variations in risk are largely ubiquitous, with similar 
patterns observed across different areas and within different countries (Johnson 
et al., 2007). For example, the risk of victimisation is similarly contagious in 
relation to motor vehicle theft (Lockwood, 2012), shootings (Ratcliffe and 
Rengert, 2008), assaults and robberies (Grubesic and Mack, 2008), and maritime 
piracy (Marchione & Johnson, 2013). In each case, an elevation in risk extends 
beyond the location of the original incident and then decays over time. 
Like urban crime, these temporal variations are also evident in attack patterns in 
sustained conflicts. Hotspots of violence during violent campaigns have been 
identified and spatio-temporal trends of terrorism decay in similar manner to 
traditional crimes. Townsley et al. (2008) used the Knox (1964) test to analyse 
IED attacks by insurgents in Iraq. Attacks were non-random and were clustered 
in space and time. After an initial attack, a further attack was likely within 1km 
and within two days. Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) found similar results in their 
analysis of insurgent attacks alongside counter-insurgency operations. Insurgent 
attacks clustered, and there was an immediate increase in risk in the immediate 
vicinity of the attack, which sharply decreased after. Berrebi and Lakdawalla 
                                                             
8 A more detailed discussion of the distance decay function and analyses will be presented in 
chapter 3. 
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(2007) found that the risk of subsequent related incidents rose after an initial 
attack in Israel before returning to the baseline after approximately eight weeks. 
Similarly, Marchione and Johnson (2013) found that following an initial incident 
of maritime piracy, the risk of a subsequent incident increased temporarily. 
Behlendorf et al. (2012) found spatio-temporal clustering in attacks by Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) in El Salvador. Terrorist attacks are not randomly distributed and factors 
such as the location of the attack and the time passed since the previous incident 
have been shown to help determine the location of future attacks (LaFree et al., 
2012). Braithwaite and Johnson (2015) conclude that risk heterogeneity is an 
especially important factor when understanding spatial-temporal patterns of IED 
attacks.  
Local infrastructure is another important element to consider as variations offer 
different opportunities, risks and rewards. However, a consideration of how the 
environmental backcloth of a city shapes the behaviour of terrorists has largely 
been neglected. Zhukov (2012) demonstrated the importance of road networks 
in a study of insurgent activity in North Caucasus and concluded that they were 
the most important determining factor for the location of attacks. Johnson and 
Braithwaite (2009) postulate that attacks by violent actors such as insurgents are 
concentrated in certain areas for tactical reasons, in an attempt to exhaust the 
resources of the opposition. The identifications of patterns such as these have 
implications for predicting where group attacks are likely to occur in future. 
However, these studies neglect to explore how targeted locations differ from one 
another, i.e. why one location is chosen from a number of very similar discrete 
alternatives. Another weakness of these studies is that they assume underlying 
processes that determine the locations of the attacks are homogenous and there 
is no consideration of ideological factors that may shape targeting behaviours.  
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2.4   Lone-actor terrorism  
The first analysis of this thesis focuses on lone-actor terrorism. Whilst the 
promotion of lone attacks by larger organisations is not a new threat – the use of 
lone attacks was encouraged by both right-wing extremists in the early 1990s and 
al-Qaeda in their publication ‘Inspire’ during the 2000s - recent high profile 
incidences of lone actor terrorism have attracted interest from policy makers and 
heightened national security concerns. Studies suggest that lone attacks have 
increased in frequency (Coffey, 2011; Eby, 2012; Nesser, 2012; Feldman, 2013; 
Appleton, 2014) and lethality, with the number of injuries and fatalities per attack 
rising considerably post 9/11 (Teich, 2013). The following quotation, from ISIS’ 
publication ‘Dabiq’ is an example of how terrorist organisations have continued 
to promote the use of lone actor attacks as part of their strategies (Ellis et al., 
2016). ‘The smaller the numbers of those involved and the less the discussion 
beforehand, the more likely it will be carried out without problems... One should 
not complicate the attacks by involving other parties, purchasing complex 
materials, or communicating with weak-hearted individuals” (Dabiq, The Failed 
Crusade, p. 44). 
Lone actors pose several challenges for law enforcement, and given the recent 
substantial increase in the number and diversity of lone actor attacks it is 
important to establish patterns related to target selection to aid prevention and 
investigation efforts. Previously, this sub-field has been dominated by descriptive 
studies which have limited external validity, and there is a clear need for 
exploratory analyses. There has been little empirical research guided by the 
application of environmental criminological paradigms specifically for lone actor 
terrorism.  Spatial patterns that we see for group terrorism and insurgency such 
as clustering and hotspots are unlikely to be replicated for lone attacks. This lack 
of a pattern means they are harder to predict or prevent. Risk forecasting used 
for group terrorism may not be appropriate.  
Although it is not a new phenomenon, at present there is no commonly accepted 
definition of lone-actor terrorism, and there is a lack of consensus regarding 
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terminology (Spaaij, 2010; Borum et al., 2012; Borum, 2013; Appleton, 2014; 
Spaaij and Hamm, 2015). Debates usually centre on whether the actor operates 
with or without the assistance of others. Lone actors may not be part of, or actively 
supported by, extremist movements (Pantucci, 2011; Nesser, 2012). However, 
there is a consensus that these individuals are not all that ‘alone’. Most are not 
completely socially isolated, with many cases interacting with other extremists 
and wider networks either face to face or online (Gill, 2015). Generally, a lone-
actor attack is considered by most scholars to be an attack by an individual who 
is not directly instructed to commit the attack by a group (but may have minor 
connections to, or be inspired by, a wider network) (Phillips, 2015)9.  
Traditionally, research on lone actors has focused on behavioural indicators. It is 
accepted that there is no utility to a lone actor ‘profile’, however there are a few 
characteristics that distinguish them from group terrorists (Gruenewald et al. 
2013; Gill et al., 2014). Lone actors tend to be older than group actors, which is 
also typical of urban criminals, and tend to follow a different temporal trajectory 
(Gill et al., 2014).  
The solitary nature of some individuals does increase the difficulty of surveillance 
and reduces the efficacy of most traditional intelligence techniques (Brynielsson, 
2013). However, lone actors are not completely undetectable. A notable 
characteristic of lone actors is leakage behaviour. It was originally assumed that 
one prominent factor making interception so difficult was that lone actors tended 
not to communicate with others. However, they often reach out to others for 
guidance and support and disclose details of their violent intents in advance to a 
third party via social media or in person (Meloy et al., 2012; Gill, 2015). This 
communication may, in their perception, increase their potential to be more 
successful. However, this leakage behaviour also increases the lone actor’s 
vulnerability by leaving them susceptible to detection, and can therefore aid 
disruption efforts. Gill (2015) found that in 79% of the cases in the sample used, 
                                                             
9 For clarity, the specific inclusion criteria for the lone actor analyses of this thesis is outlined in 
chapter 3. 
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other people were aware of the extremist’s ideology. In 64% of cases the 
individual had verbally told a family member or friend of their intent to engage in 
terrorism related activities. Almost half of the individuals had interacted with other 
extremists face to face. Gill (2015) found that there is often a meaningful and 
personal connection to the attack context. For example, when selecting a church 
to target, right wing extremist Jim Adkisson chose the one attended by one of his 
ex-wives. This information, coupled with the knowledge that lone actors often leak 
details regarding the specifics of their upcoming attacks, offers an opportunity for 
disruption.  
Lone actor attacks are of lower lethality than group attacks, tend to be simple and 
straightforward, and typically lack the sophistication of group attacks (Bakker and 
de Graaf, 2010; Jasparro, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Ackerman and Pinson, 2014; 
Appleton, 2014). This is likely due to a lack of support from others and the 
resources of a wider organisation.  As they are less likely to have the knowledge 
and expertise to construct an explosive device (Kenney, 2010; Ackerman & 
Pinson 2014), and lack the resources that members of a wider organisation 
benefit from, the weapons and methods used are often low level. An individual 
that is often at the forefront of discussions surrounding lone actor terrorism, due 
to the high impact of his attack, is Anders Breivik. Breivik killed 77 individuals on 
22nd July 2011, in targeted attacks amid the Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo and on 
the island of Utoya. However, the high degree of sophistication evident in the 
planning, preparation and commission of his attack makes him an exceptional 
case. Firearms are commonly used, which require only a small amount of training 
and are easily accessible in some countries such as the U.S. (Jasparro, 2010; 
Spaaij, 2010; 2012; van der Heide, 2011; Gruenewald et al., 2013a; 2013b; 
Schuurman et al,, 2018). Vehicular assaults are also popular (Jasparro, 2010), 
and, along with bladed weapons, seem to be the modus operandi of choice in 
attacks inspired by ISIS over the past few years. This further demonstrates a 
preference for low-skilled and easily attainable weapons.  
Lone actors tend to conduct reconnaissance of potential targets which also offers 
potential for disruption (Gill, 2015). A substantial amount of time taken for 
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planning and preparation seems to be a general characteristic of lone actors, 
although the degree varies from case to case. Schuurman et al. (2018) found the 
planning and preparation of lone actor attacks to be a lengthy process, typically 
taking several months. Lone actors appear to be more strongly driven by personal 
grievances, which may influence their target choices (Gill, 2015). It seems that 
targets are selected at an early stage during the individual’s preparation process 
(Gill and Corner, 2016; Schuurman et al., 2018) and a better understanding of 
what happens before and during the attacks will strengthen disruptive and 
preventative efforts. In an analysis of 84 lone actor terrorists, Becker (2014) found 
that most actors were able to select targets in a logical manner, regardless of 
whether they were suffering from mental or psychological problems. 
To date, no research has analysed the spatial patterns of lone actors. This is a 
critical oversight. One study of lone actor target selection has touched upon the 
concept of awareness space, however the methods used were mostly qualitative 
(Becker, 2014). More than half of the sample studied had an identifiable 
geographical connection to the target. However, this was not quantified, area 
limits were not defined, and the author only states whether they were familiar with 
the target area. There may also be variances in target selection for individuals 
who have different ideologies. For example, lone actors with a single-issue 
ideology (e.g environmentalists, anti-abortion activists) are more likely to be 
fixated on a particular target due to the specific nature of their grievance.  
The points outlined in this section offer many opportunities for disruption, 
however they are of limited utility by themselves. An analysis of spatial patterns 
and any potential geographical constraints is needed to fully understand the 
decision-making processes regarding target selection. This may provide 
important insights into their decision making regarding target selection, thus 
providing knowledge to guide and improve the efficacy of methods to counter 
violent terrorist events. Therefore, the first analysis of this thesis aims to establish 
if the distance decay pattern consistently found for urban crime and identified in 
group terrorism is reflected for lone actor attacks.  
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2.5   Northern Ireland related terrorism  
The second set of analyses conducted in this thesis (chapters 4, 5 and 6) focus 
upon attacks in Northern Ireland carried out by contemporary violent dissident 
Republican (VDR) groups and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The 
aim is to expand on the existing knowledge regarding spatial patterns and target 
selection of group actors and explore decision making at the micro level.  
Since the Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921 Northern Ireland has been the setting for 
political violence from different Irish republican paramilitaries, with the mutual aim 
of removing British rule. The most heavily researched period of the Northern 
Ireland conflict over the past 100 years has been ‘The Troubles’. From 1970 until 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, PIRA were at the forefront of 
a violent ethno-nationalist campaign10. The main targets of their campaign were 
the police and the British Army. The threat was not contained to Northern Ireland, 
with attacks occurring in parts of the Republic of Ireland, England, and mainland 
Europe11.  
Differences in policies and targeting between the subunits of PIRA have been 
observed. Attacks with high casualty numbers and on high value targets were 
more likely to be caused by the subunits of PIRA that contained individuals with 
relevant skills such as bomb making (Asal et al., 2015). Several studies have 
produced descriptive statistics on the spatial and temporal distribution of attacks 
in Northern Ireland (including Poole, 1995; O’Duffy 1995; McKittrick et al., 2001; 
Morrissey and Smith 2002; O’Leary, 2005). However, research has neglected to 
include the alternatives that could have been chosen but were not. For example, 
when examining the distribution of attacks in Belfast it is evident that deaths were 
higher in extremely divided parts of the city, however there were many other 
                                                             
10 There were several other Republican militant groups that were active during this time, including 
the Official Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, the Continuity IRA, the Real 
IRA, and the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation, however PIRA were the most prolific during 
this time.  
11 For a detailed history of ‘The Troubles’ see English. R. (2003). Armed Struggle: The History of 
the IRA. London: Pan.  
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areas that were equally as divided that experienced very few attacks (Mesev et 
al., 2009). Attacks by PIRA in the 1970s appeared to be indiscriminate and 
resulted in a substantial amount of civilian casualties (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). 
A large proportion of PIRA’s attacks did not cause fatalities. Just 8.7 percent of 
improvised explosive devices killed at least one person, and in many cases the 
victim was the bomb planter.    
As it is evident that attacks committed by PIRA were dependent on the decision 
making of the individual (Asal et al., 2015), analyses may provide further insight 
to processes of individual target selection. The longevity of their campaign 
provides a wide scope for data. To date, most analyses concerning group 
terrorism have been analogous to traditional spatial and temporal modelling 
methods guided by crime pattern theory, with the aim of identifying spatial 
concentration and diffusion of attacks. Findings have demonstrated that group 
attacks are largely concentrated to specific areas within countries. For example, 
LaFree et al. (2012) found attacks by ETA to be heavily concentrated in Basque 
Autonomous Community. Likewise, Northern Ireland related terrorism has been 
highly concentrated in Belfast (Fay et al., 1999).  However, spatial analyses 
seldom go beyond the regional level. The study of group actors could hugely 
benefit from more detailed spatial analyses to provide more depth and add a 
practical element to guide interventions.  
PIRA’s campaign ceased in 1997, however other contemporary dissident 
republican terrorist groups who reject the political process in Northern Ireland 
continue to be a threat. The two main paramilitaries12, the Continuity IRA (CIRA) 
and the New IRA, as well as multiple smaller factions, all presently regard 
violence as a legitimate means of achieving a united Ireland (Frampton, 2011, 
2012; Bean, 2012; Evans and Tong, 2012). In January 2007, Sinn Féin (the 
political wing of PIRA) made the historic announcement of their acceptance of 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as the legitimate police force of 
                                                             
12 Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) was also a prominent VDR group until they called a ceasefire in 
early 2018. 
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Northern Ireland. Since then there has been a steady rise in paramilitary violence 
from VDR groups. These groups fundamentally oppose republican engagement 
in the wider peace process and this acceptance of the PSNI (Horgan and 
Morrison, 2011; Morrison and Horgan, 2016). VDR groups want to demonstrate 
that the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has failed.   
Targeting of the security services remains a prominent feature of dissident 
Republican violence. In March 2009, Stephen Carroll became the first police 
officer to be killed since the Good Friday agreement. The Continuity IRA stated 
the following in their claim of responsibility: “As long as there is British 
involvement in Ireland, these attacks will continue.” To discourage others from 
joining the police, VDRs have focused on the targeting of Catholic and nationalist 
officers (Morrison and Horgan, 2016). This reinforces their characterisation of an 
unrepresentative police force, demonstrating that, to them, the British police force 
is illegitimate, and is a means of setting themselves apart from Sinn Féin. 
Although their campaign has thus far has been less intensive than that of PIRA, 
they still continue to target the British Army and PSNI, the successor of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and pose a ‘severe’ threat to Northern Ireland.13 
Their activity demonstrates a rising sophistication in strategy and expertise. They 
have become increasingly competent in producing viable devices, and have 
incorporated the use of bomb hoaxes (fake devices) into their strategy, which 
cause distress to the public and occupy the resources of police services. A variety 
of attack methods have been incorporated throughout their campaign, thus 
allowing for more comparisons to be made regarding incident type.   
The current threat from VDR groups is characterised by a parallel strategy of 
nationalised terrorism alongside localised violent vigilantism (Morrison and 
Horgan, 2016). Belief of ‘responsibility’ to defend and protect their community is 
a key component of modern Republican ideology (O’Doherty, 1998). This covers 
both protection from Loyalist violence, and protection from anti-social behaviour 
                                                             
13 Current threat level at time of writing according to the UK’s security service (MI5). 
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and crime within the community (McEvoy and Mika, 2001). However, for the most 
part, modern day VDR activity has not seen any significant engagement with 
Loyalist paramilitaries. Paramilitary groups claim to better represent the local 
communities than the PSNI - who they reject as a legitimate police force - and 
have taken it upon themselves to enact forms of vigilante justice on local criminals 
such as sex offenders and drug dealers. These ‘punishment attacks’ can also act 
as a form of internal policing within the groups themselves, i.e. the punishing of 
suspected informers. These are not acts of terrorism, rather acts of violence 
committed by terrorists, to gain support and power within their community.  
To date, the literature surrounding VDR related terrorism has been largely 
descriptive. To the author’s knowledge, at present there is only one study that 
looks specifically at the targeting strategy of contemporary VDR groups. Morrison 
and Horgan (2016) conclude that it is civilians who are most at risk for violence 
(especially post 2009), and can be considered the dominant target of the VDR 
campaign. Out of 1007 violent acts examined in this study, 63.5% were attacks 
against civilians. Police and intelligence personnel and facilities were the second 
most targeted category. The decision-making of VDR groups regarding target 
selection appears to be a well thought out process, and there are distinct 
differences when comparing the methods and objects of attacks (Morrison and 
Horgan, 2016). Morrison and Horgan (2016) conclude that methods of 
environmental criminology can be useful in understanding target selection. 
However, to the author’s knowledge, analyses of spatial patterning of VDR 
activity do not exist.   
 
2.6   Conclusion 
This chapter has given an overview of the environmental criminological literature 
relating to spatial patterns, and demonstrated how these paradigms may have 
utility in the study of terrorism. It has highlighted the paucity of literature and 
analyses related to the spatial decision making of lone actors, and exposed gaps 
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in the literature concerning group actors. Over the past decade, studies which 
apply methods from environmental criminology to terrorism have increased in 
number and improved in sophistication. What has been neglected however, is 
the use of methods at the micro level, which arguably has the most utility for 
preventative techniques.  
Whilst the above studies collectively contribute to our knowledge of some of the 
main threats to the UK at present, there is little to guide practical prevention and 
intervention measures. Most spatial research has thus far been oriented towards 
group terrorism, with the aim of identifying hotspots that can aid in the effective 
use of resources to counter the threat using macro and meso analyses. There 
has been a tendency to focus on macro level analyses of spatial patterns, which, 
while useful for ascertaining patterns of group terrorism and insurgency, offer little 
insight to the decision making of individuals. Micro levels offer the most utility for 
the application of environmental criminology. To date, no research has 
empirically analysed spatial patterns of lone actors, however one study of lone 
actor target selection has touched upon the concept of the awareness space. 
There has been some insight that suggests group actors behave spatially in a 
similar way to urban criminals, but we know very little about whether this can also 
be applied to lone actors.  
This thesis will expand on existing research, with a view of gaining a better 
understanding of the spatial decision making of individuals involved in terrorist 
acts. An increased knowledge of spatial patterns at the micro level will be 
extremely useful in the guidance of prevention efforts. The next chapter examines 
how far lone-actor terrorists travel to commit their attacks, and establishes 
whether the distance decay pattern that is evident for urban crimes and group 
terrorism is replicated in lone-actor terrorism.  
 
 
 43 
Chapter 3    Residence-to-attack analyses of lone-actor 
terrorists     
 
3.1   Introduction  
There has recently been a considerable increase in research into lone-actor 
terrorism (e.g. Gill et al., 2014; Gill, 2015; Corner and Gill, 2015; Spaaij and 
Hamm, 2015; Meloy and Gill, 2016; Pantucci et al., 2016; Ellis et al., 2016; 
Schuurman et al., 2018). However, attack execution is one of the main areas that 
remains understudied. Terrorists, just like urban criminals, are limited by 
geographical constraints, and numerous patterns of spatial clustering that are 
evident for traditional crimes are reflected in terrorism (Clarke and Newman, 
2006). If terrorists are selecting targets in a rational manner, then the spatial 
distribution of attacks should be non-random. When examining terrorist attacks, 
it is evident that they do not occur randomly across time and place.  
To date, geographical research into terrorist target selection has largely 
concentrated on establishing how terrorist attacks are spatially distributed, 
whether they are concentrated to specific areas, and determining variations in 
risk (Townsley et al., 2008; Rossmo & Harries, 2011; Braithwaite & Johnson, 
2015; Tench et al., 2016). Other studies have identified temporal variations in 
spatial patterns, such as changes in incidents and intensity of attacks per the 
changes in strategy of the organisation, or increases in attacks due to symbolic 
dates or special events (Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Siebeneck et al. 2009). There 
have been several target based studies of this nature for group terrorism (Berrebi 
and Lakdawalla, 2007; Siebeneck et al., 2009, Webb and Cutter, 2010; Medina 
et al., 2011; LaFree et al., 2012), but spatial patterns of group terrorism such as 
clustering and hotspots are unlikely to be replicated for lone attacks. Further, 
target based approaches are constrained as they are based solely on attack 
locations and attributes, and any information about the offender such as their 
home location is disregarded. It is therefore assumed that other factors, such as 
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distance to the target, have no effect on decision making (Bernasco, 2007). 
Further, these approaches assume that the spatial distribution of offenders’ 
homes is equally spaced (Bernasco, 2007) which has extremely limited utility for 
strategies aimed at interdiction.  
A more in depth understanding of the spatial decision making of lone-actor 
terrorists is needed to guide practitioners. Geographical constraints may be 
amplified for lone actors, who are likely to lack the resources and support that 
would be available to them if they belonged to a larger network. This lack of 
resources limits a lone actor’s capability (Boyns and Ballard, 2004), and may 
restrict the sophistication of the attack, which is dependent on the individual’s 
level of expertise, skills and knowledge (Gill & Corner, 2016).  Whilst studies have 
highlighted that lone actors typically ‘leak’ their plans to close associates, and 
that this has much relevance for prevention measures, its utility is rather limited 
by itself (Gill, Horgan and Deckert, 2014; Gill, 2015). However, if this knowledge 
could be coupled with practical knowledge such as patterns of spatial decision 
making, it may be useful to narrow down potential targets and further aid 
preventive measures. 
One of the most fundamental relationships in environmental criminology is that of 
spatial interaction and distance. Geospatial research on crime is typically guided 
by the least effort principle (Zipf, 1965), which assumes that when an offender is 
considering several options for action, he (or she) “selects the one closest to him 
in order to minimize the effort involved” (Lundrigan and Czarnomski, 2006, 
p.220). Journey-to-crime research of urban offences such as burglary illustrates 
clear and consistent patterns, where the frequency of offences decreases as the 
distance from the home increases. When considering the rational choice 
perspective, on a basic level an offender should choose a shorter distance over 
a longer one, to minimise time and effort. As lone actors lack the resources and 
support of a wider network it is likely that they will keep distances travelled 
minimal, to increase the utility of their attack (Clarke and Newman, 2006). 
 45 
This chapter examines distance as a constraining factor on lone actor events and 
seeks to identify whether the distance decay pattern that is consistently observed 
in traditional crimes is also apparent in acts of lone-actor terrorism. Quantitative 
analyses will be run to compare differences between continent attacked 
(Europe/U.S.), ideologies, types of targets and weapon use.  
3.2   Theory  
3.2.1   Journey-to-crime 
The theoretical basis of this chapter stems from crime pattern theory and the 
concept of the awareness space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; 2008). 
As an individual navigates their city or town, travelling to and from their daily 
activity nodes (e.g. place of work, education or recreation), they become more 
familiar with these areas than other areas in their home town or city. Crimes will 
occur where the awareness space of an offender overlaps with an opportunity for 
criminal activity (Bernasco, 2014). As such, targets are typically selected close to 
these activity nodes (Ratcliffe, 2006).  
Traditional journey-to-crime research for urban crimes illustrates clear and 
consistent patterns, with distance being a key criterion that the individual 
considers when choosing a target (Bernasco and Block, 2009). In 1932, White 
conducted the first systematic analysis of crime journey distances and since then 
distance-to-crime has been studied extensively. Typically, for urban offences, 
journey-to-crime distances demonstrate a distance decay pattern, whereby the 
frequency of offences decreases as distance from the home increases. In the 
case of several equally attractive alternatives, an offender generally prefers the 
one geographically closest to them. Closer targets take less time and effort to 
reach, and they therefore offer more utility to the offender (Bernasco, 2014).  
For urban crimes, such as robbery and burglary, mean journey lengths are 
generally short. The average journey-to-crime distance is less than two miles, 
and target locations are usually within one mile of the offender’s residence (White, 
1932; Harling 1972; Barker, 2000; Rossmo, 2000; Costello and Wiles, 2001). 
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These results are consistent across crimes (Harling, 1972), as well as over time 
and space, with similar results for similar crime classifications demonstrated over 
four decades (White and Clyde, 1932; Pyle et al., 1974).  Most studies use police-
recorded data of incidents, using Euclidean (straight line) or Manhattan (city 
block) methods to calculate the distance between the offender’s home address 
and the location of the crime event. Results usually demonstrate a pattern in 
number of offences on a per-unit basis, where the frequency per unit decreases 
as distance from the home location increases (Georges-Abeyie and Harries, 
1980). van Koppen and Jansen’s (1998) analysis of robberies in the Netherlands 
displayed a clear distance decay pattern. Bernasco’s (2006) findings also 
demonstrated the distance decay effect in both individual and co-offender 
residential burglaries.  
Similar results have been found for crimes against persons, where the individual’s 
motives and actions are primarily guided by emotion (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 2003). The spatial behaviour of serial killers shows logic (Lundrigan 
and Canter, 2001). Their target selection is strongly related to their awareness 
space, whereby they are most likely to come across their victims during their daily 
routines (Godwin & Canter, 1997). Evidence of distance decay has also been 
found for rapes and homicides (Rhodes and Conley, 1991; Warren et al., 1998; 
Laukkanen and Santtila, 2006; Santtila, Laukkanen and Zappala, 2007). Davies 
and Dale (1995) found that the majority of rapes occurred within the immediate 
vicinity of the home, with a reduced frequency of offences as distance increased. 
When examining individual cases rather than averages of a particular crime type 
a similar result is found. LeBeau (1987, 1992) found that serial rapists returned 
to the same location to carry out their attacks, and that these locations were in 
areas that were familiar to them.  
Terrorist organisations make carefully calculated choices that are value-
maximising and guided by logic (Asal et al., 2009), with the intention of increasing 
their probability of success (Hoffman, 2006). There is evidence to suggest that 
there is a calculation of perceived risks in the selection of targets in terrorist 
organisations at the group and individual level (Mickolus, 1980; Sandler et al., 
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1983; Sandler and Lapan, 1988). For group terrorism, proximity to the target has 
been considered a key feature of target selection (Clarke and Newman, 2006), 
and will be one of the criteria that the individual considers when choosing a 
target (Bernasco and Block, 2009). Clarke and Newman’s (2006) review of 
counter-terrorism strategies concluded that terrorists are limited by geographical 
constraints in the same way as more traditional criminals. It is likely that they will 
keep distances minimal, to increase the utility of their attack (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006). However, many of Clarke and Newman’s proposals are yet to 
be empirically tested.  
LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw (2009) concluded that 96% of domestic anti-U.S. 
attacks between 1970-2004 involved local targets close to terrorists’ homes. 
Cothren et al., (2008) found that 46% of group attacks in the U.S. took place 
within 30 miles of the home location. Eby’s (2012) analysis of 53 lone actors in 
the U.S. found a large range of distances between home and target locations. 
Many of the individuals remained in their hometowns in their attack attempts, 
although six of the sample travelled extremely long distances. Becker (2014) 
examined 84 lone actors in the U.S. between 1940 and 2012. Most actors in this 
study appeared to select targets in a logical manner. The concept of the 
‘awareness space’ of an individual was considered and 60% of the sample 
studied had an identifiable geographical connection to the target. However, this 
was not quantified, area limits were not defined, and Becker only states whether 
they were familiar with the target area. A recent examination of attacks by PIRA 
found that nearly two thirds of the sample travelled less than 4 miles to commit 
their attacks, with 40% of all attacks occurring within 1 mile of the offender’s home 
location (Gill et al., 2017). Lone actors are likely to have a lower capability than 
terrorist groups due to a lack of skills, support and resources. Therefore, it is likely 
that distance acts as a constraining factor on their target selection. As such, it is 
hypothesised: 
H1: The frequency of lone actor attacks will decrease as residence-to-attack 
distance increases.  
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From research into group terrorism it is clear that human capital is very valuable 
in the preparation and execution of an attack. A higher level of organisation and 
expertise is needed to successfully carry out complex attacks (Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008; Jackson & Frelinger, 2009). Individuals with command and 
control links with a wider network may travel further to more complicated targets 
if they have support from others. More engagement with others is likely to lead to 
more skills and knowledge, increased awareness of potential targets, and the 
ability to perpetrate a more complex attack. Given this, it is hypothesised: 
H2: Lone actors with links to a wider network will travel further than those 
without.  
 
3.2.2   Europe vs. U.S.  
A limiting factor of previous research into journey-to-crime patterns of terrorism 
is that most studies only consider U.S. cases. It is probable that the spatial 
patterns are different when comparing the U.S. to Europe as the distribution of 
available and relevant targets is likely to be different. The U.S. has a much lower 
population density, is a much larger country, and the distribution of ‘points of 
interest’ such as commercial centres is different. Many of the cases used in 
previous samples were living in rural or isolated areas, therefore it would make 
sense for them to travel greater distances.  
Traditional journey-to-crime studies have found differences in distance travelled 
between crimes committed in the U.S. and Europe. For example, when 
examining serial murderers, victims were killed an average of 1.5 miles from the 
home location of the perpetrator in Europe, compared with an average of 14 miles 
in the U.S. (Rossmo, 2000). Given these findings, it is hypothesised: 
H3: Lone actors will make longer residence-to-attack journeys in the US 
than in Europe.  
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3.2.3   Target Type  
For lone actors, it is likely that some consideration will be made regarding the 
availability of ‘good’ targets which are also suitable for their goals (i.e. 
representative of their ideology) and that they may travel further for targets of 
higher value. Regarding geographical constraints, there is likely to be a trade-off 
between costs and benefits in the selection of the target, with the cost being the 
distance travelled and the benefit being the value of the target. It is likely that the 
balance of the value to be gained against the increased travel time required is 
assessed before selecting a final target.  
Eby (2012) looked at successful and failed attacks in the U.S. He highlighted that 
there was a negative association between success and distance travelled. 
However, ‘success’ was defined in terms of how many casualties occurred as a 
direct result of the attack. One of the main difficulties associated with lone-actor 
attacks are their idiosyncrasy. It cannot be concluded that every lone actor’s goal 
or aim is to cause mass casualties. Gill et al.’s (2017) PIRA study found targets 
deemed to be of high value (i.e. government officials), were associated with much 
longer distances than low value targets, (i.e. ordinary citizens). It can be proposed 
that lone actors will travel furthest for an iconic target, as this has the most 
representative value: 
H4: Lone actors will travel further for iconic targets than symbolic or 
arbitrary targets. 
Additionally, lone actors may choose to attack unfamiliar areas if the selected 
target is more in line with their ideology (Bakker & De-Graaf, 2010; Moskalenko 
& Mccauley, 2011; Wright, 2013; Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014). As such, it is 
hypothesised: 
H5: Lone actors will travel further for symbolic targets than arbitrary 
targets. 
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Complex attacks, such as those on iconic targets with high levels of security are 
likely to be beyond most lone actors’ individual capability. The level of protection 
and difficulty in accessing these types of targets increases the complexity of the 
attack, which is amplified for lone actors as they lack human capital. 60% of 
Becker’s (2014) sample chose civilian targets. Hard targets, such as 
governmental or military targets, tend to be avoided (Spaaij, 2012; Borum, 2013; 
Becker, 2014; Gill and Corner 2016). When considering this alongside previous 
findings that lone actors are more likely to attack ‘soft’ targets such as civilians, 
and that most attacks occur in public locations (Gill et al., 2014), it is expected 
that most attacks will be of a symbolic nature. Therefore, the ‘symbolic’ subgroup 
will also be examined separately to enable further inferences to be made between 
symbolic buildings and symbolic persons.  
The distance offenders are willing to travel for urban crimes can vary depending 
on the characteristics of the crime event. Crimes against properties usually 
require more planning and tend to involve longer distances than crimes against 
individuals which are often of an opportunistic nature (Repetto, 1974; Capone 
and Nichols, 1976; Brantingham and Brantingham, 2003). Variations found in 
traditional journey-to-crime distances suggest that there is a real or perceived 
difference in opportunities for different crime types, and violent crimes against 
persons are associated with shorter distances than property crimes (Hesseling, 
1992). Traditional criminals will travel further if targeting specific victims or target 
types (Fritzon, 2001), for crimes that are more instrumental (Santilla et al., 2007) 
and for sophisticated targets if the monetary incentive is higher (van Koppen and 
Jansen (1998). Property crime is associated with longer distances travelled if the 
expected value of the outcome is higher (Pyle, 1974; Repetto, 1974; Baldwin and 
Bottoms, 1976; Rhodes and Conly, 1981; Hesseling, 1992; Tita and Griffiths, 
2005), with a positive relationship between distance travelled and the value of 
property stolen (Snook, 2004; Morselli and Royer, 2008). 
Where terrorist attacks are concerned, there is often overlap in the targeting of 
people and property, and it is difficult to distinguish between these two groups. 
However, it can be proposed that wherever persons are targeted at a symbolic 
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building that the individual has chosen this location due to the perceived number 
of available and relevant targets associated with it (for example if a mosque is 
targeted and individuals of the Muslim faith are attacked), and therefore the 
expected value of the outcome is higher. It is therefore hypothesised: 
H6: Lone actors will travel further where a symbolic building is present 
compared with when a symbolic building is not present.   
 
3.2.4   Ideology 
One factor that hinders the prevention of lone-actor attacks is the wide spectrum 
of grievances and motivations of the perpetrators. Their varying ideological 
beliefs will influence their goals, and thus will influence their target selection. 
Many distinguishable differences have been identified when comparing 
ideological subgroups of lone actors. This is not limited to demographics, and 
factors such as variances in skill acquisition and preparation for the attacks are 
significantly different (Gill et al., 2014).  
This study will therefore disaggregate by ideological group in an attempt to 
identify any differences in spatial patterns concerning target selection across 
different motivations. Target choices should be governed by the individual’s 
grievance or ideology (Drake, 1998), be reflective of the message they want to 
communicate (Hoffman, 2006), and elicit a response from their target audience 
(O’Neill, 2005). Therefore, it is likely that some consideration will be made 
regarding the availability of ‘good’ targets that are also suitable for their 
cause. This will act as a further constraining influence on their selection of targets 
from an otherwise ‘unlimited’ choice set.  
Those with single-issue grievances may have a limited choice set when 
compared to other ideologies, and may be more likely to travel further afield and 
beyond their awareness spaces. For example, anti-abortionists in the U.S. may 
be forced to travel to different states due to the varying legality of abortions in 
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different states. The individual may be willing to travel further, and to unfamiliar 
areas, to commit an attack on these targets. Ideology can therefore be 
considered a limiting factor in target selection, and as such it is hypothesised: 
H7: There will be differences in distance travelled between different 
ideological groups. 
 
3.2.5   Weapons  
Weapon choice is guided by cost-benefit analyses. Although bomb-making 
manuals are becoming more easily available online it is still difficult for a lone 
individual to successfully build a bomb. The successful construction of an 
improvised explosive device (IED) is very complex (Asal et al., 2015) and requires 
more expertise and planning than other weapons (Johnson and Braithwaite, 
2009). Due to a lack of skills and resources lone actors tend to rely less on this 
weapon type than group actors (Spaaij, 2010), and are more likely to use 
weapons that are easy to obtain and operate, such as firearms and edged 
weapons such as knives and axes (Gruenewald et al., 2013).   
Lone actors may lack the capability to pull off sophisticated attacks and may be 
constrained by several factors including limited skillsets and a lack of support and 
resources of a larger group. These limiting factors are reflected in their weapon 
choice and a tendency to target softer targets such as civilians. The type of 
weapon used will have a constraining effect on the type of target that can be 
chosen, with different types being more or less appropriate for each weapon 
(Clarke and Newman, 2006). It is therefore hypothesised:   
H8: Individuals will travel further when using a bomb as their main weapon 
than when using a firearm or bladed weapon.  
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3.3   Data and Method 
To test the hypotheses and to perform the analyses a database of lone-actor 
terrorists was constructed using parts of an existing dataset (Gill et al., 2014) as 
well as additional data obtained from open source literature. Independent coders 
had collectively spent 5500 hours working on data collection and coding for the 
existing dataset (Gill et al., 2014), which contained 119 cases (individuals) and 
185 variables (including demographic information; details about the selected 
target and weapon used; details of mental illness; preparatory behaviours; 
criminal history; whether the individual had face-to-face or virtual contact with a 
wider network, and so on). Each observation was recorded by three independent 
coders, then results reconciled in two stages (coder A with coder B, then coders 
AB with C). Most of the material was sourced using LexisNexis (e.g. media 
reports, scholarly articles, published biographies). Where data was missing in the 
dataset, the same procedure was followed for the additional data collection. 
To qualify for inclusion for the subsequent analyses of this chapter, the attack 
had to be ideologically motivated and committed by a lone offender who was 
either apprehended or killed in the commission of their offence in the U.S. and 
western Europe since 1990. Lone actors who were apprehended in the planning 
phase of their attack were removed from the dataset due to the nature of the 
analysis (n=39). To be included in the final working dataset the actor’s accurate 
home and attack(s) location had to be known (10 cases were removed at this 
stage). If the home location and attack location were in the same town or city and 
the street address for the home location was unknown the case was removed 
from the dataset (n=3). In the very few (n=2) instances where an accurate street 
address for the individual was unknown, but they travelled to a different town or 
city, the geometric centroid of their home town or city was used. Any other known 
location data were recorded if available, such as the individual’s place of work or 
higher education, place of worship and previous address(es).  
The final dataset consisted of 122 attacks committed by 70 individuals. Incidents 
included shootings, bombings, arsons and vehicular attacks. The author deemed 
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the amount of data for arson and vehicle attacks to be insufficient and so these 
cases were removed from the sample for the analyses pertaining to weapon 
choice. Residence-to-attack distances were computed for each attack using the 
home and target locations using Euclidean straight-line distance (the shortest 
distance between two points). This technique was used as opposed to road 
network distance due to the retrospective nature of this study and the irregularity 
of the street networks (whereas Manhattan distance is typically used for gridded 
street networks). This measurement is also typical of other similar studies (e.g. 
van Koppen and Jansen, 1998; Beauregard et al., 2007; Santilla et al., 2007). 
The variables indicating whether the individual had face-to-face communication 
and virtual communication with others were dichotomously coded. 
Target choices were coded as either iconic, symbolic or arbitrary by two coders. 
Iconic targets were defined as persons or buildings that were regarded as an 
ultimate representative symbol of the individual’s ideology, or a unique building 
or location. Symbolic targets were other buildings or persons that would serve as 
a symbol of the individual’s grievance. Examples of iconic buildings could include 
the Pentagon or the White House, or areas such as Times Square in New York 
City. An example of a symbolic building could be a mosque, synagogue or military 
base and a symbolic person could be a member of Parliament or member of the 
military. The single-issue subgroup included many anti-abortion activists. For 
these individuals, an iconic target was defined as a clinic or doctor that performed 
late-term abortions. All other abortion clinics and doctors were regarded as 
symbolic targets. The arbitrary subgroup included indiscriminate attacks where 
there was no obvious connection between the target of the attack and the 
individual’s grievance.  
For the symbolic subgroup, cases were coded as ‘building’ or ‘persons’. Buildings 
included all cases where the attack took place at a symbolic building, regardless 
of whether the object of the attack was the building itself, and symbolic persons 
were defined as an event where no symbolic building was involved.  
Cohen’s K was run to determine the agreement between two coders’ judgement 
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on whether the targets should be considered as iconic, symbolic or arbitrary. The 
results reflected a substantial agreement between the two coders (k = .768, p < 
.001). The disagreements were discussed and resolved, and these resolved 
codes were used for subsequent analyses.  
 
3.4   Results  
3.4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 summarises the accumulative percentages of attacks within different 
distance ranges. The mean distance of attacks from the actor’s home was 90 
miles (144km), however more than half of all the attacks (56.5%) occurred within 
10 miles (6km) of the individual’s home location, and 36% of all attacks occurred 
within 2 miles (3km).  
Individuals categorised in the single-issue group appeared travelled the furthest 
and Islamists travelled the shortest distance. Clear differences can be seen for 
the mean journey lengths for Europe and the U.S., and individuals travelled much 
further when attacking iconic targets.  
 
Table 3.1. Accumulative percentages of attacks aggregated by location, ideology 
and target type 
 
 Mean 
(miles) 
Within 
1 mile 
Within 
2 miles 
Within 
5 miles 
Within 
10 miles 
Within 
20 miles 
Within 
50 miles 
All 
(n=122) 
90 21.5% 36% 48.5% 56.5% 66.5% 77% 
Europe 
(n=57) 
15.5 35% 56% 70% 75.5% 82.5% 93% 
USA 
(n=65) 
155 9% 18.5% 29% 40% 52% 63% 
Islamist 
(n=35) 
27 29% 34.5% 40% 54.5% 71.5% 83% 
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Europe 
(n=18) 
34.5 44.5% 50% 55.5% 61% 67% 78% 
USA 
(n=17) 
19.5 12% 18% 18% 47% 76.5% 88% 
Right wing 
(n=64) 
35 22% 44% 59.5% 67% 72% 83% 
Europe 
(n=38) 
6.5 32% 60.5% 79% 84% 89.5% 100% 
USA 
(n=26) 
77.5 8% 19% 31% 42.5% 46% 58% 
Single 
issue 
(n=23) 
856 9% 17.5% 30.5% 30.5% 43.5% 52% 
Europe 
(n=1) 
20 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 
USA 
(n=22) 
1023 9% 18% 20% 32% 41% 50% 
Iconic 
(n=18) 
388 5.5% 5.5% 16.5% 22.5% 29% 50% 
Symbolic 
(n=90) 
39 21% 39% 50% 57% 67% 79% 
Arbitrary 
(n=14) 
3 40% 53.5% 73.5% 93.5% 87.5% 87.5% 
 
3.4.2   Residence-to-attack 
H1: The frequency of lone actor attacks will decrease as residence-to-attack 
distance increases.  
To test the first hypothesis the distance values for each case were grouped into 
distance intervals and the frequencies of attack trips made to each of the different 
distances were calculated. The pattern is consistent with previous literature and 
displays a classic distance-decay curve. There is a highly positively skewed 
distribution, demonstrating that as distance from an actor’s home increases, the 
number of attacks decreases (see figure 3.1). Due to the non-normal distribution 
of the data it was appropriate to use non-parametric tests for all subsequent 
analyses. A Spearman’s correlation was run on this data to determine the 
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relationship between the number of attacks and distance travelled. There was a 
strong, negative monotonic correlation (r = -.628 p <0.01) between distance 
travelled and number of attacks. 
  
 
 
Some attacks took place within the immediate vicinity to the home location and 
there was no apparent ‘buffer zone’ (a threshold in the area immediately 
surrounding the offenders home in which fewer number of crimes occur) that is 
typically detected in many crimes but is largely absent for crimes of passion 
(LeBeau, 1987) and crimes of a personal nature (Davies and Dale, 1995).  
H2: Individuals with links to a wider network will travel further than those 
without.  
Communication with others was associated with longer distances. Those who 
had interactions with a wider network travelled much longer distances (mean = 
130 miles/209km) than those who did not (mean = 69 miles/111km). A Mann-
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Figure 3.1. Frequency of attacks within 20 miles of the home location 
(n=81) 
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Whitney U test indicated that this difference was highly significant (U = 1231.5 (z 
= -3.322), p = 0.001).  
To examine this finding in more detail chi-square tests of independence were run 
to compare those who travelled short distances (up to 10 miles) and those who 
travelled long distances (11+ miles), based on a median split. A highly significant 
association was found between face-to-face interactions with members of a wider 
network and distance travelled, χ(1) = 13.246, p <.001. Based on the odds ratio, 
those who had face-to-face interactions were 4.04 times more likely to travel 
further than 10 miles than those who had no face-to-face interactions. However, 
there was no significant interaction between virtual interaction with members of a 
wider network and distance travelled, χ(1) = 1.082, p =.298.  
 
3.4.3   Europe vs. US 
H3: Individuals will make longer residence-to-attack journeys in the US than 
in Europe.  
The mean difference travelled for Europe was 15.5 miles, compared with ten 
times that amount, 155 miles, for the U.S. A high concentration of attacks 
occurred around the actor’s home in Europe, with more than half (56%) of all the 
attacks occurring within 2 miles of the home location. However, only 18.5% of 
attacks occurred within this vicinity for the U.S. 75.5% of attacks occurred within 
10 miles in Europe, whereas just 40% of attacks occurred within this range in the 
U.S. Only 3.5% of attacks took place over 100 miles from the home location in 
Europe, compared with a quarter of U.S. cases. A Mann Whitney U test 
demonstrated that there was a highly significant difference between distance 
travelled for the U.S. (mean rank = 75.35) and Europe (mean rank = 45.70), U = 
952 (z = -4.639), p <.001. 
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Journeys to commit an attack in Europe followed a clear distance decay pattern. 
A steep gradient of decline was found in the number of attacks adjusted to a per-
mile basis from 0 to 4 miles from the last known home location of the actor. The 
number of attacks remained at a relatively stable, low number from the 10 mile 
point and became sporadic from 20 miles onwards. Very few offences (n= 5, 
<9%) were committed beyond 50 miles. A Spearman’s correlation was run to 
determine the relationship between the number of attacks and distance travelled. 
There was a moderate, negative monotonic correlation (r = -.570 p <0.01). 
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Figure 3.2. Frequency of attacks in Europe within 20 miles of the home 
location at 1 mile intervals (n=47) 
 60 
 
 
On examination of attacks per mile for the U.S. the results do not appear to show 
the same distance decay curve as Europe. However, this pattern becomes more 
apparent when transforming the intervals from 1 mile to 5 miles, and observing 
the journey lengths up to 50 miles. This finding suggests that individuals travel 
further to commit attacks in the U.S., but that that the decay pattern is still evident. 
This suggests that individuals are still affected by distance, but to a different 
degree than in Europe. This is consistent with traditional journey-to-crime studies, 
which have found differences in distance travelled between the U.S. and Europe. 
A Spearman’s correlation was run to determine the relationship between the 
number of attacks and distance travelled. There was a strong, negative 
monotonic correlation distance travelled and attacks in the U.S. (r = -.651 p 
<0.01).  
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Figure 3.3. Frequency of attacks in the U.S. within 20 miles of the home 
location at 1 mile intervals (n=34) 
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3.4.4   Target Type 
H4: Individuals will travel further for iconic targets than symbolic or 
arbitrary targets. 
H5: Individuals will travel further for symbolic targets than arbitrary targets 
The mean trip length for iconic targets was much longer than for symbolic or 
arbitrary targets. Those attacking arbitrary targets travelled the shortest distance 
of the three target types. A Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there were 
statistically significant differences in distance between the different target types, 
χ2(2) = 19.084, p < 0.001, with a mean rank of 89.78 for iconic targets, 59.79 for 
symbolic targets, and 36.11 for arbitrary targets. This indicates that lone actors 
are willing to travel furthest for an iconic target, followed by symbolic targets and 
arbitrary targets. It is likely that the attacks on arbitrary targets were more 
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Figure 3.4. Frequency of attacks in the U.S. within 50 miles of the 
home location at 5 mile intervals (n=41) 
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spontaneous and involved less planning than the other attacks and therefore 
occurred closer to home. Also, as the targets were not symbolic it could be that 
the actor saw anyone as a legitimate target, which supports the theory that an 
individual will only travel further when no appropriate targets are available nearby.  
 
 
H6: Lone actors will travel further where a symbolic building is present 
compared with when a symbolic building is not present.   
As most attacks could be considered symbolic further analyses were run to 
identify any distinguishing factors within this subgroup. A Mann Whitney U test 
revealed a highly significant difference for this group when comparing distance 
travelled for attacks in which a symbolic building was involved (mean rank = 
39.17) and attacks where no symbolic building was involved (mean rank = 62.47), 
U = 541 (z = -4.014), p < 0.001. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean trip lengths (miles) of attacks aggregated by target type 
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3.4.5   Ideology 
H7: There will be differences in distance travelled across ideologies 
Two thirds of attacks on iconic targets were perpetrated by individuals with single 
issue grievances, the other third by Islamist extremists. No right-wing cases in 
this study committed attacks on iconic targets. More than half of the of the attacks 
on symbolic targets were committed by right wing extremists, and a quarter by 
Islamists. The remaining 17% were by single issue actors. Single issue actors 
executed no attacks on arbitrary targets.  
A Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically significant difference 
in distance between the different ideologies, χ2(2) = 13.899, p = 0.001, with a 
mean rank of 57.71 for Islamists, 54.27 for right wing extremists and 84.74 for 
single issue terrorists. Lone actors with single issue ideologies travelled much 
further to their targets than the other two groups, with a mean distance of 856 
miles, compared to right-wing extremists (mean = 35 miles) and Islamists (mean 
= 27 miles). There were noticeable differences when comparing single-issue 
actors in Europe (mean = 20 miles) to the U.S. (mean = 1023 miles).  
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All Europe U.S.Figure 3.6. Mean trip lengths (miles) of attacks aggregated by ideology 
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There was no significant difference in distance travelled between the Islamist and 
right wing groups, U = 905.5 (z = -1.152), p = .249, suggesting that the effects of 
distance are similar for these two subgroups. Therefore, further analyses were 
conducted using only Islamist and right wing cases. The mean for the remaining 
cases was 31 miles (compared to 90 miles for all attacks). A Mann Whitney U 
test revealed a significant difference for this combined group when comparing 
distance travelled in Europe and the US, U = 647.5 (z = -3.675), p < 0.001.  
 
Table 3.2. Accumulative percentage of Islamist and right wing attacks 
 
 
The distance decay curve for Islamist and right wing actors was to a higher 
degree than the analysis with all cases included, with a steeper gradient of 
decline (see figure 3.7).  
 
 Mean Within 1 
mile 
Within 2 
miles 
Within 5 
miles 
Within 10 
miles 
Within 20 
miles 
All 31 miles 25% 41% 54% 64% 73% 
Europe 15 miles 36% 57% 71% 77% 82% 
U.S. 53 miles 10% 19.5% 29.5% 46.5% 61% 
 65 
 
 
 
3.4.6   Weapons 
H8: Individuals will travel further when using a bomb than when using a 
firearm or bladed weapon.  
The mean trip length for attacks in which a bomb was used was higher than for a 
firearm or bladed weapon. To test for significance a Kruskal-Wallis H test was 
performed. The test was performed on the remaining three weapon types: 
firearms, bladed weapons and bombs. It demonstrated that there was a 
statistically significant difference in distance, χ2(2) = 7.845, p <0.05, with a mean 
rank of 54.29 for firearms, 45.14 for bladed weapons and 74.63 for bombs.   
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Figure 3.7. Frequency of attacks within 20 miles of the home location for 
Islamist and right wing extremists 
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Table 3.3. Mean trip lengths (miles) of attacks aggregated by weapon type 
 
 
 
Table 3.4. Summary of findings according to hypotheses 
 
No. Hypothesis Findings 
1 The frequency of lone actor attacks will decrease as 
residence-to-attack distance increases. 
- Supported 
-  
2 Lone actors with links to a wider network will travel 
further than those without. 
- Supported 
 
3 Lone actors will make longer residence-to-attack 
journeys in the US than in Europe. 
- Supported 
 
4 Lone actors will travel further for iconic targets than 
symbolic or arbitrary targets. 
- Supported 
 
5 Lone actors will travel further for symbolic targets 
than arbitrary targets. 
- Supported 
 
6 Lone actors will travel further where a symbolic 
building is present compared with when a symbolic 
building is not present.   
- Supported 
 
7 There will be differences in distance travelled 
between different ideological groups. 
- Supported 
 
8 Individuals will travel further when using a bomb as 
their main weapon than when using a firearm or 
bladed weapon. 
- Supported 
-  
 
Mean trip length 
(miles) 
Firearm Bladed Bomb Arson Vehicle 
All 138 76 148 171 10 
Europe 8 84 83 - - 
U.S. 149 0.5 283 171 10 
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3.5   Discussion  
This chapter aimed to gain a better understanding of the processes that underlie 
the spatial decision making of lone actors, and identify whether they are 
constrained by distance in the same way as traditional criminals. The analyses 
expand the empirical knowledge of lone actor target selection and add a practical 
element that could aid in the development of intervention strategies. The main 
underlying theme for this is that, in any attempt to reveal insights into possible 
attack locations, each case needs to be considered individually according to the 
subgroups outlined above. It is also emphasized that there is a necessity to 
disaggregate lone actors in future research, and to consider subgroups, and any 
interactions these subgroups may have, i.e. the relationship between single issue 
actors and iconic targets.  
The findings are very promising and distance can be highlighted as an important 
factor in target selection criteria, which is consistent with previous studies of 
terrorist activity (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Cothren et al., 2008; Gill et al., 2017) 
and traditional criminological studies (Wiles and Costello, 2000; Bernasco and 
Block 2009). The distance-decay pattern that is evident for urban crimes is 
replicated for lone actors, with the results demonstrating that frequency of attacks 
decreases as distance from home locations increase. These findings emphasise 
the value of incorporating methods of environmental criminology when modelling 
terrorism target selection. The results add further support for the argument that 
terrorists are rational thinkers when it comes to target selection. Becker’s (2014) 
findings that lone actors are more likely to attack within their awareness space, 
and that an individual with the potential to commit an attack is likely to identify 
opportunities within their awareness space during their daily routines 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981) were supported. Whether the decision 
regarding the final object of attack happens before or after they have decided to 
attack a particular type of target is yet to be determined.  
Individuals with links to a wider network travelled much further than those without. 
Those who had face-to-face interactions were over four times more likely to travel 
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further than 10 miles. However, no significant difference was found for individuals 
who had virtual interactions with members of a wider network. This has important 
practical implications. If there is intelligence that a suspected potential offender 
has had face-to-face interactions with a wider network, it can be inferred that they 
may have the capability to travel further.  
The constraining effects of distance are different for the U.S. and Europe. The 
results for both continents demonstrate the distance-decay pattern, but to a 
different degree, with individuals in the U.S. travelling much further than those in 
Europe. This finding held when examining Islamist and right-wing cases only, so 
it is not skewed by single-issue cases. The U.S. is much larger than European 
countries and has a lower population density, meaning potential targets may be 
distributed differently. The descriptive findings of accumulative percentages for 
distance travelled in Europe are particularly interesting. They are extremely 
similar to a U.K. Home Office study (Davies and Dale, 1995) into the geographical 
behaviour of stranger offenders in violent sexual crime. They found 29% of 
attacks to occur within 1 mile, 52% within 2 miles, and 76% within 5 miles, 
compared with 35% of attacks within 1 mile, 56% within 2 miles and 70% within 
5 miles (76% within 10 miles) for the lone-actor attacks in this chapter. This 
provides further support for the argument that terrorists behave similarly to 
ordinary criminals in their spatial decision making.  
Individuals travelled further for iconic targets than symbolic or arbitrary targets, 
and further for symbolic targets than arbitrary targets. This suggests that a 
consideration of costs vs. benefits may take place in decision making regarding 
target selection, and that there is a trade-off between distance to the target and 
the representative value of the target, as lone actors are willing to travel further 
for targets that are more in line with their grievance. Research has suggested that 
lone actors are not geographically constrained and are willing to travel long 
distances. However, the author argues that, due to the homogenous approach of 
previous studies, the findings are likely to be skewed by a small number of lone 
actors who attacked iconic targets. When these cases are removed and symbolic 
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targets are considered, it is proposed that lone actors will travel further when it is 
necessary for them to do so, when the availability of relevant targets is limited.  
Variations in distances for different target types reflected previous literature of 
traditional crimes (Hesseling, 1992; Fritzon, 2001; Santilla et al., 2008). Lone 
actors travelled much further for attacks where a symbolic building was present 
which is consistent with findings of traditional crimes that longer distances are 
travelled if the expected value of the outcome is higher (Pyl, 1974; Repetto, 1974; 
Baldwin and Bottoms, 1976; Rhodes and Conly, 1981; Hesseling, 1992; Tita and 
Griffiths, 2005), and further implies that some cost-benefit consideration is taken. 
These findings suggest that when considering any target that can be deemed as 
symbolic of the individual’s grievance, a distinguishing factor in regards to spatial 
patterns is whether the target is a building or a person.  
Over two thirds of attacks on iconic targets were perpetrated by individuals with 
single issue ideologies, demonstrating that attacks of this kind are more likely to 
be committed by members of this subgroup than Islamist and right-wing 
extremists, most likely due to the nature of their grievances. Single-issue actors 
committed less than a fifth of the attacks on symbolic targets.  None of the right-
wing cases studied in this chapter attacked iconic targets. 
The significant differences concerning grievances provide a good starting point 
for further spatial analyses beyond this thesis that may be useful for practical 
interventions. No significant difference was found in distance travelled for Islamist 
and right wing lone actors, and the results suggest that their spatial decision 
making when selecting targets is similar to urban criminals. However single issue 
actors do not seem to be constrained by distance in the same way. They may 
have a limited choice set of targets to choose from due to the specific nature of 
their ideology. This demonstrates a necessity that, in any interdiction attempts, 
the ideology or grievance of the individual needs to be considered before 
attempting to narrow down possible targets. 
The identifiable effects of distance for subgroups may be beneficial for 
preventative techniques, especially when coupled with leakage. In most lone 
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actor cases other individuals are aware of the individual’s commitment to their 
extremist ideology, or intent to engage in a terrorism related activity (Gill et al., 
2014). If an individual has been identified as likely to engage in an imminent 
attack this knowledge may be useful to narrow down potential targets. If an 
individual commits an attack but is not apprehended in the commission of their 
attack and manages to escape it could also be beneficial for post-event 
investigative techniques.  
Consistent with previous research (Spaiij, 2010, Gruenewald et al., 2013; Asal et 
al., 2015), firearms seemed to be the weapon of choice for the lone actors studied 
in this chapter. Individuals travelled further when a bomb was used as their main 
weapon compared to firearms and bladed weapons. This may be reflective of 
capability, as 60% of lone actors who built a bomb had had face-to-face 
interactions with members of a wider network.  
An underlying limitation of these analyses is the small sample. The cases used 
were not an extensive dataset of all lone actor attacks, as some had to be 
removed due to inaccurate or inconclusive information regarding home or attack 
locations. Therefore, it is inevitably subject to some bias. A larger sample would 
have been preferable; however, this was not possible without access to closed 
source data. This may mean that the sample used was not entirely representative 
and may limit the reliability of the results. A larger dataset would also have 
allowed for further disaggregation and additional statistical analyses to be run, for 
example to examine distances from places of work and education, and previous 
addresses. Only cases in the U.S. and Europe were used, therefore additional 
analyses need to be conducted to establish whether these findings have utility for 
other countries. When using Euclidean distance, there is also a small likelihood 
that distances could be over or under estimated, however the results are still 
useful when using this method (Rossmo, 2014). 
Some scholars argue that a problem associated with this type of analysis is the 
distance decay ecological fallacy, whereby the aggregated distance decay 
function may conceal clustering and variation at the individual level (Townsley 
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and Sidebottom, 2010). If there is no individual distance decay, but the targets 
are dispersed randomly within the sample, it may incorrectly reveal a distance 
decay function (van Koppen and de Keijser, 1997) and therefore any inferences 
from the analyses may be inappropriate. To test for this, individual cases with 
more than one attack in a series were tested, for example John Ausonius and 
Johan Peter Mangs. A similar distance decay curve was apparent in their attack 
series.   
 
3.6   Conclusion 
Whilst the vast majority of the lone-actor terrorists travelled short distances, there 
are outliers worthy of discussion. Many of these outliers might simply be depicted 
as such because “residence” can be an imprecise indicator of awareness space. 
An individual’s full awareness space is guided by other locations of their daily 
routine activities or past residences. Further quantitative analyses regarding the 
whole nodal network of an individual, including all possible nodes such as 
previous addresses, places of work and education, as well as their last known 
place of residence, were intended. However, this information could not be 
ascertained for every case, and therefore there was an insufficient amount of data 
to do so. Individuals who engage in urban crimes such as residential burglaries, 
robberies, thefts from vehicles and assaults are much more likely to offend in an 
area that they have previously lived, than in comparable areas where they have 
not resided (Bernasco and Kooistra, 2010; Bernaso 2010). Individuals have a 
range of routine activities, involving home, work, school, recreation etc, which 
increase their awareness space. This familiarity and increased knowledge of an 
area allows for a better evaluation of risks and minimises the effort of locating 
suitable targets.   
The illustrative examples below highlight the importance of considering the whole 
awareness space of an individual. Even when individuals travel great distances, 
and the attacks are seemingly random, there is a strong likelihood of some 
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identifiable geographical connection between the actor and the target. Previous 
addresses, place of work/higher education need to be considered as well as the 
present.  
 
Benjamin Nathaniel Smith  
Benjamin Nathaniel Smith was a right-wing extremist who killed 2 individuals and 
injured 10 in his targeted attacks on ethnic minorities over a 3-day period in 1999. 
Smith began his attacks on Friday 2nd July, in the neighbourhoods surrounding 
his childhood home in Wilmette, where he had recently returned to live. These 
neighbourhoods, Rogers Park and Skokie, were predominantly populated by 
Orthodox Jews as well as large numbers of immigrants. The following day, on the 
penultimate day of his spree, attacks took place at the first university he attended 
(University of Illinois in Urbana) as well as two of the closest towns to the 
university by direct route. He fired twice at black men on streets of Springfield 
and a black minister was shot from Smith’s car in Decatur. Finally, on the Sunday, 
he waited outside a Korean Methodist church near Indiana University in 
Bloomington, Indianapolis, before killing a graduate student as the congregation 
emerged. Smith had just finished his third year of college at Indiana University, 
and was living in student accommodation less than half a mile away from this 
campus until a few months before his attacks.   
This case highlights the importance of considering all locations in the individual’s 
awareness space, including previous addresses, places of work and education, 
as well as the areas surrounding their home (Bernasco and Kooistra, 2010; 
Bernaso 2010). This case also concurs with previous research on traditional 
crimes which suggests that an offender’s first offence location will be closest to 
their home (Canter, 1994; Canter and Larkin, 1993; Warren, Reboussin, and 
Hazelwood, 1995). 
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Hesham Mohammed Hadayet  
On 4th July, 2002, Hesham Mohammed Hadayet approached the Israeli airline El 
Al’s ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and started shooting 
at the passengers in the line, killing 2 Israeli nationals. It was concluded that this 
attack was due to his contempt of Israel’s policies towards Palestinians and their 
occupation of the West Bank. Hadayet had intense anti-Israeli views that had 
developed over his time in the U.S. It is believed that his anger was only aimed 
at Israel, and not U.S. civilians. Abdallatef Aboulzahab, a former employee of 
Hadayet, stated: 
 “He blamed Israel for what was going on [in the Middle East]... He had nothing 
against Americans... He's not hateful for the American people on the street... He 
loved this country. He loved freedom of speech. He told me, 'I'd like to be a U.S. 
citizen.’” 
On first examination, the location of this attack seems relatively random as 
Hadayet lived 40 miles away in Irvine, California. However, Hadayet was a taxi 
and limo driver who frequently served LAX and John Wayne airports, and so it is 
likely that he was aware of the El Al counter from previous trips. It can be inferred 
that he did not want to kill an American citizen and so LAX provided the closest 
location in his awareness space that could provide a large number of legitimate 
targets. Hadayet bypassed other busy ticket counters in the airport, so it can be 
inferred that his objective was not to target random civilians, as he could have 
attacked other counters more easily. As the flights dealt with by El Al are only in 
and out of Israel and is owned by the Israeli government it can be inferred that 
he made this choice as he specifically wanted to target Israelis.  
 
Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly 
On 11th December, 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly detonated two bombs 
in central Stockholm. When considering his last known address in Luton, al-
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Abdaly travelled the furthest out of the European subgroup. However, prior to his 
attack he had recently returned to Sweden, visiting his parents in a small town 
called Tranas. The family had settled there as refugees after fleeing Iraq in 1992, 
when al-Abdaly was 11 years old. He lived there until 2001, before moving to the 
U.K. to study.  
On the morning of 11th December, 2010, al-Abdaly left his parents’ house and 
drove to Stockholm. It could be that Tranas, with a population of only 14,000 
inhabitants, did not provide an adequate number of potential targets for the 
attack. A city with high urban density is much more attractive as a target, due to 
the increased number of potential victims and witnesses, as well as potential 
economic losses. There are two major cities close to Tranas: Stockholm and 
Gothenburg. Stockholm is the capital of Sweden so his attack would have more 
of an impact. This example further highlights the importance of the awareness 
space. It has been suggested that the bomb was intended to be triggered 
remotely, and that the explosives went off accidentally en-route to the intended 
target. The most likely target was the department store ‘Ahlens’, located at the 
end of the street. Ahlens is the largest department store in Stockholm, and as Al-
Abdaly’s attack took place just before Christmas it is likely that there were an 
increased number of people in the area at that time.  
Collectively, the statistical analysis and illustrative examples suggest that 
distance can be put forward as a constraining factor that governs the selection of 
targets. Lone actor target selection is a result of a confluence of distance and 
appropriate targets, whereby a target will be chosen where it is a) in the 
individual’s awareness space, b) within close proximity to the individual’s home 
location and c) is relevant to the individual’s ideology. This chapter has 
demonstrated that most lone actors will behave similarly to group terrorist actors 
and urban criminals. Therefore, it may be appropriate to consider any findings 
regarding the spatial decision making of group actors as applicable to lone actors. 
This chapter indicates that target selection is guided by an inherent logic, 
providing further support that environmental criminological methods are useful in 
understanding terrorism. The next chapter builds upon this line of argument by 
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analysing the spatial and temporal characteristics of a campaign of violence (as 
opposed to the sporadic and individual attacks characterised by lone-actor 
terrorists). 
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Chapter 4    Spatial and temporal patterns of 
contemporary violent dissident Republican incidents 
 
4.1   Introduction  
As well as the obvious threat from Islamist-inspired groups such as ISIS, one of 
the main contemporary concerns to U.K. national security is the threat from 
violent dissident Republicans (VDRs). VDRs reject the Northern Ireland peace 
process, want to demonstrate that the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has failed, 
and continue to fight for a united Ireland (Frampton, 2011, 2012; Bean, 2012; 
Evans and Tonge, 2012).  
This conflict represents a relevant and growing terrorism threat (Morrison & Gill, 
2016). Despite hopes that the Good Friday Agreement of 19981 represented an 
end to terrorism, dissident Republicans unhappy with the constitutional 
settlement continue their armed opposition with growing intensity. Speaking in 
2010, Jonathan Evans, the Director General of MI5, admitted that the situation 
had been initially misjudged and that contrary to expectations, the preceding 
three years had seen a persistent rise in terrorist activity. The escalating nature 
of the threat was further echoed in the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 
2010 (HM Government, 2010a: para.4.A.2), whilst the National Security Strategy 
of the same year classified the security situation as a tier-one priority risk (HM 
Government, 2010b: 27). Violent activity associated with dissident Republican 
groups continues to grow (Horgan & Morrison, 2011; Morrison & Horgan, 2016). 
The threat largely comes from two main groups: the Continuity IRA (CIRA) and 
the New IRA14, as well as multiple smaller factions.  
There is substantial support for the assertion that terrorism incidents are 
geographically concentrated (e.g. Townsley et al., 2008; Rossmo & Harries, 
                                                             
14 Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) were also particularly active until a ceasefire in January 2018. 
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2011; Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015; Tench et al., 2016). They typically cluster in 
space and time and occur in urban areas (Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Nunn, 
2007; Piegorsch et al., 2007).  Spatial and temporal analyses can be effective in 
guiding the interventions and allocation of security resources needed to manage 
terrorist related incidents, which can improve the efficiency and productivity of 
police resources.  However, there is still a distinct lack of research compared to 
the study of urban crimes. Most analyses regarding spatial and temporal patterns 
of group terrorism using finer scales of analysis have been focused on conflicts 
in Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq (i.e. 
Kliot and Charney, 2006; Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Townsley et al., 2008; 
Siebeneck et al., 2009; Johnson and Braithwaite, 2009; O’Loughlin, Witmer and 
Linke, 2010; Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012). Little has been done to examine the 
threat from a sustained campaign of violence in Europe (with the exception of 
studies such as LaFree, 2012; Behlendorf et al., 2012).  
This chapter seeks to expand on the existing literature relating to the geography 
of terrorism through an analysis of the spatial patterns of incidents involving VDRs 
in Belfast. Studies regarding VDR violence so far have largely been descriptive 
(see Tonge, 2004; Gilmore, 2009; White, 2010; Frampton, 2011; Taylor and 
Currie, 2011), except for a few notable examples (i.e. Morrison and Horgan, 
2016). One of the main reasons for this is a distinct lack of data. The analyses in 
this chapter use parts of a unique detailed dataset of VDR violence created by Dr 
John Morrison (Royal Holloway University). In particular, this chapter conducts a 
Kaplan Meier hazard estimate and bivariate analyses of VDR incidents, as well 
as various spatial statistics comparing VDR bombings and hoaxes. The results 
demonstrate that the threat from VDR terrorism in the contemporary wave has 
been temporally and spatially concentrated.  
4.2   Literature Review   
This section discusses the elements that characterise the current terrorist threat 
in Northern Ireland as well as the existing research on spatial and temporal 
patterns of terrorist violence. 
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4.2.1   The current threat from VDRs 
Prior to their final ceasefire on July 20, 1997, PIRA was the most prolific terrorist 
organisation operating within the region. Since then, the nationalist threat has 
instead emerged from multiple and distinct dissident Republican groups who 
reject the constitutional compromise accepted by PIRA leadership (Morrison, 
2013). Collectively, dissident Republican organisations maintain that the only 
acceptable outcome is the complete reunification of the island of Ireland 
(Frampton, 2011; Evans and Tonge, 2012; Frampton, 2012). They also take the 
view that PIRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, have become collaborators with 
the British state particularly through their endorsement of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI). Their principle strategy is to undermine the regime 
created by the Good Friday Agreement in a number of ways including: obstructing 
its institutions, seeking to increase British Army presence on the streets, offering 
alternative policing functions, seeking to recruit young members of the Catholic 
community, targeting Catholic members of the security and police forces and 
ultimately by precluding the establishment of a normalised existence. In essence, 
they hope to emphatically demonstrate that the agreement has failed (Frampton, 
2011, 2012; Bean, 2012). Their use of violence therefore intends to act as both a 
“medium of mobilisation and propaganda against the state” (Bean, 2012, p.213).  
However, lacking a comparable capability to PIRA (Frampton, 2012), they have 
been unable to undertake an intense and high profile campaign of violence. 
Instead, they use persistent and often low-level violence to shatter any illusion of 
peace and to occupy the resources of the police services, limiting their ability to 
fulfill their traditional role and consequently undermining their authority (Horgan 
and Morrison, 2011; Frampton, 2011; 2012). A core tactic of the current VDR 
campaign is the use of hoax devices, deliberately planted to disrupt civilians and 
occupy the security services’ time. There has been a dramatic increase in the use 
of hoaxes during the contemporary wave of VDR violence (Horgan and Morrison, 
2011), especially since 2009.  
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 4.2.2   Spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist violence  
Although far from comprehensive, there have been some applications of spatial, 
temporal and spatio-temporal analyses to terrorism.  The main limitation of most 
research thus far is that the geographical areas they cover are too large to have 
meaningful practical implications for the prevention and disruption of terrorist 
acts. Early analyses, for example, focused on the spatial distribution of terrorism 
worldwide. Midlarsky et al. (1980) argued that terrorism has a contagion like 
effect, having physical contiguity between locations. However, recent research 
has demonstrated that worldwide contagious diffusion of terrorism is rare, and 
non-contagious increases are more common than contagious increases (LaFree, 
2018).  
Using 73,961 attacks in 206 countries and territories in the period 1970-2006, 
LaFree et al. (2010) demonstrated that terrorism is clustered on a global level, 
with just 32 countries accounting for more than three-quarters of all attacks during 
this period. The results confirmed that terrorist attacks were highly concentrated 
across specific countries and that these concentrations were stable over time. 
Gao et al. (2013) also found terrorist events to cluster on a global level, and 
proposed that periodic (daily or weekly) monitoring of terrorist events can aid in 
the early identification of terrorist outbreaks within countries. Braithwaite and Li 
(2007) studied transnational terrorism to identify hotspots at the country level. 
They found that, whilst not all countries within a hotspot experienced a large 
number of incidents, if a country was within a hotspot it was likely to experience 
an increase in number of terrorist incidents in the next period. Countries with 
higher populations unsurprisingly generate and experience more terrorism 
(Neumayer and Plumper, 2010). Terrorism is also more frequent in countries with 
low per capita income and richer countries are more attractive for international 
terrorists.  
Terrorism is also clustered within countries. Savitch and Ardashev (2001) 
determined that terrorism is more common in cities than rural areas. Likewise, in 
their analyses of terrorist incidents in the US, both Nunn (2007) and Piegorsch et 
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al. (2007) concluded that terrorism clusters in urban areas. Python et al. (2016) 
used a Bayesian hierarchical framework to model the frequency of lethal attacks, 
as well as how lethal they were, through the integration of spatial and temporal 
dependencies. They found higher lethality for attacks close to large cities. When 
studying terrorist incidents in the U.S. from 1970-2004, Webb and Cutter (2009) 
found clear spatial and temporal patterns. Terrorism clustered in cities, with 
Washington D.C. and New York City accounting for a quarter of all activity within 
the U.S. throughout the period studied. Öcal and Yildirim (2010) used 
geographically weighted regressions to analyse variations in local activity of the 
Partiya Karekeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey. This method uses a sequence of 
linear regressions to model relationships that vary over space and time. Distance 
based weightings were used to provide parameter estimates for each 
geographical location and variable and produce values for each region. They 
found considerable variation in the spatial distribution of terrorism throughout the 
country. Rehman (2015) found that terrorist attacks in Pakistan were spatially 
clustered, and that if an intervention was implemented in a district, it caused 
significant displacement of terrorist incidents to neighbouring districts.  
As well as being spatially concentrated, like urban crime there is also an added 
temporal element in the clustering of terrorist attacks. Townsley et al. (2008) 
examined IED attacks in Iraq and found that they clustered in time and space. 
Johnson and Braithwaite’s (2009) study of insurgent attacks found a similar 
result, with an increased period of risk for a further attack in the immediate vicinity 
of an initial attack of four to five weeks. Siebeneck et al. (2009) also identified 
spatial clustering in Iraq in the period 2004-2006. They identified variations in 
patterns of attack frequency and intensity (determined by the number of victims). 
As the number of attacks per month increased, the intensity of the attacks 
decreased. They also found a statistically significant decrease in frequency and 
intensity on or around Islamic holidays, and an increase on or around American 
holidays. Medina et al. (2011) expanded on this to examine the spatial, temporal 
and spatio-temporal patterns of incidents in Iraq from 2004-2009. They found 
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variations in attack patterns over time and that while frequency of attacks 
correlated with population variables, the intensities of the attacks did not.  
Behlendorf et al. (2012) examined attacks by Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 
Spain, as well as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El 
Salvador. Using a dataset of 4000 attacks, they identified spatio-temporal 
clustering, and found the two groups to exhibit substantial similarities. They call 
these clusters ‘violent micro-cycles’ (2012:50), and found that bombings and non-
lethal attacks were more likely to be part of these micro-cycles than other types 
of attacks. Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) found the key determinants of spatial 
variation of risk of terrorist attacks in Israel to be proximity to operational bases 
and proximity to international borders. Areas near to international borders were 
twice as likely to be attacked than other areas. The risk of subsequent related 
incidents rose after an initial attack in Israel before returning to the baseline after 
approximately eight weeks. Marchione and Johnson (2013) found that following 
an initial incident of maritime piracy, the risk of a subsequent incident increased 
temporarily.  
Elevation in risk extends beyond the location of the original offence (Farrell, 1995; 
Pease, 1998). Townsley et al. (2003), and Johnson and Bowers (2004), found 
that after a residence has experienced an initial burglary there is a temporary 
elevation in risk of a further burglary at the same premise or a neighbour’s house. 
This is likely due to the number of potential opportunities identified by the offender 
when committing the initial offence. Similar patterns have been observed within 
and across different countries (Johnson et al., 2007) and across different crimes 
like assaults and robberies (Grubesic and Mack, 2008), shootings (Ratcliffe and 
Rengert, 2008), vehicle theft (Lockwood, 2012) and maritime piracy (Marchione 
and Johnson, 2013). Indeed, it has also been found in a terrorism context. For 
example, LaFree (2012) used logistic regression analyses to examine attacks by 
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) using data on previous incidents to aid in the 
prediction of the location of future attacks. They found differences in spatial 
patterns according to variations in the group’s strategy. The locations of previous 
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incidents and the time elapsed since these incidents were significant predictors 
of subsequent attacks. 
Mohler (2013) used a Hawkes-Cox process model to examine attacks in Northern 
Ireland. The identified pattern was like that of crime in Chicago, where 
approximately half of events could be attributed to contagion. A more recent study 
by Tench et al. (2016) also used a Hawkes process model to find that PIRA 
attacks between 1970 and 1998 were clustered in time. Again, changes in 
strategy were analogous with changes in the degree to which the attacks were 
clustered. There was also a relationship between PIRA’s reaction to counter-
terrorism events which resulted in fatalities. These findings lead to the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: After an initial incident of VDR violence, the risk of a subsequent 
incident will increase and then decrease  
The notion that crime is spatially clustered is widely supported in the 
criminological literature. Crimes are not equally or randomly distributed across 
locations (Block and Block, 1995), and occur when the following elements 
converge in space and time: when opportunities are presented to a motivated 
offender, through the availability of a suitable target, with the absence of a 
capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). These opportunities are identified 
within an offender’s awareness space, and as demonstrated in previous research 
and the preceding chapter of this thesis, terrorist offenders tend to travel short 
distances to commit their offences. Within cities, crime is typically concentrated 
at a small number of locations, known as ‘hotspots’ (Eck et al., 2000; Bowers, 
2014). These hotspots tend to be stable over time (Weisburd et al., 2004; Braga 
et al., 2010; Braga et al., 2011).  
Studies concerning the concentration of urban crimes consistently demonstrate 
significant intra-neighbourhood variance. This information can be lost if 
neighbourhoods are only considered as wholes (Weisburd et al., 2004; 2009; 
Groff et al., 2010). For example, ‘good’ neighbourhoods (i.e. those with low levels 
of residential burglary overall) may have several ‘bad’ streets (those that 
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experience a high level of burglary) and vice versa. Weisburd et al. (2004) found 
that 4-5% of street segments in Seattle accounted for 50% of all crime. Around 
half of all street segments did not experience any crime. There have been a 
substantial amount of studies examining the spatial and temporal patterns of 
terrorism at country, region and city level. Analyses at finer levels of aggregation, 
such as administrative output areas and street segments, are now commonplace 
in the study of urban crime. However, a shift to micro-place study is yet to be 
extended to the study of terrorism. It can be proposed that micro-level analyses 
are the most effective unit to use to guide any policing measures that may be 
implemented in this context, and analyses at this level will therefore be used in 
this chapter. It is hypothesised:  
H2: VDR incidents will be spatially clustered  
One of the key limitations of previous terrorism research is that studies often treat 
different types of attacks homogenously. It is unlikely that different incident types 
will occur in the same place. Where bombings are concerned, there may be 
additional logistical elements involved in setting up and detonating viable devices 
that are not required for hoax devices. Ease of access and escape will be more 
important for viable devices, and it is likely that there is some awareness and 
consideration of associated risk. Gill, Marchment, Corner and Bouhana (2018) 
demonstrate that terrorist actors consider risk in a similar way to other types of 
offenders. Therefore, it is hypothesised: 
H3: There will be differences in the locations of bombings and bomb hoaxes   
Røislien and Røislien (2010) propose that target accessibility is a crucial 
component of target selection. This is a logical suggestion as areas that are more 
accessible and connected to other parts of the city, i.e. those that contain a major 
thoroughfare, are likely to be travelled on more often than other smaller streets, 
such as cul-de-sacs. Major roads facilitate travel around the city and as such an 
individual’s familiarity with the area surrounding major thoroughfares is increased 
(Armitage, 2007). Therefore, it is likely that areas containing major roads will 
experience more attacks than those that are not, and it is hypothesised: 
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H4: VDR incidents will occur in close proximity to major roads  
The stark residential segregation of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland 
should also be considered. The separation of the two religious communities is a 
key characteristic of Northern Irish society that has helped in the understanding 
of many aspects of the conflict (Cairns, 1982; Hewstone et al., 2006). When 
optimal foraging theory is considered it is unlikely that members of VDR groups 
will regularly frequent Protestant areas (Hughes et al., 2008). These areas may 
not be in the offender’s cognitive awareness space and as such they would have 
limited knowledge about the inhabitants (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981) 
and physical infrastructure (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005). Carter and Hill 
(1979) found that, in the case of extremely segregated cities, an individual’s 
mental image of their city is often incomplete and strongly influenced by their 
racial background, due to the dangers of offending where they cannot blend in 
easily. Although this concept of ‘standing out’ in unknown territory is most obvious 
when considering race, the same effects may be reflected when considering 
religion. VDRs would be easily identifiable as the ‘opposite side’ (Gill, Horgan and 
Corner, 2017), and could be recognised as strangers to the area (Brown and 
Altman, 1981; Reynald et al., 2008; Bernasco and Block, 2009). Although it could 
be argued that a neighbourhood with a Protestant majority would be selected as 
a target area due to the availability of suitable targets it can be suggested that 
VDR members may avoid travelling through these neighbourhoods, to minimise 
the risk of detection and interception. Therefore, it is hypothesised: 
H5: VDR incidents will be more likely to occur in areas with Catholic 
majority  
 
4.3   Data and Analytical Strategy  
The subsequent analyses will examine VDR incidents in Belfast, between 
January 2007 and 2016. First, a Kaplan-Meier hazard estimate will be employed 
to examine temporal variation in risk of a VDR incident. Leading on from this, 
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bivariate analyses will be performed to see if any factors of an initial attack 
increase the likelihood of the next attack occurring within a specified time period 
established through the hazard estimate. Finally, spatial analyses will be 
performed. The locations and patterns of bombings and bomb hoaxes will be 
compared. 
4.3.1   Incident Data 
The dataset of terrorist incidents was obtained from Dr John Morrison of Royal 
Holloway University, most of which was previously compiled for the ‘Violent 
Dissident Republican Project’ (Horgan and Morrison, 2011). It was created using 
open sources (e.g., media sources, governmental and non-governmental reports) 
and included VDR incidents in Northern Ireland from 1990 until the end of 2016. 
The dataset consisted of violent and non-violent incidents and included 
information regarding the date and time of the incident, the location of the 
incident, incident type, victim type, and so on. To maximise the utility for potential 
use by practitioners only attacks that took place during the third Contemporary 
wave (as defined by Horgan and Morrison) - January 2007 to December 2016 - 
were used for the analyses. There was a substantial increase in VDR violence 
during this time, especially after Sinn Fein’s 2007 decision to support the PSNI.  
4.3.2   Kaplan Meier Hazard Estimate  
A Kaplan-Meier hazard estimate was performed to examine temporal variation in 
the risk of a subsequent incident after an initial incident. This method was used 
to enable comparisons to previous research on temporal risk variations for 
terrorist incidents (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Johnson and Braithwaite, 
2009). The procedure outlined by Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) was followed. 
After an initial incident (i), the time elapsed until the next incident (i+1) was 
calculated for each incident in the dataset. This is expressed algebraically as 
follows: there are N total incidents, x(0) of which experience a subsequent 
incident (i+1) on the same day, x(1) on the following day, x(2) 2 days later, and 
so on, until x(t). The risk of a further incident on the same day is therefore 
calculated as: x(0)/N. The risk of an incident on the next day (i+1) is calculated 
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as x(1)/(N-x(0)), the risk of an incident two days later is x(2)/(N-x(0)-x(1)) and so 
on15. The hazard rate was computed and plotted against time to estimate the 
probability of a further incident occurring within Northern Ireland following an 
initial incident.  
4.3.3   Bivariate Analyses  
Following on from the hazard estimate, chi square tests of independence were 
run to see if any factors of an initial attack increased the likelihood of the next 
attack occurring within 4 days. The variables were coded as follows: A categorical 
variable was used to represent whether the time elapsed between incident i and 
the next event (incident i+1) was within 4 days. Binary indicator variables were 
used to indicate whether incident i resulted in a) casualties or b) fatalities; whether 
the incident involved the use of c) a viable explosive device; or d) a fake device; 
and e) whether the focus of the attack was civilians (as opposed to the security 
services). 
 
4.3.4   Spatial Statistics 
Geographical Data and Units of Analysis 
Belfast was a logical choice for the spatial analyses as it had experienced the 
most VDR incidents during this time (around one third of all incidents in Northern 
Ireland). It is the capital and largest city of Northern Ireland and is on the flood 
plain of the River Lagan. The spatial analyses were focused on two incident 
types: bombings and hoaxes. The dataset for these analyses consisted of all 
cases of bombings and hoaxes where the street address for the incident was 
                                                             
15 The smallest unit of time available for all events was the date on which the incident occurred. 
This excludes the possibility of determining the ordering of events when multiple incidents took 
place on the same day. However, this was not problematic in relation to the present analysis as 
it was necessary only to measure the elapsed time between incidents. For example, where three 
incidents occurred on the same date, two of these can safely be considered to have preceded at 
least one incident on the same day. In each case the elapsed time would be zero days. 
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known. All cases that were not located in Belfast had been removed from the 
dataset. The latitude and longitude coordinates were determined for the street of 
each incident. If the street address of the incident was not known, the case was 
removed from the dataset (n=3)16. To conduct the analyses within a Geographic 
Information System (GIS) it was necessary to geocode all incidents in the dataset 
and convert into a point shapefile. These were then appended to ward, small area 
(SA) and street level in ArcMap. CrimeStatIV was used to calculate the nearest 
neighbour indexes. All other spatial statistics were conducted in ArcMap. 
‘Small area’ and street level analyses were conducted. Since 2011, Northern 
Ireland has been divided into 4537 small areas (SAs) which are currently the 
smallest geographical unit above streets and will be used for most of the spatial 
statistics in this chapter. It was decided that this was the best unit to use as they 
are not only the smallest level above streets, but they were designed specifically 
for statistical purposes and follow physical features of the environment such as 
roads and rivers (NISRA, 2011). The shapefile for SAs was obtained from 
OpenDataNI, and the shapefile for streets was obtained from OpenStreetMap. 
Small Area Characteristics 
Major thoroughfares (A-roads) were identified using the Ordnance Survey of 
Northern Ireland. Religious data was taken from the 2011 census, obtained from 
the Northern Ireland Research and Statistics Agency (NISRA).  
Nearest Neighbour Analyses 
A Nearest Neighbour Index (Nni) was calculated for each type of incident in 
CrimeStatIV. This method was used as a starting point to determine whether each 
type of incident was clustered or dispersed more than would be expected by 
chance, and to what degree. The nearest neighbour index is the ratio of the 
                                                             
16 it was necessary to remove 2 bombings and 1 hoax due to missing geographical information). 
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observed nearest neighbour distance to the mean random distance, and is 
calculated as follows: 
Nearest Neighbour Index = !"#$%&#	(#%$#)*	(#+&,-./$012#3*#4	%"#$%&#	(#%$#)*	(#+&,-./$ 
Where: 
Average Nearest Neighbour = 5+)*%(3#6/7-#$	.8	#"#(*) 
And: 
Expected Average Nearest Neighbour = 9:; !$#%6/7-#$	.8	2.+(*) 
If the observed average distance is like the mean random distance, then the ratio 
will be close to 1. If the observed average distance is smaller than the mean 
random distance then the nearest neighbour index will be less than 1, indicative 
of clustering. If the observed average distance is greater than the mean random 
(expected) distance, then the index will be greater than 1, indicative of dispersion 
(CrimeStat Manual, Chapter 5). The significance test for the nearest neighbour 
index determines whether the average nearest neighbour distance is significantly 
different than what would be expected by chance.  
Thematic Mapping 
Thematic mapping visualises spatial variations across defined geographical 
units, such as census boundaries. In this case, frequency of incidents were 
divided into bombings and bomb hoaxes, and aggregated to small areas and 
streets. These counts by geographic area were used to create thematic maps to 
display the distribution of incidents across Belfast.   
Although thematic mapping is a useful tool in exploratory analysis, it is subject to 
limitations such as the ecological fallacy17 and any analyses using geographical 
                                                             
17  Where an inference is made about an individual based on aggregate data for a group. 
Ecological fallacy effects are endemic when using areal units such as district boundaries, as they 
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boundaries defined by census administration are subject to the modifiable area 
unit problem (MAUP) (Openshaw, 1984).18 Using different boundaries can result 
in significantly different maps. Therefore, several types of spatial statistics were 
employed to gain a better understanding of the data.  
Local Indicators of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA): Local Moran’s I  
Local Moran’s I (Anselin, 1995) is a measure of spatial autocorrelation or 
dependency: the degree to which the value of a variable at one location is 
influenced by neighbouring locations, i.e. the clustering of ‘like’ values. When 
used for operational purposes, Local Morans I is preferred to other methods of 
hotspot analysis (i.e. the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic) because it can identify 
statistically significant clusters of neighbouring features with similar values, as 
well as outliers.  
Spatial autocorrelation is important as it provides information on the degree to 
which the locations of events are related to each other (Levine, 2013). Tobler 
(1970: 236) posited that “everything is related to everything else, but near things 
are more related than distant things”, therefore places closer together are more 
likely to have similar values. Whereas the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic can ascertain 
where features with either high or low values cluster (surrounded by other 
similarly valued features), Local Morans I can distinguish between statistically 
significant clusters of high values surrounded by high values (HH), low values 
surrounded by low values (LL), high values surrounded by low values (HL), and 
low values surrounded by high values (LH). 
For this chapter, each pair (L, N) of local (L) and neighbouring (N) SAs consist of 
the standardised level of incidents in each spatial unit. These are standardised 
relative to their respective mean and standard deviation across the spatial units. 
                                                             
are typically defined in an arbitrary manner and are rarely natural or meaningful (Openshaw, 
1982). 
18 “The results of any geographic aggregation process, such as the count of crimes within a set 
of geographic boundaries, may be as much a function of the size, shape and orientation of the 
geographic areas as it is of the spatial distribution of the crime data” (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005: 
151-152). 
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Neighbouring SAs are those that are adjacent to the local SA and share a 
common border. Each SA is classified as having either low (L) or high (H) 
frequency, relative to the distribution of local and neighbour values across the 
whole area. If the two SAs both have values above their respective means then 
they will be classified as high-high (HH). If they are below their means then they 
will be classified as low-low (LL). If the local and neighbouring SA differ then they 
will be classified as high-low (HL) or low-high (LH). 
Kernel Density Estimation  
A Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) of each incident type was produced to identify 
hotspots within the city. This method was used as it is not constrained by 
boundaries and allows incidents to be mapped over a continuous surface, so it is 
easier to interpret where incidents are clustered. KDE calculates a magnitude-
per-unit area from point features using a kernel function to fit a smoothly tapered 
surface to each point. The individual density surfaces are integrated in order to 
generate a continuous density surface over the entire area.  Quartic function of 
interpolation was used as it weighs near points more than far points and so the 
risk of repeat and near repeat victimisation is considered according to its distance 
decay (Johnson et al., 2009; Levine, 2013). This function also has high predictive 
accuracy and distinguishes peaks within the data (as opposed to a more 
generalised smoothing of the surface) (Drawve, 2016).  Cell size resolution was 
set according to the division of the shorter side of the minimum bounding 
rectangle19 by 150 (Ratcliffe, 2004). Bandwidth was selected by multiplying the 
median nearest neighbour distance by 6 (Brimicombe, 2004). The bandwidth 
determines the number of observations (incidents) around each point and 
controls the distance decay in weighting function. The larger the distance 
between any incident and the location of estimating the density, the less weight 
is assigned. This non-parametric approach has been widely applied to 
                                                             
19 The shortest of the two extents between the maximum x and minimum x, and maximum y and 
minimum y  
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characterise spatial crime data as it is has high predictive accuracy (Chainey et 
al., 2008).  
 
4.4   Results  
4.4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Between 1st January 2007 and 31st December 2016 Northern Ireland experienced 
920 VDR related incidents, including bombings; bomb hoaxes; shootings; 
assaults; arsons; hijackings; kidnappings; protests; and riots. Of these, 61% 
occurred in Belfast or Londonderry. The final working dataset for Belfast 
consisted of 293 incidents where the precise location was known. This included 
99 bombings and 89 bomb hoaxes for the spatial statistics. 
4.4.2    Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimate  
The results of the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimate demonstrate that the risk of 
another attack is highest the day after an initial incident, before steadily declining, 
thus supporting hypothesis one (see figure 4.1). Around 23% of incidents were 
likely to be followed by another incident the next day. The risk of a subsequent 
incident on the same day is also high, with around 20% of succeeding incidents 
likely to be experienced the same day as an initial incident. After the second day, 
the hazard rate begins to decline quite substantially, reaching a low level at 4 
days, and 0.01% at around 10 days. Around 12 days after an initial incident there 
is a slightly elevated level of risk, rising to 0.05 and then declining to 0.007%. 
After 3 weeks, the chance of a subsequent incident levels off at 0.001%.   
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4.4.3    Bivariate Analyses 
Chi square tests of independence were conducted to see if any attributes of an 
initial VDR incident in Northern Ireland (fatalities; injuries; use of a viable 
explosive device; use of a fake device; aimed at civilians) were associated with a 
subsequent incident occurring after an initial incident within 4 days. Two variables 
demonstrated significant results. If the initial incident resulted in injuries χ(1) = 
12.810, p <.001, or involved the use of a viable explosive device χ(1) = 4.081, p 
=.043, a subsequent incident was less likely within 4 days.  
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Figure 4.1. Hazard estimate of VDR incident risk within Northern Ireland following 
an initial incident 
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4.4.4    Spatial Statistics 
Taken together, the analyses presented in this section indicate that VDR 
incidents were spatially clustered during the period studied. It can be concluded 
that future VDR incidents are not likely to be randomly distributed, and that 
different incident types yield different spatial patterns. The general pattern was 
that most of the city was free from incidents, reinforcing previous findings of urban 
crime that most places experience little or no crime.  
Nearest Neighbour Analyses 
The nearest neighbour index for bombings indicated that this type of incident was 
significantly spatially clustered: Nni = 0.62, (p<.001), providing further support for 
hypothesis one. Hoaxes were also significantly spatially clustered, to a greater 
extent than bombings: Nni = 0.37, (p<.001).  
Thematic Mapping 
Just 8.5% (n=74) of SAs (see figures 4.2, 4.3 4.4 and 4.5) and 1.2% (n=97) of 
streets experienced a bombing. The highest frequency of bombings occurred in 
a residential area to the west of the city centre. 7.77% (n=68) of SAs (see figures 
4 and 5) and 1.03% of streets (n=82) experienced a hoax. Most hoaxes occurred 
in the city centre.   
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Figure 4.2. Thematic map of bombings in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2016 at 
small area level 
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Figure 4.3. Thematic map of hoaxes in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2016 at 
small area level 
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Figure 4.4. Thematic map of bombings in Belfast, January 2007 – December 
2016 at small area level (zoom) 
Figure 4.5. Thematic map of hoaxes in Belfast, January 2007 – December 
2016 at small area level (zoom) 
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There was high street by street variation in SAs with high frequencies, with a 
small number of streets accounting for the total high count. Examples are 
provided in figures 4 and 5. This highlights how thematic maps at SA level can 
be misleading, as they highlight the whole of these areas as having a high 
frequency of incidents, and suggests that the incidents were uniformly distributed 
throughout. However, when looking at the street level, it is evident that they 
occurred on just a few streets. This reinforces the need for spatial analyses 
regarding terrorism to move towards smaller levels of analysis that are now 
common within the study of urban crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Thematic map of bombings in Belfast, January 2007 – December 
2016 at SA and street level 
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Local Moran’s I  
Most SAs were non-significant for both types of incident, meaning that the count 
of incidents was not significantly correlated with the count of incidents in 
surrounding SAs, either positively or negatively. The remaining SAs were 
classified into four categories, all of which indicate significant local spatial 
autocorrelation.  
For bombings (see figure 6), 12 SAs were identified as high-high clusters, 
indicative of significant positive spatial autocorrelation, meaning each of these 
SAs had a high frequency of bombings and were surrounded by other areas with 
high levels. Several high-low (n=24) and low-high (n=80) outliers were identified, 
representative of negative spatial autocorrelation. No low-Low clusters were 
identified. 
Figure 4.7. Thematic map of hoaxes in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2016 
at street level 
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Most SAs for hoaxes (see figure 7) were also non-significant. 11 SAs were 
identified as high-high clusters, indicative of significant positive spatial 
autocorrelation. Several high-low (n=18) and low-high (n=86) outliers were 
identified, representative of negative spatial autocorrelation. One low-low cluster 
was identified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Local Moran’s I of bombings in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2016 
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Figure 4.9. Local Moran’s I of hoaxes in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2016 
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Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) 
Data between January 2007 and December 2013 were used for the KDEs. The 
KDE for bombings identified three main hotspots. Two were to the south of the 
city centre, and the third was to the west. For hoaxes, two main hotspots were 
identified. The first was in the city centre, and the second was to the south west 
of the first.  
Figure 4.10. KDEs of bombings in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2013 
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Figure 4.11. KDEs of bomb hoaxes in Belfast, January 2007 – December 2013 
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Predictive accuracy of KDE  
Due to a limited amount of data any assessment of predictive accuracy of 
methods used in this thesis is reliant on descriptive statistics. Incidents occurring 
between January 2014 and December 2017 were plotted to see if KDE could be 
a useful tool in identifying areas at future risk of a VDR incidents (see figure 9).  
Several post-2013 bombings occurred areas with low-medium density. Only 3 
bombings occurred in high or very high density areas (see table 1). Most hoaxes 
occurred in high or medium density areas.  
Figure 4.12. Locations of 2014-2017 bombings 
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Table 4.1. Locations of 2014-2017 bombings and bomb hoaxes by to density 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Locations of 2014-2017 hoaxes 
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Proximity to major thoroughfares 
SAs that experienced VDR incidents were more likely to be in closer proximity to 
major roads (A-roads). A Mann-Whitney U test revealed significant differences in 
distance to a major road for SAs that experienced bombings (mean rank = 
368.75) and those that didn’t (mean rank = 444.4), (U = 24512.5 (z = -2.464), p 
= 0.014) and SAs that experienced hoaxes (mean rank = 354.99) and those that 
didn’t (mean rank = 445), (U = 21793 (z = -2.820), p = 0.005. These analyses 
were conducted using the distance between the geometric centroid (the centre 
point) of each SA and a polyline file of the major roads.  
Religious Segregation 
Most areas that experienced several VDR incidents had a Catholic majority. 
Spearman’s correlations were run at SA level to determine the relationship 
between the number of attacks and percentages of Catholic and Protestant 
residents.  
There were weak, positive correlations between percentage of Catholic residents 
and all incidents (r = .282, p <.001); bombings (r =.125 p <.001) and hoaxes (r 
=.145 p <.001); thus supporting hypothesis 5. Weak negative correlations were 
found between percentage of Protestant residents and all incidents (r=-.274 
p<.001); bombings (r=-.116 p<.001); hoaxes (r=-.141 p<.001). 
 
4.5   Discussion  
The aim of this chapter was to identify spatial and temporal patterns of incidents 
by VDRs in Northern Ireland, and establish if the risk of a subsequent incident is 
extended beyond an initial incident. The findings shed some light on the current 
threat to U.K. national security and are a step forward in establishing an effective 
police response to the problem of VDR terrorism in Northern Ireland and within 
Belfast. The findings reinforce the importance of considering information about 
the timing and location of previous attacks to quantify the risk of subsequent 
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attacks. Within Northern Ireland, the incidents were spatially clustered and mainly 
concentrated in two cities. The most common types of incidents were bombings, 
bomb hoaxes and punishment attacks. 
In line with hypothesis one, the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimate revealed the risk 
of a subsequent incident to be highest the day after an initial incident before 
steadily declining. The next highest level of risk was the same day. After the 
second day, the hazard rate begins to decline quite substantially, reaching a 
lower level at 4 days and reaching a plateau after 3 weeks. If an attack has taken 
place, then a subsequent attack is high within this period. This finding is in line 
with previous studies which found the risk of a subsequent incident to be elevated 
after an initial incident (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Johnson and Braithwaite, 
2009; Marchione and Johnson, 2013), however the period of elevated risk is quite 
different. Johnson and Braithwaite (2009) found an increased level of risk for four 
to five weeks, and Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) found an elevated risk for eight 
weeks. This may be a function of the capability of the group or may be reflective 
of the types of incidents carried out. Different conflicts present different patterns 
and therefore it should not be assumed that the results of this hazard estimate 
will transfer across different territories.  
The chi square analyses revealed that if an attack resulted in injuries, it was less 
likely to be followed by a subsequent attack within 4 days. An incident resulting 
in injuries could be inferred as a ‘successful’ incident. An attack was also less 
likely within 4 days if a viable explosive device was used. The use of a viable 
device is likely to involve more planning than a hoax device, and greater expertise 
and resources are needed to create the device. Future research could examine 
the interactions between security incidents and police responses and counter 
terrorism strategies. Unfortunately it was not possible to include this in the 
analyses. It could be that an increased security response following an incident 
may have deterred VDRs from committing further attacks within a close time 
period. The results from the Kaplan-Meier indicate that increased patrols 
following an initial attack are warranted. It would have been preferable to analyse 
findings with a comparison of locations pre and post a specific intervention. This 
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data was unavailable for the current study, but there may be a possibility to 
include it in future research.  
Consistent with hypothesis two, both types of attacks were spatially clustered. 
The analyses revealed non-random distribution within the city and indicated that 
incidents were geographically concentrated in specific areas. Large areas of the 
city experienced no or very few attacks. The east side of the city experienced few 
attacks when compared to the west. The area between the Crumlin and Falls 
roads experienced very few attacks, as did the outer areas of the city. The nearest 
neighbour analyses revealed that both incident types were significantly spatially 
clustered. The results are consistent with findings for insurgent activity in 
countries such as Iraq and Palestine (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Johnson 
and Braithwaite, 2009). Most streets in the city experienced no attacks at all 
during the period studied. This finding is consistent with the wider criminological 
literature and the pareto principle.  
High degree of variability was found between and within SAs. This highlights the 
importance of using micro level geographical units for the analysis of terrorist 
threats. Some of the analyses in this study are subject to the modifiable area unit 
problem (MAUP) (Openshaw, 1984), as they required the data to be spatially 
aggregated to areas as geographical boundaries defined by census 
administration were used (small areas and streets). As Chainey and Ratcliffe 
(2005, p. 151-152) effectively describe, “the results of any geographic 
aggregation process, such as the count of crimes within a set of geographic 
boundaries, may be as much a function of the size, shape and orientation of the 
geographic areas as it is of the spatial distribution of the crime data”. Using 
different boundaries can result in significantly different maps. There are 
numerous alternative ways that the data could have been aggregated, all of which 
may have had different outcomes. This is a potential source of error that can 
affect outcomes of spatially aggregated data. However, analyses at street level 
minimise the aggregation and therefore limit the risk of ecological fallacy 
(Brantingham et al., 1976). Spatial heterogeneity (uneven distribution of 
population and environmental factors), that is often observed when using large 
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areal units, is also reduced when using street segment level of analysis (Smith et 
al., 2000). This level is also the most useful for practical interventions and policy 
implications.  
The use of the KDEs overcame these problems, as this method smooths the 
surface and is not constrained by boundaries. However, KDE is also subject to 
some limitations. As it is a smoothing technique some of the surface may cover 
areas where no incidents have occurred, and therefore exaggerate the extent of 
the problem. The interpretation of the KDE can be also subjective, as the risk 
density thresholds can be changed.  KDE also ignores the influence of the street 
network on the locations of incidents. This means any features of the street 
network that may be factors in target selection are disregarded. This highlights 
the need for a combined approach when analysing VDR incidents in Northern 
Ireland.  
The Local Moran’s I analyses were used to enhance the understanding of the 
underlying spatial patterns by measuring the extent of similarity or dissimilarity of 
VDR incidents across neighbouring spatial units. They identified several clusters 
of neighbours with high-high values. These statistically significant clusters are 
indicative of underlying favourable conditions that extend beyond a single spatial 
unit (SA). However, numerous outliers for both types of incident were also 
identified, in many different areas of the city. There may be different factors in 
these neighbouring areas that create favourable or disadvantageous conditions 
for these incidents. Further analyses should be conducted to identify situational 
factors of these areas that may be correlated with bombings and hoaxes.  
Consistent with hypothesis three, differences in locations were found for 
bombings and bomb hoaxes, as visualised in the thematic maps at small area 
and street level. The highest frequency of bombings was in a residential area 
whereas the highest frequency of hoaxes was in the city centre. This 
demonstrates that there may be different factors at play when distinguishing 
targets for different types of attacks and provides further support for the 
disaggregation of incidents when conducting analyses of terrorist target selection.  
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In line with hypothesis four, VDR incidents were more likely to occur in areas in 
closer proximity to major roads. As mentioned in the literature review of this 
chapter, crime pattern theory suggests that streets that are more likely to be 
travelled upon may be more likely to experience incidents. Future research could 
build on this by applying graph theoretical measures to identify risky streets 
through an analysis of the street network. Some sections of streets are more 
likely to feature in routes than others. The types of streets least likely to 
experience urban crimes are cul-de-sacs and private roads (Johnson and 
Bowers, 2010; 2013), even when accounting for factors such as levels of 
deprivation. These are also the types of streets that are the least likely to be 
travelled upon. Due to time constraints20, this was not possible for the present 
analyses.  
As predicted in the hypothesis five, most incidents occurred in areas with Catholic 
majorities. The number of Catholics in an area was positively correlated with the 
number of incidents. This provides further support for the notion that terrorists are 
rational actors, assessing risks and committing acts within their awareness 
space. The number of Protestants was negatively correlated with number of 
incidents. This contrasts with Berrebi and Lakdawalla’s findings that the presence 
of a targeted group increased the risk of an attack.  
As the dataset used was reliant on open source information some incidents that 
received very little media attention may have been unintentionally omitted. As 
hoax devices are a non-lethal tactic it is likely that they are under-reported. 
Further, as no closed source information was included there could have been 
many thwarted incidents that could have added further depth to these analyses. 
Inevitably, with all analyses of this kind, there could be errors in the reporting of 
the exact location where each incident occurred which may affect the outcome.  
                                                             
20 An accurate and appropriate shapefile (with street segments of equal or similar length) of the 
Belfast street network for use in a graph theory analysis could not be located, and as such would 
need to be created manually, taking a great deal amount of time).  
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As touched upon in the theory section, different groups have different strategies 
and capabilities, so it cannot be said that these results can be effectively 
generalised to all terrorist groups. However, this chapter again provides further 
support for the notion that terrorist actors behave similarly to urban criminals, as 
the findings suggest that they are acting rationally and carefully selecting targets.  
Although this analysis has identified hotspots of terrorist activity, potential 
correlates of these hotspots are yet to be determined. The environmental 
backcloth needs to be studied to determine if there are features of the 
environment that may be correlated with increased risk. Studies of urban crime 
may focus on features such as crime attractors and generators, but there may be 
something else guiding terrorist activity, i.e. features related to ideology.  
 
4.6   Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate that, like urban crimes, attacks by VDRs 
in Belfast were spatially and temporally clustered during the period studied. The 
results of these analyses may have important practical implications for policing in 
Northern Ireland. The hotspots identified in the analyses provide an indicator for 
areas which may be at an increased risk of an attack, and therefore should 
receive priority when it comes to patrolling and other measures such as target 
hardening. Prevention efforts must be proactive, not reactive (Ratcliffe, 2009) and 
there is a growing body of research to suggest that a focus of police resources 
on hot spot areas can significantly disrupt and ultimately reduce crime (Braga et 
al., 2014). If any measures were to be implemented using the results of these 
analyses, a follow up study is necessary to assess their efficacy.  
The analyses revealed that KDE may be an effective way of predicting further 
attacks. However, although hotspots of activity have been established, any 
potential correlates of the hotspots are yet to be identified. Using a KDE approach 
in prevention efforts for terrorist attacks will not be possible in cities or towns that 
have experienced very few attacks. Therefore, any insights into the causes of 
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these hotspots will be beneficial and have the potential to be applicable across 
different contexts. Taking the results of this chapter, the next chapter builds on 
these analyses by using risk terrain modelling to determine the underlying factors 
causing VDR bombings and bomb hoaxes to cluster within the city.  
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Chapter 5    Risk Terrain Modelling of VDR incidents: a 
comparison of bombings and bomb hoaxes in Belfast. 
 
 
5.1   Introduction  
The previous chapter concluded that VDR activity in Belfast was spatially 
clustered during the period studied. However, the spatial analyses were unable 
to identify potential underlying correlates of these hotspots – just the fact they 
exist. This is also common in other analyses demonstrating spatial and temporal 
variation in risk of terrorist attacks (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Townsley et 
al., 2008; Johnson and Braithwaite, 2009; Siebeneck et al., 2009; Medina et al., 
2011; Behlendorf et al., 2012; Mohler, 2013; Tench et al, 2016). Fortunately, risk 
terrain modelling (hereafter, RTM) was developed in the study of urban crime to 
quantitatively assess the spatial influence of features of the urban landscape and 
identify areas where criminal activity is likely to emerge or persist. RTM has been 
applied to many different urban crimes including burglaries (Gale and Hollernan, 
2013; Moreto et al., 2013), robberies (Kennedy and Gaziarifoglu, 2011; Dugato, 
2013), shootings (Caplan et al, 2011; Drawve et al., 2016a), aggravated assaults 
(Kennedy et al., 2015; Anyinam, 2015; Kocher and Leitner, 2015), and assaults 
on police (Drawve and Barnum, 2018).  
Because RTM includes contextual information relevant to the social and physical 
environment, it should be an appropriate approach to use in assessing terrorism 
risk. Whilst retrospective hot spot mapping attempts to predict the likelihood of 
future attack locations based solely on where attacks have previously occurred 
(Johnson et al., 2007), RTM can be used to estimate future risks of all areas 
according to the presence of correlated risk factors. Indeed, RTM can outperform 
retrospective mapping. The inclusion of environmental risk values has produced 
better violent crime prediction models than those produced solely with hot spots 
(Kennedy et al., 2011; Caplan et al., 2013a). In both Yerxa (2013) and Dugato 
(2013), RTM outperformed kernel density estimation (KDE). In Drawve et al. 
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(2016a) RTM was more precise than the nearest neighbour hierarchical (Nnh) 
method. Research consistently demonstrates that RTM can be an important 
crime prevention tool (Kennedy, 2011). However, its application to terrorist 
attacks has been extremely limited, with only two published studies available 
(according to the author’s knowledge) (Onat, 2016; Onat and Gul, 2018). 
This chapter examines the influences of social and physical context on target 
selection. The aim is to identify risk factors related to VDR activity in Belfast and 
to assess the predictive accuracy of this type of model. As well as being the first 
application of RTM to terrorism in a Western context, it is the first to compare two 
types of terrorist incident using this method. 
 
5.2   Literature Review 
This section begins with a discussion of the current literature regarding the use 
of RTM and crime. Next, to develop the RTMs used in this study, potential risk 
factors for VDR attacks must be determined. As such, existing target selection 
studies and literature relevant to the Northern Irish context is then reviewed. 
5.2.1   Risk terrain modelling  
Building on the foundations of environmental criminology, Caplan and Kennedy 
(2010) developed RTM to assess the risk of an incident occurring by analysing 
the level of opportunity a location may offer to an offender seeking a target. Each 
location has an associated value to an offender, which is determined by the 
opportunity for crime that it offers. RTM can be used to identify the locations that 
have the greatest estimated opportunity and therefore pose the highest level of 
risk. RTM identifies features that are potentially correlated with the presence or 
absence of future event(s) in a particular location. The presence of relevant 
features that are deemed to have a spatial influence on increasing the likelihood 
of crime determine the level of risk. In combination, these correlates of criminal 
events can identify areas within a city at the highest risk of future incidents.  
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As previously stated, RTM has been applied to a wide number of crime types and 
the spatial features examined vary from study to study. For example, Gale and 
Hollernan (2013) applied RTM to residential burglaries. They found significant 
associations between burglaries and concentrations of bus stops, which can offer 
an offender easy access and escape when committing their crimes. Calls to the 
police regarding suspicious vehicles and persons were also significant correlates 
for residential burglary. The areas with the highest concentrations of these three 
factors had the highest concentration of offences. Moreto et al. (2013) found 
residential burglaries were more likely to occur in places spatially influenced by 
factors such as the presence of pawn shops, at-risk housing and drug markets.  
Kennedy and Gaziarifoglu’s (2011) analyses of street robbery found five 
associated risk factors: bus stops, retail venues, banks, drug arrests and 
prostitution arrests. Once these factors had been combined and reclassified 
according to risk levels, they concluded that a robbery was almost 2.3 times more 
likely to occur with every unit increase in the risk value of a cell. Dugato (2013) 
identified transport stations, public housing, prostitution offences, banks, licensed 
premises and post offices as risk factors for robberies. Daley et al. (2016) applied 
RTM to identify areas at high risk of instances of child maltreatment, including 
neglect, physical abuse and sexual abuse. In the year after the study, half of all 
instances occurred in the top 10% of the areas deemed as having the highest 
risk, with 98% of cases occurring in areas that were identified by the model as 
being at elevated risk. 
RTM has also been successfully applied to violent crimes, such as shootings 
(Caplan et al., 2011). Kennedy et al. (2015) found known problem buildings, 
foreclosures, and gang hotspots to be significantly correlated with aggravated 
assaults in Chicago. Interestingly, variables typically associated with assaults in 
other cities, such as bars and liquor stores, were less likely to be associated with 
this type of crime within the Chicago context. Drawve et al. (2016a) tested the 
predictive accuracy of RTM for shootings (Drawve et al., 2016a). Six of the seven 
social and physical environmental measures they tested in the RTM significantly 
predicted future gun crime locations: on-site consumption and off-site 
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consumption alcohol establishments; fast food establishments; drug incidents; 
percentage of black residents and percentage of male residents. Drawve and 
Barnum (2018) applied RTM to aggravated assault and found bus stops and 
liquor stores to be significant risk factors.  
Although the application of RTM to terrorism has been limited, it has been used 
to identify risk factors related to armed conflict (Gaziarifoglu et al., 2012) which 
include variables commonly used to study terrorism, such as population density, 
political instability and ethnic or religious divisions in society (i.e Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Goldstone, 2010). However, almost all 
risk indicators identified so far are based on studies of armed conflict in African 
countries and therefore may yield different results to those in Europe (Buhaug 
and Rød, 2006). Prior studies are also largely focused on social factors (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Goldstone, 2010), which tend to be 
consistent across large geographical areas, and as such provide little utility to 
prevention efforts at micro places  
To the author’s knowledge, at present there have only been two applications of 
RTM to terrorist attacks at the micro level. Onat (2016) identified areas that were 
at risk of attack from terrorist groups in Istanbul. He found the riskiest factor in 
the urban environment to be the presence of bakeries. Although this type of 
building has no symbolic value, bakeries have a social meaning in Turkish culture 
and are visited frequently by most residents. Thus, bakeries have a role in an 
individual’s daily routine. Because they attract large numbers of people daily, they 
can be considered a generator for many available targets. This again highlights 
the importance of considering an individual’s every day behaviour, and their 
awareness space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981), in the selection of 
targets. Other significant correlates included religious facilities, bars and clubs, 
and grocery stores. Whereas these latter significant correlates may be 
generalisable to other conflicts, the presence of bakeries may be culturally-
specific to certain contexts. Thus, RTM’s application to terrorism warrants further 
testing in non-similar cities.  
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Building from the prior RTM study of terrorism in Istanbul, Onat and Gul (2018) 
identified differences in terrorist targeting according to two ideologies: separatist 
and leftist groups. Grocery stores, bakeries, bars/clubs, and educational facilities 
were identified as risk factors for both types. They also found differences in risk 
factors for attacks by each group. Religious facilities and office blocks were 
significant correlates of separatist attacks but not for leftist attacks. Government 
buildings were found to be a significant risk factor for leftist attacks only. This 
paper also built on Onat (2016) by testing the predictive accuracy of the RTM. In 
the 20 month period following their RTM, almost half of the attacks occurred in 
the top 10% highest risk cells, and nearly 80% in the top 20% highest risk cells. 
The model was based on the preceding 36-month period. 
5.2.2   Spatial risk factors of VDR attacks  
To test the utility of RTM for terrorism, as well as to generate the relevant 
hypotheses and risk factors, it was necessary to first select a geographical area 
that had experienced several incidents. Belfast was selected as the city has been 
central to the Northern Ireland conflict and experienced the most VDR activity to 
date. Next, to develop the RTM, potential risk factors for VDR attacks had to be 
determined through a review of existing target selection literature to identify 
potential correlates. These were then operationalised to geographic units over a 
continuous surface, and incorporated into the model. The following features were 
considered: crime generators and attractors, symbolic buildings related to 
ideology, the social context and other related VDR activity. 
Crime generators are places that attract large numbers of people for reasons 
unrelated to criminal motivation, but offer increased opportunities for crime due 
to the high footfall (Clarke and Eck, 2003). For terrorist attacks, crime generators 
are likely to attract offenders due to the large amount of people in one space, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of a high number of casualties and witnesses, 
and increased likelihood of disruption. These areas also offer easy means of 
escape, as the attacker can move discreetly throughout the crowd. As suggested 
above, the existing RTM literature consistently suggests two types of such crime 
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generators: commercial establishments (pubs/bars, restaurants/cafes, shops) 
and transport hubs. Additionally, for the Northern Ireland context, it might be 
worth considering the presence of sports clubs. Such locations, such as football 
clubs, attract large numbers of people and play an important part in Northern Irish 
culture (Kurland et al., 2014a, 2014b). Football is religiously divided in Northern 
Ireland (Bairner and Shirlow, 1998; Cronin, 2000), and violent conflict between 
clubs is well known and documented (Bairner, 1999).  
Ideology impacts terrorist targeting because it “sets out the moral framework 
within which they operate” (Drake, 1998, p.53). There should therefore be some 
consideration of VDR ideology and this further highlights the need for conflict-
specific risk terrain modelling. Since VDRs reject UK government rule in Northern 
Ireland, government buildings are likely to act as crime attractors due to the 
quantity of government workers present in the buildings and in the surrounding 
areas. When considering urban crimes, premises such a police stations can be 
considered as crime detractors. However, VDR groups consider the police an 
illegitimate force in Northern Ireland. It is likely therefore that premises such as 
police stations will act as crime attractors, due to their symbolic nature. This also 
further highlights the need for crime-specific risk terrain modelling. The Orange 
Order (The Loyal Orange Institution), whose members are overwhelmingly 
Protestant, are in favour of Northern Ireland’s union with the UK. There has been 
a lot of conflict surrounding Orange Order marches, where individuals march 
carrying flags depicting scenes from Protestant and Orange Order history 
(Kaufmann, 2007). There is therefore the possibility that Orange Order halls and 
lodges could act as attractors.  
Gimenez-Santana et al.’s (2017) RTM of crime in the highly segregated city of 
Bogota, demonstrates the utility of examining the social context of a city. Low 
strata neighbourhoods were significantly correlated with personal injury and 
homicide. High strata neighbourhoods were significantly correlated with theft. In 
Northern Ireland, churches are a good measure of the religious segregation that 
is a defining characteristic of the social context. Belfast, in particular, is highly 
segregated and it is likely that the religiosity of the area would influence target 
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selection. It may be that areas within the city with a Catholic majority are more 
likely to be attacked as it is likely that they are more familiar with certain areas 
and would also be less likely to be detected as a member of the ‘opposition’. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapters of this thesis, areas within an individual’s 
awareness space are more likely to be targeted. Catholic churches may therefore 
serve as ‘risky places’ for attacks. On the other hand, it could be that a Catholic 
majority could deter offenders choosing these areas as to not risk attacking 
someone they know, and areas with a Protestant majority may offer a higher 
number of targets. Therefore, the effects of both will be examined.  
RTM research also demonstrates the importance of considering other (perhaps 
related) crimes in the modelling. For example, Kennedy et al (2011) successfully 
predicted the location of shootings by using drug arrests as a risk factor because 
the underlying factors that drive these crimes are similar (e.g. high levels of gang 
related activity in areas that are socially disorganised). Gale and Hollernan (2013) 
found a statistically significant association between burglary and calls for 
suspicious persons and vehicles. Dugato et al’s (2017) RTM of organised crime 
violence in Italy from 2004-2011 found that other crime activities of the group 
such as drug-dealing were significant correlates of mafia homicides (Dugato et 
al., 2017). 85% of homicides for 2012 occurred in high risk areas. Such predictors 
out-performed social disorganisation variables, such as poor socio-economic 
conditions, percentage of unemployed residents and residential instability, which 
were non-significant. Escudero and Ramirez (2018) found that illicit drug markets 
were significantly correlated with motorcycle thefts. Anyinam (2015) found the 
most important predictor for violent crimes to be public calls regarding drug 
offences. As discussed in chapter 2, localised violent vigilantism, such as 
punishment attacks (Morrison and Horgan, 2016) are a defining feature of the 
current VDR threat. These acts of violence committed by terrorists are designed 
to gain support and power within their community. Therefore, other known VDR 
activity, such as punishment attacks, protests and riots, and arms finds should 
be included.  
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5.2.3   Differences in attack type 
Different types of crime exhibit different spatial patterns (Andresen and Linning, 
2012). Barnum et al’s (2017) examination of drug dealing locations in Chicago 
found grocery stores and foreclosures to be risk factors across all types of drugs 
studied (cannabis, heroin, crack and cocaine). However, the degree of spatial 
influence of these common risk factors varied. There were also multiple other risk 
factors that varied for each drug, for example parks and homeless shelters were 
correlates of heroin dealing only. This highlights the importance of disaggregating 
data.  
Any analysis of terrorist activity should consider differences between attack 
types, as they serve different purposes. For bomb hoaxes, the goal is not to cause 
casualties, but to occupy the security services’ time and portray them as 
ineffective. Also, the associated risks with carrying out a successful bombing are 
much higher than a bomb hoax. Building a viable device requires a higher level 
of capability and resources. A bomb may need to be activated by someone in the 
vicinity shortly before, whereas a bomb hoax can be left for a long period of time. 
Therefore, it is likely that there is more consideration about risk of detection and 
ease of escape in the commission of an attack involving a viable device, so the 
locations of these types of incidents should differ.  
 
5.3   Data and Analytical Strategy  
5.3.1   Incident Data 
The dataset of VDR incidents used for the analyses included the bombings and 
bomb hoaxes from the final working dataset used in Chapter 4. To maximise the 
utility for potential use by practitioners only attacks that took place during the most 
recent wave - January 2007 to December 2016 (the Contemporary wave as 
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defined by Morrison and Horgan, 2016) - were used for the analyses21. All 
bombings and bomb hoaxes within this period where an accurate geographical 
location was known22 were used for the subsequent analyses23. Incidents from 
January 2007 to December 2013 were used to develop each RTM, and incidents 
from January 2014 to December 2016 were used to test the accuracy of each 
model. Each dataset was geocoded and converted into a point file, to be used as 
the event data for the relevant model.  
5.3.2   Risk factors  
To operationalise the risk factors, data was obtained from several sources. The 
geographical (polygon) data for Belfast was obtained from the Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). Most locations of the physical 
infrastructure to create the feature sets were obtained from Open Data NI. This 
included the following: pubs, bars, restaurants, cafes, sports clubs, Catholic and 
Protestant churches, railway and bus stations, and government buildings. 
Addresses for PSNI stations were obtained from an existing dataset created by 
John Morrison. The locations of Orange Order Lodges were received from 
Professor Eric Kaufmann (Birkbeck College, University of London). The data 
concerning protests/riots, arms finds and punishment attacks was drawn from the 
original VDR project dataset mentioned in the previous chapter. Each feature set 
was geocoded and converted into a point shapefile and then a raster layer using 
ArcGIS. These were used to represent the presence or absence of each risk 
factor in each grid square. 
 
                                                             
21 As discussed in chapter 4, Sinn Fein’s decision to support the PSNI marked the beginning of 
this wave, which saw a substantial increase in VDR incidents compared to the preceding years.  
22 As mentioned in chapter 4, it  was necessary to remove 2 bombings and 1 hoax due to missing 
geographical information. 
23 All bombings and hoaxes included as outcome events were distinct from any other VDR activity 
included in the risk factors. For example, none of the bombing events occurred during any of the 
riots. This was to prevent overlap of incidents which could invalidate the results. 
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5.3.3   RTMDx 
The RTMDx Diagnostics Utility (Caplan and Kennedy, 2013; Caplan et al., 2013b) 
software automates the statistical procedures involved in RTM and was used to 
identify the significant risk layers. This tool evaluates the relative influence and 
importance of risk factors using a bidirectional stepwise regression process. The 
variables are examined and the most problematic risk factors are selected, along 
with their most appropriate spatial influence distance, to build the overall best 
model.  
The software requires several parameters to be set prior to analysis. The relevant 
file of event data (aggregated to raster cells) was selected as the outcome event 
for each model. The polygon shapefile of Belfast was used to define the boundary 
to be tested. RTMDx allows for two types of model: aggravating (to identify factors 
that increase risk) and protective (to identify factors that decrease risk). An 
aggravating model was used for all analyses conducted in this chapter, to 
determine which factors increased the risk of VDR incidents.   
The parameter ‘operationalisation’ was used to select how the spatial influence 
of each variable was to be assessed, based on proximity or density. Spatial 
influence for proximity is operationalised as the presence of a physical feature 
within the defined distance from the event. Spatial influence for density is 
operationalised as a high concentration of a physical feature within the defined 
distance from the event. To determine which of these two functions was 
appropriate, it was necessary to compute a nearest neighbour index (Nni) for 
each risk factor using the CrimeStatIV software to determine whether they were 
clustered. As discussed in chapter 4, a nearest neighbour index (Nni) of less than 
1 is indicative of clustering, values of more than 1 are indicative of dispersion. 
Risk factors that were significantly clustered were operationalised by ‘density’, 
and those that weren’t were operationalised by ‘proximity’ (see table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1. Nearest neighbour indexes and operationalisations of risk factors to 
be used in the model 
 
 
It was also necessary to define the grid cell size for the outputs. Caplan and 
Kennedy suggest that using the average street length (in this case 100m), with a 
cell raster size of half a street length (50m) is appropriate to create the cells. To 
maximise the potential utility of the model, the risk factors were operationalised 
to a maximum spatial influence of 400m (four streets). Taylor and Harrell (1996) 
propose that places prone to crime consist of a few streets, and this measure is 
a realistic area to use for the guidance of future policing measures. Each file was 
converted into a raster layer via the Density and Proximity Tools in ArcMap’s 
Spatial Analyst extension. Each raster map contained equally sized 50mx50m 
cells to reflect half of the average street length in Belfast, as measured within 
ArcMap. Each cell received a count of points falling within its boundaries. 
Risk factor Nni z-score p-value Operationalisation 
     
Catholic churches  1.14 1.17 0.24 Proximity 
Government buildings 1.03 0.24 0.81 Proximity 
Orange Order Lodges 0.17 -21.84 <0.001 Density 
Police stations  1.26 2.05 0.04 Proximity 
Protestant churches 1.09 1.22 0.22 Proximity 
Pubs/bars 0.73 -5.78 <0.001 Density 
Restaurants/cafes 0.56 -15.04 <0.001 Density 
Shops 0.53 -18.58 <0.001 Density 
Sports clubs 0.82 -2.56 0.01 Density 
Transport hubs 1.25 1.41 0.1 Proximity 
     
Arms Finds 2.07 4.08 <0.001 Proximity 
Protests/Riots  1.5 3.3 <0.001 Proximity 
Punishment Attacks 0.58 -6.18 <0.001 Density 
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The first model used bombings as the outcome event, and the second model 
used bomb hoaxes. For each model, the 13 risk factors (pubs/bars; 
restaurants/cafes; shops; sports clubs; transport hubs; police stations; 
government buildings; Orange Order lodges; Catholic churches; Protestant 
churches; punishment attacks; protests/riots; arms finds) generated 52 variables 
(testing the spatial influence of each risk factor as a function for either proximity 
or density at 100m, 200m, 300m and 400m) that were tested for significance.  
The testing process began by building an elastic net penalised regression model 
assuming a Poisson distribution of events. The process then selected variables 
that may be potentially useful through cross validation, which were then utilised 
in a bidirectional step-wise regression process (starting with a null model), to build 
the optimal model by optimising the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). This 
score is a balance of complexity of the model and fit of the data.  
The models also include two intercept terms that represent the background rate 
of events and overdispersion of the event counts. Exponentiated coefficient 
values were used to produce the relative risk values, which can be interpreted as 
the weights of the risk factor (Caplan et al., 2013b). These can be used to 
understand the riskiness of each factor relative to one another.  
 
5.4   Results 
5.4.1   Bombings  
The RTMDx Utility determined that the best risk terrain model for bombings was 
a Negative Binomial type II model with 3 risk factors and a BIC score of 1174.1. 
The selected risk terrain model was assigned relative risk scores to cells ranging 
from 1 for the lowest risk cell to 460.1 for the highest risk cell. A cell with a value 
of 460.1 has an expected rate of bombings that is 460.1 times higher than a cell 
with a value of 1.  
 124 
Previous protests and riots were the riskiest factor for this model,24 with a relative 
risk value of 14.07 and a spatial influence of 100m. In other words, areas within 
100 metres of a previous protest or riot posed over 14 times greater risk of 
experiencing a bombing than other areas not within this realm of spatial influence. 
The second riskiest factor was areas dense with punishment attacks with a 
relative risk value of 6.56 and a spatial influence of 300m. Areas dense with pubs 
and bars had a relative risk value of 4.98, with a spatial influence of 200m. The 
spatial operationalisation of ‘density’ suggests that risk is more pronounced at 
places where these risk factors are densely clustered.   
Table 5.2. Results of the bombings RTM 
 
A point density layer for the risk factors operationalised by density were derived 
using the ArcGIS ‘Kernel Density’ tool, and those based on proximity were 
created using the ‘Euclidean Distance’ tool. They were then combined to produce 
a composite risk terrain map for each of the two models (see figures 2 and 3). 
Using ‘Map Algebra’ in the ‘Raster Calculator’ function in the ‘Spatial Analyst’ 
extension in ArcMap the risk terrain map (figure 2) for bombings was produced 
using the following formula (generated by the RTMDx software): 
                                                             
24 Upon this finding, a separate RTM was conducted for protests and riots to determine whether 
the risk factors for these incidents overlapped with the risk factors for bombings. Different risk 
factors were found, meaning it is unlikely that the same environmental dynamics are driving this.  
Name Operationalisation Spatial 
Influence (m) 
Coefficient Relative Risk 
Value 
Protests/Riots Proximity 100 2.6443 14.0736 
Punishment 
Attacks 
Density 300 1.8809 6.5594 
Pubs/bars Density 200 1.6062 4.9838 
Intercept   -6.9640  
Overdispersion   -1.5247  
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Exp(-6.9640 + 2.6443 * "Protests" + 1.8809 * "Punishment Attacks" + 1.6062 * 
"Pubs/Bars") / Exp(-6.9640) 
 
For the risk terrain maps (figures 1 and 2) Belfast was modelled as a continuous 
surface grid of 100m x 100m cells. Each cell was reclassified into 1 of 4 risk 
levels, according to standard deviational breaks. Low risk was classified as a cell 
value between 0 and the mean cell value (1.47); medium risk was classified as a 
cell value between the mean and 1 standard deviation (SD) (1.48-6.28); high risk 
was between +1SD and +2SD (6.29-11.09); and very high risk were all cell values 
above +2SDs (>11.09).  
  Figure 5.1. Risk terrain map for bombings in Belfast 2007-2013 
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5.4.2   Bomb Hoaxes 
For bomb hoaxes, the RTMDx Utility determined that the best risk terrain model 
was a Negative Binomial type II model with 3 risk factors and a BIC score of 
1195.2. The selected risk terrain model was assigned relative risk scores to cells 
ranging from 1 for the lowest risk cell to 94.3 for the highest risk cell.  
Punishment attacks were the riskiest factor for this model, with a relative risk 
value of 10.77 and a spatial influence of 100m. In other words, areas within 100 
metres of a previous punishment attack posed almost 11 times greater risk of 
experiencing a hoax than other areas not within this realm of spatial influence. 
This was followed by police stations with a relative risk value of 8.76 and a spatial 
influence of 200m, and places dense with shops, with a relative risk value of 6.94 
and spatial influence of 400m.  
Table 5.3. Results of the bomb hoaxes RTM 
 
Name Operationalisation Spatial 
Influence (m) 
Coefficient Relative Risk 
Value 
Punishment 
Attacks 
Density 100 2.3764 10.7661 
Police Stations Proximity 200 2.1703 8.7609 
Shops Density 400 1.9378 6.9435 
Intercept   -7.1510  
Overdispersion   -2.1445  
 
For bomb hoaxes, the formula (generated by the RTMDx software) for the risk 
terrain map (figure 3) was as follows: 
Exp(-7.1510 + 2.3764 * "Punishment Attacks" + 2.1703 * "Police Stations" + 
1.9378 * "Shops ") / Exp(-7.1510) 
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As before, each cell was reclassified into 1 of 4 risk levels. Low risk: 0 – mean (0-
2.21); medium risk: mean - +1SD 2.22-10.61); high risk: +1SD - +2SD (10.62-
19.01) and very high risk were all cell values above +2SDs (>19.01).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Risk terrain map for bomb hoaxes in Belfast, 2007-2013 
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5.4.3   Predictive Accuracy  
The risk terrain maps presented in figures 2 and 3 show the areas within Belfast 
that are most likely to attract or enable bombings and bomb hoaxes. In line with 
previous research it would have been preferable to run binary logistic regressions 
to ascertain the predictive accuracy of the models. However, due to an insufficient 
amount of data, this was not possible. Therefore, descriptive statistics are 
provided in table 5.4, using the locations of bombings and bomb hoaxes that 
occurred between 2014 and 2017. These results demonstrate that several post-
2013 incidents occurred in places that appear to be the most vulnerable. 
 
Table 5.4. Locations of 2014-2017 bombings and bomb hoaxes according to risk 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bombings 
During the test period, 28 bombings occurred. Seven bombings occurred in the 
cells that were inferred as being at very high risk. Seven occurred in high risk 
cells. 2 bombings occurred in medium risk cells and 12 bombings occurred in 
areas deemed to be at low risk. 
 
 Frequency 
Risk Level Bombings Bomb Hoaxes 
1 (0 – mean) 12 0 
2 (mean - +1SD) 2 4 
3 (+1SD - +2SD) 7 2 
4 (> +2SD) 7 2 
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Bomb hoaxes  
Eight hoaxes occurred post-2013. Four occurred in medium risk areas, two in 
high risk areas and two in very high risk areas. No hoaxes occurred in areas 
deemed to be at low risk.  
Figure 5.3. Risk terrain map with 2014-2017 bombings (n=28) 
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5.4.4   Further Models  
The riskiest factors identified in both models were other related VDR activity 
(protests/riots and punishment attacks). A further model for each incident type 
was run with the related VDR activity variables excluded, to ascertain if the 
models would be accurate in identifying high risk areas without this information. 
Figure 5.4. Risk terrain map with 2014-2017 bomb hoaxes (n=8) 
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The same procedure was followed as before, but with the VDR related activity 
risk factors (arms finds; protests/riots; punishment attacks) excluded.  
For bombings (see table 5.5), the best RTM was a negative binomial type II model 
with 2 risk factors and a BIC score of 1210.1. Pubs/bars were the riskiest factor, 
followed by shops.  
Table 5.5. Results of the bombings RTM with VDR activity excluded 
Name Operationalisation Spatial 
Influence (m) 
Coefficient Relative Risk 
Value 
Pubs/bars Density 200 1.4967 4.4669 
Shops Density 100 1.2377 3.4477 
Intercept   -6.8016  
Overdispersion   -1.4412  
 
For hoaxes, the best RTM was a negative binomial type II model with 3 risk 
factors and a BIC score of 1162.9. Shops were the riskiest factor, followed by 
police stations and Catholic churches. 
Table 5.6. Results of the hoaxes RTM with VDR activity excluded 
 
Name Operationalisation Spatial 
Influence (m) 
Coefficient Relative Risk 
Value 
Shops Density 400 1.4646 4.3258 
Police Stations Proximity  300 1.2377 3.4851 
Catholic 
Churches 
Proximity 400 1.1809 3.2573 
Intercept   -7.1408  
Overdispersion   -2.3350  
 132 
The risk terrain maps and the locations of the post-2013 events are presented in 
figures 5.5 and 5.6. These maps and the accompanying comparison table (see 
table 5.7) demonstrate that the exclusion of other VDR related activity may 
weaken the accuracy of identifying high risk areas. 
For bombings, sixteen occurred in low risk areas, ten in medium risk, and two in 
very high risk areas. For hoaxes, four occurred in low risk areas, one in medium 
risk areas, and three in high risk areas. No hoaxes occurred in very high risk 
areas. More post-2013 events occurred in areas deemed to be at low risk for the 
second model than the first. On this basis it can be concluded that the inclusion 
of other activity related to the group being studied is useful and beneficial.  
 
Table 5.7. Comparison of accuracy of models in predicting locations of incidents  
   Frequency 
Risk Level Bombings 
Model 1 
Bombings 
Model 2 
Hoaxes 
Model 1 
Hoaxes 
Model 2 
1 (0 – mean) 12 16 0 4 
2 (mean - 
+1SD) 
2 10 4 1 
3 (+1SD - 
+2SD) 
7 0 2 3 
4 (> +2SD) 7 2 2 0 
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Figure 5.5. Risk terrain map with 2014-2017 bombings (VDR related activity 
excluded) (n=28) 
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Figure 5.6. Risk terrain map with 2014-2017 bomb hoaxes (VDR related activity 
excluded) (n=8) 
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5.5     Discussion 
This chapter identified areas in the city of Belfast that could be at risk for future 
incidents of VDR incidents, based on the spatial influence of features identified 
through a review of previous literature. A combination of factors, determined 
through the RTMs, contributed to the associated risk levels. Different risk factors 
were identified for the two incident types. The results indicated that previous 
experience of protests/riots and punishment attacks, and the presence of 
pubs/bars were associated with bombings. Previous experience of punishment 
attacks and the presence of police stations and shops were associated with bomb 
hoaxes.  
To be consistent with previous research such as Caplan et al. (2010), a binary 
logistic regression was originally planned to determine whether bombings and 
bomb hoaxes in a second defined period occurred in cells which were deemed to 
be ‘high risk’. However, the total dataset was deemed too small to split reliably 
and in a meaningful manner. The descriptive statistics that were implemented as 
an alternative are promising and indicate that it may be useful to incorporate this 
method in guiding counter-terrorism measures. However, some caution should 
be advised due to the small amount of data used to test this. Half of bombings 
and bomb hoaxes in the post-RTM study period occurred in high or very high risk 
cells, and it can be suggested that these areas should be hardened where 
possible. Seeing as only a small proportion of the city was deemed to be at the 
high or very high levels of risk, this is impressive. However, a large proportion 
(43%) of bombings did occur in low risk cells. Although several did occur very 
close to areas deemed to be at risk, the predictive accuracy of this method is 
therefore difficult to determine. If enough data for further years post-RTM could 
be obtained, a logistic regression could be used to see if the odds of a bombing 
or bomb hoax occurring increases as the spatial risk value of the cells increases.  
The riskiest factor for bombings was protests/riots. This was followed by 
punishment attacks which were also the riskiest factor for bomb hoaxes. It is likely 
that these areas would have been known to the individuals involved in the attacks, 
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and the increased familiarity with these areas increases the recognition of 
opportunities, as well as ease of escape. This concurs with the results of Onat’s 
(2016) RTM study of PKK attacks in Turkey, where bakeries were found to be a 
significant correlate due to their role in individuals’ daily routines. This highlights 
the importance of considering other known activity of the group being studied. 
The further models were used to demonstrate the utility of including other related 
VDR activity. These models, where the VDR related variables were excluded, 
were weaker in identifying high risk areas for incidents in the 3 year post-study 
period. 
The RTM was more accurate than the KDEs in chapter 4 in identifying high risk 
locations for bombings. During the test period of January 2014 to December 
2016, 14 bombings occurred in high or very high risk cells for the RTM, compared 
with just 3 in high or very high density for the KDE. Retrospective analyses such 
as KDE cannot consider the influence of underlying social and physical factors, 
such as the influence of related VDR activity. The variables related to other VDR 
events were identified as strong influences on the locations of bombings. This 
finding is consistent with Dugato, Calderoni and Berlusconi (2017), who found 
the highest correlates of mafia homicides in Naples to be other Camorra related 
activity.  
For hoaxes, 4 occurred in high or very high risk cells for the RTM compared with 
5 in high or very high density cells for the KDE. 2 occurred in low or very low 
density areas, however none occurred in low risk areas identified by the RTM. As 
there was a small amount of data available to test the hoaxes, it is difficult to 
determine the predictive accuracy of RTM compared to KDE for this type of 
incident.   
It was proposed that there may be an increased risk in areas surrounding 
premises relevant to the group’s ideology. Police stations were identified as risky 
places for bomb hoaxes, however this risk factor was not significantly correlated 
with bombings. This difference could be explained by the perceived level of 
security at these premises and therefore increased likelihood of 
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detection/reduced likelihood of success. As Morrison and Horgan (2016) 
effectively highlight in their study of VDR target selection, the targeting of police 
services naturally comes with a higher risk of arrest, due to the presence of police 
officers surrounding the point of attack. This result suggests that there is some 
assessment of risk by the offenders, and that they are selecting targets rationally. 
This is consistent with the findings of Gill et al. (2018), who concluded that fear 
of detection plays a strong role in the decision-making encompassing a terrorist 
event by those groups not intending the offender’s death at the scene of the 
attack. It can be proposed that there may be differences between targets relevant 
to ideology and realistic targets with increased chance of success.  
Places dense with pubs and bars were significantly correlated with bombings, 
and those dense with shops were significantly correlated with bomb hoaxes. 
Urban areas that have a high human density with plenty of foot flow and low levels 
of security are vulnerable to attacks. They allow the attacker to operate discretely, 
increase the chances of escaping undetected, and offer a predictable amount of 
human density. As well as these factors, the high concentration of individuals also 
makes these areas an attractive target due to the number of potential casualties 
and fatalities. These findings are consistent with Onat and Gul’s (2018) findings 
and with Webb and Cutter’s (2009) argument that the spatial strategies of 
terrorism have shifted towards places of everyday activity. This seems to be the 
case with more recent attacks inspired by ISIS who have targeted highly 
populous public spaces. Further research should examine the level of risk each 
factor poses according to temporal variables. For example, it is likely that areas 
dense with shops are more likely to targeted during the day and at weekends, 
and areas dense with pubs and bars more likely to be targeted in the evenings. 
As the period studied spans 10 years, it could be argued that the infrastructure 
underwent some changes during this time. However, Caplan, Kennedy and Miller 
(2011) argue that generally infrastructure is stable over time.  
Restaurants and cafes, protestant churches, sports clubs, transport hubs and 
arms finds were not significant correlates of bombings or bomb hoaxes. VDRs 
are known to attack along the railway lines (Horgan and Morrison, 2011), however 
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it was not possible to add the length of the lines onto the RTM. Government 
buildings may have a high level of security and therefore deter attacks, with the 
actors preferring more populous areas with less security measures.  
It would have been preferable to examine the effects of residential segregation in 
more detail. However, the only religious data that could be obtained was for 
‘Small Area’ (SA) level. As there is a high degree of variation in the land area that 
SAs cover it was deemed inappropriate to use the centroids of majority Catholic 
or Protestant areas as a risk factor. If grid square level data was obtainable, this 
could have been a useful addition to the model, although the land area that each 
grid square covers (typically 1km2) is likely to have been too large to establish a 
meaningful connection.  
Only one city was modelled and one ideology studied, therefore it may not be 
appropriate to generalise these findings. The results of the models suggest that 
risk terrain modelling could be an important tool in the policing of terrorist events 
in Northern Ireland. Although they may have limited applicability to other regions, 
some of the findings may also be valid in other contexts. For example, the finding 
that populous areas such as places dense with pubs, bars and shops are 
significant correlates of attacks may hold in other cities, and future research 
should endeavour to study this. Until this is established, it should not be assumed 
that the results of this RTM can be applied across all environments. Some of the 
risk factors that were identified were a unique combination of VDR ideology and 
Northern Irish culture, and so the risk factors identified may be specific to the 
spatial and situational contexts of VDR activity. Further, as with all open source 
data, there is always the possibility that the locations of some events were not 
recorded accurately, and as such the distances from the risk factors could be 
under or over estimated. 
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5.6     Conclusion 
The mode of analysis applied in this chapter could be a useful tool in guiding 
targeted responses to the VDR threat in Belfast. It has identified specific areas 
that are likely to be more vulnerable to attacks than elsewhere in the city and 
should therefore be prioritised in security measures. Other known activity of the 
group, symbolic buildings and populous areas were all found to be correlates of 
terrorist incidents. This has important implications for the policing of terrorism in 
Belfast, and has the potential to be applied to other cities within Northern Ireland. 
Extra resources could be deployed to the areas identified as being high risk when 
necessary, and target hardening could be implemented in these areas. It should 
not be assumed that all areas which were identified as being high risk will be 
targeted. If any interventions are implemented there is the possibility for 
displacement of incidents. However, as this type of model identifies the key 
correlates of the hotspots, rather than solely their location, other possible future 
locations that could potentially be at risk can be identified. 
Thus far, this thesis has used offender (chapter 3) or target (chapters 4 and 5) 
based approaches to study target selection. Offender based studies that focus 
on the journey-to-crime are limited, as distance is treated as the dependent 
variable. This assumes that possible targets are spatially uniformly distributed. 
Target based approaches, such as the decision-making process in ‘who’ or ‘what’ 
is targeted (for example the factors involved in leading a terrorist group to attack 
civilians), are also constrained. Although the specific target attributes can be 
examined and choice criteria can be established, information regarding the 
offender is often disregarded. By ignoring the home locations of the offenders this 
approach assumes that geographical proximity has no influence on attacks or 
that the spatial distribution of offenders’ homes is equally spaced. The next 
chapter uses discrete choice modelling to overcome these limitations, through an 
analysis of attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army.  
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Chapter 6    Modelling the spatial decision making of 
PIRA: the discrete choice approach.  
 
6.1   Introduction 
Terrorists are rational decision-makers (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Much like 
ordinary criminals, they make a series of cost-benefit analyses to judge whether 
a particular act is worth committing (Gill et al., 2018). Their rationality is bounded 
by a number of individual factors such as risk sensitivity, group guidance, prior 
experience, and personality. Geographical proximity is an additional factor which 
has received some empirical support lately (Gill et al., 2017; Marchment et al., 
2018). In treating distance as a dependent variable however, such studies are 
limited. They assume targets are spatially uniformly distributed. The potential 
targets that could have been chosen, but were not, are overlooked. Ideally, 
distance should be treated as an explanatory variable, rather than the dependent 
variable (Kleemans, 1996) and should be used alongside other choice criteria, 
such as the connectedness of the area, to determine why the chosen target was 
selected above other similar targets (Bernaso and Block, 2009).   
To overcome similar limitations to those mentioned above, Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta (2005) applied McFadden’s (1974) discrete choice model to the 
spatial-decision making of burglars. Stemming from the field of economics, this 
approach allows target selection analyses to simultaneously consider multiple 
factors including the chosen target destination, areas that could have been 
chosen but were not, the likely origin of offenders and their perceptions that affect 
decision making. This approach is now well-established in the study of a variety 
of urban crimes, however is yet to be applied to terrorism.  
This study applies the discrete choice model to 150 attacks committed by core 
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (hereafter, PIRA). PIRA’s 
attacks were often dependent on the decision making of the individual and were 
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not carried out unless there was a high probability of success (Horgan and Taylor, 
1997). The longevity of their campaign, and the variety of attacks incorporated 
throughout, also provides a wide scope for data. The results suggest that 
terrorists are similar to traditional criminals in their decision making and they are 
influenced by spatial context, such as the distance from their home location to 
the attack location, or the presence of a premises relevant to their ideology.  
 
6.2   Theory  
Collectively, rational choice perspectives, routine activity theory and crime pattern 
theory, as discussed in chapter 2, suggest offenders actively select areas and 
targets in a way that minimises effort and risks and maximises rewards (Johnson 
and Bowers, 2004; Felson, 2006). Research suggests that a multistage 
hierarchical process in decision making occurs, whereby offenders select an area 
that is deemed suitable for the offence, before selecting the specific target 
(Brantingham, 1978; Brown and Altman, 1981; Wright et al., 1995; Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta, 2005). The discrete choice approach (McFadden, 1974) can be 
used to model an individual’s choice between a set of two or more discrete 
alternatives. This is based on the utility they expect to derive from each alternative 
(Train, 2003). It is assumed that the terrorist’s choice is the one that offers the 
best perceived utility, based on expected rewards, risks and effort. When applied 
to crime, the approach allows target selection to be analysed by considering 
multiple factors at the same time, and enables an impedance measure of 
distance to be treated as an explanatory variable. As well as the location that was 
selected for an attack, the model also allows for areas that were not chosen to 
be examined simultaneously, as well as also considering the origin of offender, 
and other defined factors that may affect decision making (Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta, 2005).  
The approach was first applied in environmental criminology by Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta’s (2005) study of residential burglaries. As well as confirming the 
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importance of proximity in target selection, this framework was the first step in 
establishing risk factors for burglary that were reliant on specific offender 
characteristics (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005). This residential burglary 
study has since been extended upon with different sample sizes, types of 
offenders, areal units and independent variables (Bernasco 2006; Bernasco and 
Kooistra, 2010; Bernasco, 2010; Townsley et al., 2016). High house values for 
the area increased the likelihood that the area would be chosen (Bernasco and 
Kooistra, 2010), and a more recent area of residence was more likely to be 
selected than a less recent area of residence (Bernasco, 2010).  
Since its introduction into the study of crime, the discrete choice model has also 
been used to identify factors (including crime generators and crime attractors) 
that can increase the likelihood of an area being chosen as a target for residential 
burglaries in other cities (Townsley et al., 2015; Vandeviver et al., 2015; Frith et 
al., 2017), street robberies (Bernaso and Block 2009; Bernasco et al., 2013; 
Bernasco et al., 2013), commercial robberies (Bernasco and Kooistra, 2010) and 
thefts from vehicles (Johnson and Summers, 2015). Ethnic dissimilarity to the 
offender decreased the likelihood that an area would be selected for street 
robberies (Bernasco and Block, 2009; 2011). If an offender had previously lived 
in an area it increased the likelihood that they would select it for a commercial 
robbery (Bernasco and Kooistra, 2010). Areas low in social cohesion were 
preferred by offenders committing thefts from vehicles, and areas that contained 
schools were favoured by juvenile offenders (Johnson and Summers, 2015).  
Clare et al. (2009) expanded on previous studies by exploring the role of natural 
barriers and connectors on location choice for residential burglaries in Perth. 
They found the presence of physical barriers such as rivers and roads between 
the home and target locations significantly reduced the likelihood that the area 
would be chosen. Connectors, such as the presence of a train line in both the 
home and target location, increased the likelihood that the area would be chosen. 
Johnson and Summers (2015) also found that areas more connected by major 
roads were favoured by adult offenders for thefts from vehicles. Similarly, 
Bernasco, Block and Ruiter (2013) found offenders committing street robbery 
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were more likely to attack in areas that were easily accessible and contained legal 
or illegal cash economies.  
More recently, Menting et al. (2016) used the discrete choice model to examine 
the effects of the offenders’ family members’ homes on crime location choice. 
They found the residential areas of the offender’s family members were more 
likely to be targeted, most likely due to the increased familiarity with the area as 
it becomes part of their awareness space. Bernasco et al. (2017) added a 
temporal element by using separate discrete choice models for every 2-hour time 
block per day, for every day of the week, to examine street robbery in Chicago. 
They concluded that the time of day or week does not affect the importance of 
defined attributes. For example, robbers preferred to operate in areas close to 
transit hubs and cash economies, regardless of population density at the time. 
Lammers (2017) examined the influence of co-offending on crime location choice 
in The Hague, with results indicating a preference for areas known to multiple 
members of the group (a shared awareness space). This framework is now well 
established in studies pertaining to traditional urban crimes. It has also been 
applied to infrequent extreme events such as rioting (Baudains et al., 2013). 
There, the presence of an underground train station increased the likelihood the 
area would be chosen as well as the volume of retail outlets (and therefore 
number of potential targets).  
However, to the best of our knowledge, the discrete choice model is yet to be 
applied to terrorism. The literature suggests terrorists are rational and purposeful 
in their decision making. Terrorists make carefully calculated decisions that are 
utility maximising (Asal et al., 2009) and likely to increase their probability of 
success (Hoffman, 2006; Clarke and Newman, 2006). When considering the 
operations of PIRA, it is evident that target selection was guided by the decision 
making of individuals living within the locality, due to their increased familiarity 
with the operational area (Gill and Horgan, 2013; Johnson et al., 2013; Asal et 
al., 2015; Gill et al, 2017; Gill et al, 2018). PIRA members often operated with a 
high degree of autonomy. Even when high-profile operations were ordered from 
the top-down, the target selection was likely to have been guided by the attacker’s 
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original intelligence-gathering on that target (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). PIRA 
member Eamon Collins reported that he “never stopped looking for military 
targets.” Gerry Bradley’s account of life in PIRA describes attacks as “pure spur-
of-the-moment ... target of opportunity.” Brendan Hughes recalls noticing a British 
Army jeep nearby: “We were so confident and in such control of the area at that 
time that instinct took over: ‘There’s a target’ and ‘Hit it.’” PIRA attacks were only 
carried out if there was a high probability that the attack would be a success 
(Horgan and Taylor, 1997).  
As this model of target selection is a model of choice, the decision criteria that 
shape the choices of offenders should be defined, as well as the specification of 
the set of alternatives that the actors can choose from. A terrorist’s decision 
making process is bounded by incomplete information. Although their knowledge 
is bounded, they are essentially choosing between every premise and person in 
the city, presenting an enormous choice set. However, the idea there is a 
hierarchical process in decision making, as mentioned above, suggests the 
choice set for any offender is a limited number of areas. These can be defined 
using spatial units such as suburbs, wards or output areas. In this case, the set 
of alternatives takes the form of output areas called ‘small areas’ in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland and the expected utility of each potential target area is assumed 
to be evaluated according to the decision criteria presented below. 
 
6.3   Decision Criteria  
The following subsections, a) distance; b) natural barriers and c) ideology, 
consider the theories presented above as well as previous empirical research. In 
a broad sense, they are based on the assumption that the offender will act 
rationally in spatial decision making, considering the associated risks, rewards 
and efforts when selecting areas to target.  
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6.3.1   Distance  
The least effort principle (Zipf, 1965) assumes that when considering a “number 
of identical alternatives for action, an offender selects the one closest to him in 
order to minimize the effort involved” (Lundrigan and Czarnomski, 2006, p.220). 
Typically, an offender’s journey to crime demonstrates the distance decay 
function, whereby chances of offending and frequency of offences decrease as 
distance from their home increases (Wiles and Costello, 2000; Bernasco and 
Block, 2009). To increase the utility of their attack the offender would aim to keep 
the distance travelled minimal (Clarke and Newman, 2006). As well as 
considering effort, the risk of interception before an attack should also be taken 
into consideration (Townsley et al., 2008). The function of distance decay has 
been empirically supported when examining the activities of PIRA (Gill et al., 
2016), and the effect has been replicated for lone actors (Marchment, Bouhana 
and Gill, 2018). Due to their familiarity with the area, PIRA members often 
operated within their own ‘locality’ (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). Further, PIRA 
members were often under time constraints, for example due to work and/or 
family commitments, and as such they would limit the distance they would travel 
when offending (Gill et al., 2017). As such, it is hypothesised:  
H1: The closer a potential target area to an actor’s home, the more likely it 
is that it will be selected. 
Similarly, it is also likely that areas in the individual’s awareness space identified 
through their daily routines will be targeted. It is likely that the city centre will be 
more familiar to the offender than other areas of the city, as they are more likely 
to be regularly frequented due to the amount of facilities available (i.e. transport, 
entertainment, retail establishments) (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005, 
Bernasco and Block, 2009). Johnson and Summers (2015) found that adult 
offenders exhibited a preference of offending close to the city centre when 
considering thefts from vehicles. It is therefore hypothesised:  
H2: The closer a potential target area to the city centre, the more likely it is 
that it will be selected. 
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6.3.2   Natural barriers 
The movement of an individual is not random and can be bounded by physical 
and social constraints. Brantingham and Brantingham (2003; 2008) propose that 
natural features such as rivers and forests act as natural ‘barriers’. These barriers 
restrict the movements of offenders and the resulting effort required to offend 
beyond them is increased. When examining effects of the physical environment 
on burglary locations, Clare et al. (2009) found a decreased likelihood that a 
potential target area beyond a natural barrier would be selected. When examining 
target choices of the August 2011 London riots, Baudains et al. (2013) found that 
individuals were up to five times more likely to select an area that was on the 
same side of the river Thames as their home. When taking into consideration that 
the city of Belfast is split by the River Lagan, and that this will impede the 
movement of the offenders, it can be suggested that:  
H3: The presence of a water body between the actor’s home and a target 
area will reduce the likelihood that the area will be targeted. 
A logical suggestion for why one area is chosen over another is accessibility. It is 
likely that areas that are more connected to other parts of the city will experience 
more attacks than those that are not. For example, the existence of a major 
thoroughfare in the area may influence the likelihood of an area being chosen. 
As major roads facilitate travel around the city, they are likely to be travelled on 
more often than other smaller streets, such as cul-de-sacs. Thus, an individual’s 
familiarity with the area surrounding major thoroughfares is increased (Armitage, 
2007). Similar previous research into burglaries suggests that the risk is higher 
in places that are more connected to others (Johnson & Bowers, 2010; Armitage, 
2007). Similarly, Ozer and Akbas (2011) suggest the reason one of the major 
police stations in Istanbul is targeted by terrorists is because this station is 
connected by major streets. As well as ease of access, more connected areas 
also offer ease of escape (Berman and Laitin, 2008). Horgan and Taylor (1997) 
note “escape route accessibility” as one of the key considerations of PIRA 
members during the planning stage of their attacks. 
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H4: The presence of a major thoroughfare in an area will increase the 
likelihood it will be targeted.  
6.3.3   Ideology 
When considering that acts of terrorism are “designed to communicate a 
message” (Hoffman, 2006), it can be assumed that the spatial decision making 
of an individual regarding target selection will be influenced by interpretation of 
ideology25 in some way. Clear differences have been demonstrated in the target 
patterning of PIRA when compared with their loyalist opposition, who were 
operating in the same social and geographical environment. This suggests that 
their differing ideologies may have played some part (Drake, 1998). Decisions 
regarding where to target are likely to be influenced by the availability of “good” 
and “suitable” targets. Under the assumption that terrorists are rational actors, it 
can be argued that their target choices will be governed by ideology and reflective 
of the greatest benefit for their cause (Drake, 1998), as acts of terrorism are 
designed to elicit a response from their target audience (O’Neill, 2005). 
Furthermore, attacks should be tailored to concur with their ideological 
framework, in order to maintain support from those sympathetic to the cause 
(Hoffman, 2006).   
Rewards may be dependent on the availability of suitable victims. Specific 
structures will increase the attractiveness of the area, as the likelihood that a 
suitable target is present will increase. PIRA’s ultimate aim of ending British rule 
in Northern Ireland by inflicting enough casualties on British forces that they 
would be forced to withdraw meant that any member of the security forces was 
seen as a legitimate target (Drake, 1998). It is expected that buildings 
representative of a British presence in Belfast will act as crime attractors, due to 
the availability of suitable targets, i.e. individuals entering and leaving the 
premises, as well as the premises themselves. It is also suggested that those 
                                                             
25 Defined as “beliefs, values, principles, and objectives – however ill-defined or tenuous - by 
which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims… and provides a motive and 
framework for action” (Drake, 1998: 2-3). 
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chosen will be in the awareness space of the individual (Baudains et al., 2013). 
When considering traditional crimes, it is likely the presence of a police station 
would act as a crime detractor and an offender would avoid that area to reduce 
the risk of detection. However, when considering PIRA’s ideology, it can be 
argued that the opposite may be true, due to the availability of targets. As such, 
the following is formulated: 
H5: The presence of a British military base, an Irish military base, or a police 
station will increase the likelihood that the area will be targeted.  
 
6.4   Data and Analytical Strategy    
6.4.1   Geographical domain 
To test the hypotheses, data were used pertaining to attacks by members of 
PIRA, living in the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland, in the period 1969-1989. This 
period encompasses the first three of five distinct phases of PIRA activity (Gill et 
al., 2014). Belfast is the capital and largest city of Northern Ireland and is on the 
flood plain of the River Lagan. The city of Belfast was chosen for this chapter as 
The Belfast Brigade was the largest of PIRA’s command areas, and as such a 
substantial amount of PIRA activity occurred in the city.  
Since 2011, Northern Ireland has been divided into 4537 ‘Small Areas’ (hereafter, 
SAs), which are currently the smallest areal unit. 26  SAs were designed 
specifically for statistical purposes and follow physical features of the 
environment such as roads and rivers (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency (NISRA)). As no sociodemographic variables were included in the 
analysis, it was deemed that SAs would be appropriate to use, and they therefore 
                                                             
26 Wards were the smallest geographical unit in Northern Ireland during the period studied (and 
were revised twice during this time). However, the area that each ward covered was quite large 
(mean area 2.25km2) and as such it was likely that the effects of some of the variables may be 
wrongly estimated. For example, most of the wards in Belfast contained a major road and/or a 
police station, and the effect of distance was one of the key variables to be examined. 
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formed the choice set of alternatives for this study (a total of 890 for Belfast). The 
geographical boundary data for the SAs was obtained from NISRA.  
6.4.2   Case Selection 
The final offence and offender datasets comprised 150 attacks by 127 PIRA 
members within Belfast.27 The datasets were created using parts of an existing 
dataset (n=92 members) previously used for a social network analysis of PIRA’s 
active core members (Gill et al., 2013), as well as additional data obtained from 
The Irish Times newspaper archives (n=58 members). The full original dataset 
(Gill et al., 2013) contained 1240 members of PIRA. The individuals were 
identified from a number of open-sources: a) statements by the Irish Republican 
Army; b) the Belfast Graves publication (an account of Republicans killed in 
combat); c) McKittrick et al.’s (2001) “Lost Lives” which provides an obituary of 
each civilian and paramilitary victim of the Northern Ireland conflict; d) historical 
accounts of PIRA from academic sources; and e) newspaper archives. Core 
members included those individuals who had conducted attacks on behalf of 
PIRA whilst also holding central positions within the organisation, or at one point 
in time, co-offended alongside those who held central positions within PIRA. Of 
these, 139 were convicted of planting bombs and 103 were convicted of 
shootings (total of 239) in Northern Ireland. To qualify for inclusion in the offence 
dataset, the attack had to be attempted or committed by a member residing in 
Belfast, between 1970 and 1989 (n=97). Cases were removed from the dataset 
if an accurate home location could not be ascertained (n=2). Cases were also 
removed if the home location of the actor was outside of the study area (n=3), in 
line with previous studies (Bernasco & Luykx, 2003; Bernasco, 2006, 2010; 
Bernasco & Block, 2009, 2011; Clare et al., 2009; Bernasco et al., 2013), as the 
model requires all alternatives in the choice set to be computed. This resulted in 
a total of 92 incidents.  
                                                             
27 To account for reoffending, and to avoid disproportionate influence on parameter estimation, 
robust standard errors (SE) were used (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Johnson and 
Summers, 2014). 
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Following this, the full archives of The Irish Times were systematically searched 
for convictions of core members of PIRA using the same inclusion criteria. This 
resulted in 58 additional cases for inclusion.  
The location of each attack was geocoded to the corresponding SA. A direct link 
had to be made with the member of PIRA who committed the attack, whose home 
address at the time of the attack was known, to qualify for inclusion. The offender 
dataset contained information on the offender’s home location (also geocoded to 
SA). 
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Figure 6.1. Thematic map of home locations of offenders per SA in Belfast 
(1969-89) 
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Figure 6.2. Thematic map of attacks per SA in Belfast (1969-89) 
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6.4.3   Small Area Characteristics  
Various sources were used to operationalize the characteristics of each SA as 
well as other decision criteria. The geographical SA data was obtained from the 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). Binary indicator 
variables were used to identify the presence of major thoroughfares (A-roads - 
as according to the Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland), military bases and 
police stations (both identified using the Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland 
web service (CAIN) during the period studied. Distance from the city centre was 
calculated as the distance from each centroid to the centre of Belfast (measured 
as a point in the Central Business District) in kilometres, and Ghosh distance was 
used in cases where the city centre was located in the same SA as the home SA 
(please see below for a more thorough explanation of these measures). Attacks 
were clustered at SA level: 7 SAs (out of 890) accounted for a third of all attacks 
for this period. 
 
Table 6.1. Summary statistics of the independent variables used to characterise 
the SAs 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Distance to 
the city centre 
Measured in km 3.88 1.97 0.28 10.37 
River Lagan Binary indicator for whether 
the SA is east or west of 
the river (same or opposite 
side to the home SA) 
0.73 0.45 0 1 
Major roads Binary indicator for whether 
there is a major road (A-
road) in an area 
0.27 0.57 0 1 
Military base 
/police station 
Binary indicator for whether 
there is a military base or a 
police station in an area 
0.03 0.16 0 1 
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6.4.4   Small Area to Small Area Characteristics 
These dyad level measures reflect the relationship between the home location of 
the actor and the target location of the attack and are used to measure impedance 
and barrier variables between two SAs.   
Distance Measures 
In line with previous research, the Euclidean distance was computed between 
the offender’s home location and each potential target area.  Although the exact 
home and target locations of each attack were known, the model requires the 
distance to all non-selected areas to be calculated as well as the ones that were 
chosen as targets. Consequently, to keep measurement errors consistent, the 
distances to selected and non-selected SAs were calculated in the same way, 
using the geometrical centroids of each SA (Bernasco, 2006). An origin-
destination distance matrix was created which defined the distance between the 
geometrical centroids of each SA and the city centre. In line with previous studies, 
in cases where the origin and destination were located in the same SA (and 
therefore representing a zero value on the diagonal of the distance matrix) the 
Ghosh (1951) distance was used. This distance measure calculates the average 
distance between two points in a polygon using the formula Dii = ½ √𝑂, where O 
is the area of the SA in square kilometres (Ghosh, 1951; Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Bernasco, 2006). Consistent with previous studies, the 
distance decay function of crime trips is clear (see figure 3).  
Binary Variables 
Binary indicator variables were used to identify the presence of the following: a) 
the river Lagan, and as such determining a natural division between the 
offender’s home SA and target SA); b) a British army base, Irish army base or 
police station; and c) a major thoroughfare.   
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6.4.5   Discrete Choice Model 
The discrete spatial choice approach concerns an individual’s choice between a 
set of two or more discrete alternatives, based on the utility they expect to derive 
from each alternative (Train, 2003). In this case, the set of alternatives takes the 
form of SAs in Belfast, Northern Ireland and the expected utility of each potential 
target area is assumed to be evaluated according to the decision criteria 
presented above. It is assumed that the alternative the terrorist actor chooses is 
the one that offers the best perceived utility, based on expected rewards, risks 
and effort.  
              This is specified as: 
Uij = b Zij + eij 
whereby Zij is representative of the perceived utility of the actor i from choosing 
alternative j. b is the attribute coefficient that is empirically estimated from 
patterns in the data. As the information for the observer is limited eij is a random 
error term representative of any unobserved additional factors (i.e. personal 
preferences and other idiosyncrasies of the terrorist actor) that are not included 
in the model but may affect perceived utility.  
It is assumed that an actor (i) will choose the alternative (j) if it gives them more 
utility than the others (k): 
 
Zi = j   if   Uij  > Uik,  ∀ k ≠ j 
 
where Zi represents the choice made by actor i. Under the assumption that the j 
disturbances are independently and identically distributed with type 1 extreme 
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Gumbel distributions, the appropriate statistical analysis to test the hypotheses 
of this study is the conditional logit model28, which takes the form of:  
𝑍+@ = B 𝛽7	D7E9 𝑋7+@ 
where M is the number of characteristics associated with the utility, 
corresponding to the total number of variables captured at the area level. Xmij is 
the value measured for attribute m for the actor i choosing to select a target in 
area j.  
The probability that the actor will choose area j is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑌+ = 𝑗) = exp(𝑍+@)∑ expPQE9 (𝑍+Q) 
= exp(𝛽9		𝑋9+@ +	𝛽:	𝑋:+@ + ⋯+	𝛽D	𝑋D+@)∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝PQE9 (𝛽9	𝑋9+Q	 + 	𝛽:	𝑋:+Q		 + ⋯+	𝛽D𝑋D+Q) 
 
where J is the number of areas for the actor to choose between. 
The values of bm are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation and are 
interpreted as the multiplicative effects of a one unit increase in a SA’s attribute 
on its probability of being selected by actor i. A bm value equal to 1 is 
representative of no association between the variable and the decision making of 
the actor, with values above 1 suggesting that the variable is positively associated 
with the likelihood of a SA being chosen. 
                                                             
28 The conditional logit model is used as it incorporates attributes of both the alternatives and the 
individual (terrorist) actors. This is opposed to the multinomial logit model which only considers 
the attributes of the actors.  
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6.4.6   Conditional Logit 
The conditional logit model was applied to test the hypotheses of this study: all 
models were estimated using STATA (StataCorp, College Station, TX). To 
implement the model a final working dataset was created in which every possible 
alternative SA (N = 890) was listed for every individual attack (N = 150), resulting 
in a 133,500-record matrix. The dependent variable for the conditional logit 
estimation procedure takes the form of an indicator variable, used in this study to 
identify the chosen target SA of each offender for each attack. A value of 1 is 
representative of the chosen SA, values of 0 used for the other 889 SAs that were 
not chosen. Model fits were assessed and compared using McFadden’s Adjusted 
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden, 1976): those with large R2 values were considered better 
fitting. Pseudo R2 values are typically much lower than those of ordinary 
regression analyses: values of 0.2-0.4 are considered extremely good for a 
conditional logit model (Domencich and McFadden, 1975; McFadden, 1976; 
Louviere et al., 2000). 
 
6.5   Results 
The results of the conditional logit model are presented in table 6.2. The eb 
parameters in all results tables are representative of the multiplicative odds ratio 
of a target SA being selected, following an increase of one unit in the relevant 
variable.  
Overall Model Fits  
The model tested in this study provided a satisfactory level of fit, with a McFadden 
pseudo-R2 value of 0.178. The likelihood-ratio test (p<0.001) of the model 
demonstrates that it fits the data better than the null model. Three of the 
parameters significantly contributed to the predictive capacity of the model.  
The coefficient of the first distance parameter is in line with hypothesis 1. The 
results show that an increase in distance to the target SA from the home location 
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will decrease the likelihood that this SA will be chosen as a target (eb = 0.61, 
p<.001). However, against the expectation of hypothesis 2, no significant effect 
was found for the distance from the city centre.  
The estimated effects of a river acting as a natural barrier (hypothesis 3) were in 
the right direction, but not statistically significant (eb = 0.72, p=.25). In line with 
hypothesis 4, the presence of a major road was associated with target choice, 
increasing the likelihood of the SA being chosen as a target by a factor of 1.77 
(p<.001). As predicted, the presence of a military base or police station increased 
the likelihood that the area would be chosen as a target (eb = 13.78, p<.001).  
 
Table 6.2. Estimates of the conditional logit model  
 
Variable  eb z 
Distance (km) 0.61*** -7.5 
Distance to city centre (km) 1.02 0.21 
River (Barrier) 0.72 -1.16 
Major Road (Connectivity) 1.77*** 8.95 
Military Bases / Police stations 13.78*** 15 
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo- R2 0.143  
 
* p  < 0.05 for eb = 1, one-tailed, ** p < 0.01 for eb = 1, one-tailed, *** p < 0.001 
for eb = 1, one-tailed  
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Table 6.3. Summary of findings according to hypotheses 
 
 
No. Hypothesis Findings 
1 The closer a potential target area to an actor’s 
home, the more likely it is that it will be 
selected. 
- Supported 
-  
2 The closer a potential target area to the city 
centre, the more likely it is that it will be 
selected. 
- Not supported 
3 The presence of a water body between the 
actor’s home and a target area will reduce the 
likelihood that the area will be targeted. 
- Not supported 
4 The presence of a major thoroughfare in an 
area will increase the likelihood it will be 
targeted. 
- Supported 
-  
5 The presence of a British military base, an 
Irish military base or a police station will 
increase the likelihood that the area will be 
targeted. 
- Supported 
-  
Figure 6.3. Results for each variable of the conditional logit model 
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6.6   Discussion 
Whilst there are some associated unavoidable caveats, this analysis provides a 
good starting point for further applications of the discrete choice approach to 
terrorist activity. The findings are very promising and provide further support that 
terrorist actors behave similarly to urban criminals in terms of spatial decision 
making when selecting targets. The results empirically demonstrate that the 
locations of attacks by PIRA were influenced by characteristics of the target SAs 
as well as the properties of their likely journey to the target. The main model 
indicated that three of the variables affected the likelihood of a SA being chosen 
as a target. An increase in distance from the home location decreased the 
likelihood that the SA would be chosen. The presence of a major road in the SA 
also increased the likelihood that the SA would be selected, as did the presence 
of a military base or police station. 
Distance is highlighted as an important factor in target selection, which is 
consistent with previous studies of terrorist activity (Clarke and Newman, 2006; 
Gill et al., 2017) and traditional criminological studies (Wiles and Costello, 2000; 
Bernasco and Block, 2009). The results illustrate the impact of distance decay, 
with actors less likely to select an area as distance from the home increases, 
most likely due to the changes in required effort. This provides further empirical 
evidence that the target location choice of terrorists is affected by required effort, 
and that, like traditional criminals, terrorists are limited by geographical 
constraints. The identifiable effects of the distance variables could be extremely 
beneficial for investigative techniques, especially when a threat is made against 
a specific target (Gill et al., 2017).  
Something that could be taken into consideration in future analyses is the mode 
of transport to and from each attack. Travelling on foot yields higher risk than by 
car and it is likely that the actors would stay closer to home. Travelling to more 
distant areas on foot would also be much more time consuming, and could 
increase the risk of identification and apprehension (Bernasco and Block, 2009). 
It is likely that the 
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the majority of these attacks were bombings and arson attacks; in particular the 
use of car bombs during the mid 1970s was extremely high (Horgan and Taylor, 
1997). 
Contrary to expectations, an association between target selection and distance 
from the city centre was not supported. This goes against previous research and 
the suggestion that SAs closer to the city centre will be selected due to an actor’s 
familiarity with the area (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Bernasco and Block, 
2009). However, as highlighted by Johnson and Summers (2015), it should be 
noted that the distance of the target location from the city centre is analysed 
independently of how far the attacker’s home location is from the city centre. It is 
likely that their homes were in residential areas away from the city centre and the 
results confirm that the actors were more likely to commit attacks very close to 
their homes. The mean distance between home addresses and the city centre 
was 3.08km. 
No support was found for the notion that rivers can act as physical ‘barriers’, 
which contrasts with previous research (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2003; 
Clare et al., 2009). As Euclidean distance was used, it could be argued that the 
true distances between SAs on either side of the river may be underestimated. 
There are only a few points to cross the river via road, which would have 
influenced the results of a street network approach to the analyses, and may have 
revealed support for this hypothesis. Further research should explore this. 
The presence of a military base or police station increased the likelihood of a SA 
being targeted. This is in line with optimal foraging theory, and the hypothesis 
that certain premises would increase the likelihood of an attack due to the 
availability of targets in the surrounding areas, i.e. officers travelling to and from 
work. However, caution must be taken when considering this outcome. It may be 
that attacks near to police stations or military bases were more likely to have been 
detected, and as such the identity of the offender is more likely to be known. 
When a sample of attacks is used where it is necessary to have both the home 
and attack locations, this may be over-represented in the data. However, after 
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plotting a dataset of all attacks where a street address could be found (regardless 
of whether the home location was known), it was found that SAs experienced 
similar proportions of attacks. 
Regarding connectivity, and consistent with the findings of Ozer and Akbas 
(2011), the presence of a major thoroughfare increased the likelihood of an area 
being chosen. This suggests that ease of access and escape are important when 
selecting targets (Stohl, 1998). These variables are also analogous with the 
offender’s likely familiarity of the area (Armitage, 2007; Johnson and Bowers, 
2010) which further highlights the importance of an individual’s awareness space 
(Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005).  
As with many quantitative studies of terrorism and political violence there are a 
number of constraints associated with the data used in this study, and possible 
caveats are acknowledged. Some difficulties were encountered due to the 
historical nature of the records used. Typically, similar studies that implement this 
model to traditional crimes also analyse social context factors in order to further 
examine environmental criminological theories. For example, levels of social 
disorganisation (Shaw and McKay, 1942) can be used to assess the degree to 
which residents of an area can affect informal social control (Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Clare et al., 2009). It was not possible to test the function of 
some factors that have previously been tested in traditional criminological papers, 
such as the effects of affluence and social disorganisation, as appropriate figures 
were not available.  
The author initially wanted to consider the residential segregation of Catholics 
and Protestants in Northern Ireland in this paper. The separation of the two 
religious communities is a key characteristic of Northern Irish society that has 
helped in the understanding of many aspects of the conflict (Cairns, 1982; 
Hewstone et al., 2006). When optimal foraging theory is taken into consideration 
it is unlikely that members of the predominantly Catholic PIRA would have 
frequented areas dominated by the Protestant opposition (Hughes et al., 2008). 
These areas would not be in the offender’s cognitive awareness space and as 
 163 
such they would have limited knowledge about the inhabitants (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1981) and physical infrastructure (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 
2005).  
Bloom (2005) proposes that Palestinian groups chose individuals to carry out 
attacks who had features that would fit in with Israeli society. Carter and Hill 
(1979) found that, in the case of extremely segregated cities, an individual’s 
mental image of their city is often incomplete and strongly influenced by their 
racial background, due to the dangers of offending where they cannot blend in 
easily. Bernaso, Block and Ruiter (2013) found that offenders committing street 
robberies in Chicago preferred areas where the majority of residents matched 
their own racial or ethnic background. Although this concept of ‘standing out’ in 
unknown territory is most obvious when considering race, the same affects may 
be reflected when considering religion. PIRA would be easily identifiable as the 
opposite side (Gill et al., 2017) and could be recognized as strangers to the area 
(Brown and Altman, 1981; Bernasco and Block, 2009). However, due to the 
retrospective nature of this study it was not possible to get this information for the 
period studied at small areas level. Some information was available at ward level, 
however the extent to which analyses at this level can provide meaningful 
information is limited, and the author deemed this level of aggregation to be too 
large. As a result, the decision was made to exclude potential social context 
variables. This meant that it was possible to use a smaller areal unit and therefore 
increase the potential utility for practitioners. 
This is a complete analysis of core Belfast PIRA members convicted of an attack 
where both the home and attack locations are known. It is a comprehensive 
dataset for the city with respect to the most important and highly connected 
members of PIRA (Gill et al., 2014). However, it is not a complete dataset of all 
PIRA activity in Belfast during this period as several attacks that were identified 
from the Irish Times archive had to be excluded from the dataset. The main 
reason for this was because they could not be directly attributed to a specific 
individual. Also, due to the underlying mechanisms of this model, the data had to 
be restricted to one city. It was also necessary to omit attacks in Belfast 
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committed by non-residents and incidents outside of Belfast committed by Belfast 
residents from the sample, thus the effects of the distance variables may be 
underestimated. This dataset is a slightly smaller sample in comparison to most 
previous similar studies of crime. There may be some parameter inflation and 
there is the possibility of skewing of distributions to values higher than the true 
odds ratio. However, Baudains et al (2013) used a similar sample size in one of 
their models in their study of the five days of rioting in London. They also noted 
that although they excluded two of the days (with sample sizes of 54 and 90) the 
parameter estimates were consistent with the other three days that were 
examined. Although the sample used in this study was deemed sufficient for the 
implementation of the model (Greenland et al., 2000), utilisation of a larger 
sample size would have been preferable. As well as improving the power and 
reliability of the model, a larger dataset would have enabled further hypothesis 
testing. 
Areal unit boundaries are arbitrary and lack ecological meaning (Bursik, 1986) 
and the characteristic data used may not be an accurate representation of the 
perceptions of those living in the areas (Coulton et al., 2001). Smaller units would 
enable factors such as the effects of social disorganisation to be touched upon, 
if the data was available. The theoretical notions apply to much smaller units and 
the street block is the most appropriate unit for analysis (Taylor, 1997).  However, 
larger areal units such as small areas relax the effects of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which is a consideration of the conditional logit 
estimation. The IIA assumption expresses that if someone is choosing among a 
set of alternatives, their odds of choosing A over B should not be affected by the 
presence or absence of an alternative C. When using larger units preferences for 
a choice will be less influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of other alternatives, 
thus affecting the ratios of b29 estimates (Greene, 1997). 
                                                             
29 The attribute coefficient that is empirically estimated from patterns in the data. 
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As well as the necessity of replicating this study using other cities in Northern 
Ireland where PIRA were in operation, further studies should examine different 
terrorist groups to identify how transferable the effects are to different contexts. 
A good comparison would be another separatist organisation with similar 
targeting patterns, for example Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). ETA has 
repeatedly targeted the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and the majority of attacks are 
focused on military and police personnel as well as political and economic targets 
(Drake, 1998; Barros, 2003). Groups with different ideologies should also be 
studied, to increase the generalisability of the model.  
There are several ways this study could be improved and expanded on through 
the further disaggregation of data. Initially, there was the aim to distinguish 
between different types of targets (i.e. attacks on premises and attacks on 
individuals); however, there was insufficient data to do so. Differences between 
males and females could be examined as well as modes of attack (bombings, 
shootings, arson etc.) and types of human target, i.e. military/government/civilian. 
Other models, such as a mixed logit (McFadden and Train, 2000) or latent class 
model, could be considered in future studies. The mixed logit also accounts for 
idiosyncratic variations to be examined, as it is likely that individuals place 
different emphases on certain attributes, for example distance (Robinson 1950). 
Disparities in the attacks of different terrorist actors could be looked at, in 
particular for PIRA where there were variations in the skill sets of members. Gill 
et al. (2017) found differences between different roles in the group (in this case 
shooters and IED planters), i.e. IED planters travelled longer distances to attacks.  
The use of a mixed logit or latent class model would also relax the effects of IIA.  
Temporal variations are often neglected in criminological research (Ratcliffe, 
2006). Using a model of spatiotemporal choice as opposed to spatial choice may 
demonstrate that certain types of attacks were more likely to occur on certain 
days of the week, or certain times of day (included in the set of alternatives), and 
improve the understanding of target selection. For example, PIRA tended to avoid 
attacks on Saturdays as there was no news on Sundays, and attacks were often 
tailored to fit in with the working and social schedules of members (Collins, 1998). 
 166 
Terrorism is not static (Drake, 1998), and PIRA’s structure and strategy 
underwent many changes throughout their campaign (Asal et al., 2013; Gill and 
Horgan, 2013). Future research could incorporate distinctions between the 
different phases of PIRA activity, to see if changes in strategy were reflected in 
variations in target patterning. It may also be interesting to examine differences 
between different groups in the same conflict.  The effects of repeat and near 
repeat victimisation could also be taken into consideration. The use of this model 
to identify the effects of repeat and near-repeat patterns in terrorist attacks would 
be extremely useful in the anticipation of further attacks and prevention 
strategies. Studies of traditional crimes tell us that a crime event at one location 
increases the risk of a further event in the immediate vicinity and within a short 
time span (Johnson et al., 2007). This pattern has also been found when 
examining insurgent activity in Iraq (Townsley et al., 2008).  
 
6.7   Conclusion 
In summary, this study provides a very promising starting point for further 
applications of the discrete choice approach in terrorism studies. The results 
provide further support that decisions made by terrorist actors are guided by 
rationality, are similar to those made by traditional criminals, and are affected by 
associated risks and rewards. Future use of this model could play a key role in 
developing and implementing successful prevention and disruption measures. 
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Chapter 7     Conclusions  
This chapter summarises the results of this thesis, addresses possible limitations 
and discusses ideas for future research. A general target selection framework 
(TRACK) is generated from the findings. This framework is then assessed using 
illustrative examples of recent attacks in the U.K. 
7.1   Discussion of findings 
The aim of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the spatial decision 
making of terrorists when they are selecting targets, through the use of multiple 
methodologies and analyses. The results of each chapter collectively indicate 
that target selection is guided by an inherent logic, and that terrorists are rational 
in their spatial decision making. The findings of many previous studies of urban 
crime and terrorism were reflected in the results of this thesis, providing further 
support that paradigms of environmental criminology are relevant and useful in 
the analysis of terrorist threats. The insights into target selection are important for 
prevention and disruption efforts, and could be useful for policing and the 
allocation of resources in response to threats from lone-actor and dissident 
Republican terrorism. If any measures were to be implemented using the results 
of these analyses follow up studies would be necessary to assess their efficacy. 
Chapter 3 presented the first empirical analysis of lone-actor terrorist journey-to-
crime patterns in the U.S. and Western Europe. The results indicate that it may 
be appropriate to consider any findings regarding criminal and group-terrorist 
spatial decision making as relevant and applicable to right-wing and Islamist lone-
actor terrorists. These types of lone actors behaved similarly to group actors and 
urban criminals by selecting targets in close proximity to their homes. However, 
single-issue lone actors may travel further due to a limited choice set of targets.  
Chapter 4 offered the first spatial and temporal analysis of the current threat from 
violent dissident Republicans in Northern Ireland. It was demonstrated that, like 
urban crimes, attacks by VDRs in Belfast were spatially and temporally clustered. 
Attacks were more likely to occur in areas with a Catholic majority and in areas 
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in closer proximity to major roads. An incident was less likely to be followed by a 
subsequent attack within 4 days if the initial attack resulted in injuries or used a 
viable explosive device.  
Chapter 5 sought to establish potential correlates of the hotspots that had been 
identified in chapter 4 through the use of risk terrain modelling. Areas in Belfast 
that may be more vulnerable to attacks than elsewhere in the city were identified. 
Other known activity of the group, symbolic buildings and populous areas were 
all found to be correlates of VDR incidents. These areas should therefore be 
prioritised in security measures. Extra resources could be deployed to the areas 
identified as being high risk and target hardening could be implemented in these 
areas. Differences were found between incident types. Police stations were 
identified as risky places for bomb hoaxes but not bombings. This difference 
could be explained by the perceived level of security at these premises and 
therefore increased likelihood of detection/reduced likelihood of success. As well 
as providing further support for the rationality of terrorists, this finding highlights 
the need to disaggregate data, and to avoid the treatment of terrorist incidents as 
one outcome variable.  
Chapter 6 incorporated offender data through the use of a discrete choice 
approach. The results empirically demonstrated that the locations of attacks by 
PIRA were influenced by characteristics of the target areas as well as the 
properties of their likely journey to the target. The findings from this chapter 
provide further support that terrorists behave similarly to urban criminals in terms 
of spatial decision making when selecting targets. 
 
7.2   Limitations  
Although deemed sufficient for all analyses undertaken, a possible caveat of this 
thesis is the relatively small amount of data used in comparison to those typically 
used for studies of urban crimes. However, this is an unavoidable limitation in the 
field of terrorism studies, due to the clandestine nature of terrorist activity. The 
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samples used may also not be entirely representative of the phenomena studied 
as they are limited to the Western context. Terrorism is less frequent in Western 
countries than other areas of the world, such as the Middle East. Aside from 
practical data collection constraints (such as language barriers), the high 
frequency of attacks attracts a diminishing return on media attention on attacks 
in these areas and they are therefore under-reported. The results may be limited 
in generalisability, however, they do provide important insights for attacks in the 
U.K. The data used for lone actor attacks was not an extensive dataset30 , 
therefore it is inevitably subject to some bias. As with all open source data, there 
is always the possibility that the locations of some events were not recorded 
accurately, and as such the distances from the risk factors could be under or over 
estimated. 
 
7.3   Recommendations for future research  
Future work should endeavour to extend on the analyses using larger datasets if 
available, using samples from different countries and conflicts, and making 
comparisons across different terrorist groups. The variations in the facilitating 
conditions of the whole opportunity structure of terrorist incidents should be 
considered.  Further temporal analyses should be incorporated where possible. 
For example, a discrete choice model of spatio-temporal choice, including factors 
such as day of the week and time of the day (as opposed to just spatial choice), 
could be used to advance our understanding of target selection. If closed source 
data were obtainable, it would be useful to identify similarities and differences in 
the target selection of successful attacks and attacks that were interdicted. One 
consideration that should be taken into account for this process is that actual 
targets often differ from intended targets.  
                                                             
 
30 Some cases had to be removed due to inaccurate home addresses. 
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It would have been preferable to analyse the findings of chapter 4 with the 
responses of police and counter terrorism strategies included (e.g. a comparison 
of locations pre and post a specific intervention). This data was unavailable for 
the current study, but, if possible, would be an important avenue to explore in 
future research. 
A key area that has thus far been neglected and should be examined in future 
research is the spatial patterning of the residences of members of terrorist 
groups. The research surrounding involvement in terrorism intimates that there is 
a geographical dimension to recruitment and membership. Social network 
analysis has been used to study the structure of terrorist groups (Krebs, 2002; 
Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005; Clauset et al., 2008; Medina, 2011), and research 
has shown the biggest predictor of joining a terrorist group is to know someone 
already in that group (i.e. Galvin, 1983; Krebs, 2002; ARTIS International, 2009; 
Hamid, 2017; Schuurman, 2017). While these analyses can tell us which 
individuals know each other, they do not explain how they know each other. There 
is a need for a better understanding of interactions within spaces, but there are 
very few studies that examine the spatial element of these networks. Certainly, 
there are several process variables including setting events, personal factors, 
and the social, political and organisational context which need to be considered 
and should not be overlooked. However, risk factors for involvement in terrorism 
cannot explain differences between two individuals with the same ‘risk factors’, 
where only one of them will be recruited into a terrorist organisation. Neglecting 
social network and geographical information means the risk is inaccurately 
estimated. 
 
7.4   TRACK framework 
At present, the most commonly used model of terrorist target selection is Clarke 
and Newman’s ‘EVIL DONE’, where target attractiveness is considered by the 
following factors: exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near 
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and easy. Terrorist strategies are continuously changing in response to increased 
counter-terrorism capability. Rather than being high-level and complicated, 
recent attacks are demonstrating a lower level of sophistication that can go 
undetected. Attacks tend to be lower risk and on soft targets, meaning EVIL 
DONE’s high level focus, and certain factors of the model such as vital, iconic 
and destructible, can now be considered less pertinent. The framework presented 
in this chapter should not be viewed as a criticism of EVIL DONE as its focus on 
high impact attacks by foreign based terrorists (such as 9/11) was appropriate at 
the time it was introduced. 
Based on the empirical analyses conducted in this thesis, the following section 
presents five factors that may increase the attractiveness of a potential target: 
tolerable, relevant, accessible, close and/or known. These five elements are not 
a definitive list of features that can predict whether a target will be selected 
(preventive actions should be focused on specific types of attacks to maximise 
effectiveness), but are designed to give an insight into factors that generally 
increase a target’s appeal. They may be more or less relevant in different 
contexts, and are intended to cover all types of terrorist related incidents, by both 
group and lone actors. As such, some elements of the model may be more 
pertinent for some types. It is proposed that the five factors identified and put 
forward in this framework provide a good starting point in narrowing down 
potential targets. The use of this framework could be an effective way of 
identifying areas that would benefit from increased security such as target 
hardening.  
 
7.4.1   Tolerable  
Low security measures, low risk of detection up to the point of attack 
implementation (not during or post attack). 
In line with previous research, the results from this thesis suggest that there is a 
consideration of costs and benefits in decision making regarding target selection. 
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Chapter 3 found that lone-actor terrorists tended to attack soft targets rather than 
hard targets. Most lone actors studied chose symbolic or arbitrary targets, with 
iconic targets being the least likely to be chosen. This is likely due to the 
increased amount of security associated with these types of targets. In chapter 
4, VDR attacks were more likely to be in areas with a Catholic majority. Protestant 
areas may not have been in the offender’s cognitive awareness space and as 
such they would have avoided these areas due to their limited knowledge about 
the inhabitants and physical infrastructure. In chapter 5, police stations were 
found to be significant risk factors for hoaxes, but not for bombings. This indicates 
that terrorists may seek less ideological targets with lower perceived risk for 
bombings relative to bomb hoaxes, given the potential for anonymity and ease of 
escape that busy places provide for actual bombings. Collectively, these findings 
suggest a rational consideration of risks.  
Further, Gill, Marchment, Corner and Bouhana, (2018) found that, no matter the 
length of the planning process, terrorists weigh up various risks and benefits 
during the planning phase. Several potential targets are kept in mind before 
choosing the one with the relatively fewest risks. The factors considered 
encompass both subjective and objective factors and, in many ways, mirror 
criminological findings related to criminal cost–benefit decision making. There 
were many depictions of how fear and nerves negatively impacted the decision-
making processes in planning and carrying out an attack. These appeared to be 
most intense during the commission of an attack. The weighing of security 
features necessitates hostile reconnaissance which itself offers risk to the 
terrorist in terms of detection. The conscious awareness of these objective 
security factors often leads to doubts, irregular behaviour, and an almost 
paranoid state where the terrorists often over-exaggerate the degree to which 
they are being watched and the number of security measures. The individuals’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of deployed security was important in this 
process. 
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7.4.2   Relevant  
Relevant to the ideology of the individual/group. 
Terrorists, being utility maximising, will target areas that they perceive will offer 
the highest rewards. Target choices will be governed by ideology and be 
reflective of the greatest benefit for their cause (Drake, 1998; O’Neill, 2005). 
Ideology provides a framework for target selection, and attacks are often tailored 
to concur with the ideological framework of the group.  
For urban crime, offenders will travel further if they feel the potential value of the 
attack is higher. This was supported for lone-actor terrorist attacks in chapter 3. 
Individuals travelled further for iconic targets than symbolic or arbitrary targets, 
and further for symbolic targets than arbitrary targets. Urban crimes against 
properties usually require more planning and tend to involve longer distances 
than crimes against individuals, which are often of an opportunistic nature. This 
was true too for lone-actor terrorists. Those who attacked symbolic buildings 
travelled much further than those who attacked symbolic persons. Lone actors 
were willing to travel further for targets that are more in line with their grievance. 
This suggests that a consideration of costs and benefits may take place in 
decision making regarding target selection, and that there is a trade-off between 
distance to the target and the representative value of the target.  
In chapter 6, it was found that an area was 14 times more likely to be selected to 
target if it contained an army base or police station. These features may have 
increased the likelihood of an attack due to the availability of targets in line with 
their ideology in the surrounding areas, i.e. officers travelling to and from work. 
The subject(s) of an attack may not always be explicitly symbolic but attacks will 
be designed to communicate a message. As Asal et al (2009, p:261) state “the 
image of civilians dying can be much more powerful than the image of an attack 
on soldiers or police officers, as this risk is considered to be an element of the 
job.” For ISIS, anyone who rejects Sharia law can be considered a legitimate 
target. Scholars have argued that this ‘us vs them’ dichotomy between members 
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and non-members of an organization eases the process of viewing civilians as 
legitimate targets (Tilly, 2003). This mindset and legitimisation of civilian targets 
may lead to an increase in attacks against softer targets, as they are not worried 
or constrained by fear that the use of excessive violence will lead to 
condemnation (Tucker, 2001).  
7.4.3   Accessible 
Easily accessible building or individual, located in a part of the city or town that is 
easily accessible from other areas. 
Terrorist actors are more likely to target areas that are easily accessible. As well 
as considering effort, the risk of interception before an attack will also be 
deliberated. It can be concluded from the results of chapters 4 and 6 that areas 
more connected to other parts of the city will experience more attacks than those 
that are not. VDR incidents were spatially clustered, and small areas that 
experienced incidents were more likely to be in closer proximity to major roads. 
The likelihood of an area being selected by PIRA to target increased if the area 
contained a major road.  
Major roads facilitate travel around cities and are therefore more likely to be 
travelled on more often than other smaller streets. Thus, an individual’s familiarity 
with the area surrounding major thoroughfares is increased (Armitage, 2007). 
This in turn increases both their awareness of opportunities and their awareness 
of entry and exit points. Ozer and Akbas (2011) suggest the reason one of the 
major police stations in Istanbul, Turkey, is targeted by terrorists is because this 
station is connected by major streets. Zhukov (2012) demonstrated the 
importance of road networks in a study of insurgent activity in North Caucasus 
and concluded that they were the most important determining factor for the 
location of attacks. Similar research into urban crimes such as burglaries 
suggests that the risk is higher in places that are more connected to others 
(Armitage, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2010).  
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7.4.4   Close and/or Known 
Close to the home location or other activity nodes of the offender, and/or known 
to the individual through their awareness space or hostile reconnaissance. 
One of the most fundamental relationships in environmental criminology is that of 
spatial interaction and distance (Lundrigan and Czarnomski, 2006), and the 
findings from this thesis suggest that is also true for terrorist target selection. 
Offenders are more likely to attack within their awareness space, including the 
area close to their home and other activity nodes such as place of 
work/education, previous addresses and places of recreational activity. 
For the lone actors studied in chapter 3, attacks in Europe followed a clear 
distance decay pattern. A high concentration of attacks occurred around the 
actor’s home in Europe, with more than half (56%) of all the attacks occurring 
within 2 miles of the home location. The mean trip length for iconic targets was 
much longer than for symbolic or arbitrary targets. Those attacking arbitrary 
targets travelled the shortest distance of the three target types studied. These 
differences were statistically significant. It is likely that the attacks on arbitrary 
targets were more spontaneous and involved less planning than the other attacks 
and therefore occurred closer to home. Also, as the targets were not symbolic, it 
could be that the actor saw anyone as a legitimate target, which supports the 
theory that an individual will only travel further when no appropriate targets are 
available close by. 
The distance decay pattern of Islamist and right wing extremists was similar to 
that of urban criminals and group terrorists. Single issue terrorists travelled 
further. This may be because they have a limited choice set of relevant targets to 
select from when compared to other ideologies. They therefore may be more 
likely to travel beyond their awareness spaces into unfamiliar areas further afield. 
For example, anti-abortionists in the U.S. may be forced to travel to different 
states due to the varying legality of abortions in different states. Ideology can 
therefore be considered a limiting factor in target selection. Previous research 
concluded that lone actors are not geographically constrained and willing to travel 
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long distances to commit their attack. However, the findings of chapter 3 suggest 
that this was due to the homogenous approach of previous studies. The findings 
of these studies are likely to be skewed by a small number of lone actors with 
single issue grievances who may have also attacked iconic targets. When these 
cases are removed and symbolic targets are considered, it is proposed that lone 
actors will travel further when it is necessary for them to do so, when the 
availability of relevant targets is limited.  
The results of the RTM in chapter 5 identified that previous known VDR activity 
in the area increased the likelihood that the area would be targeted. The results 
indicated that they were more likely to occur in areas where other VDR activity, 
such as punishment attacks, protests and riots had previously occurred. This 
suggests that individuals are more likely to attack in places they know. An 
individual with the potential to commit an attack is likely to identify opportunities 
within their awareness space during their daily routines (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1981). One factor of this decision-making process that is yet to be 
determined and warrants further research is whether the selection of the final 
object of attack happens before or after they have decided to attack a particular 
type of target.  
Distance was highlighted as a significant deciding factor in which areas to offend 
in, ceteris paribus, for members of PIRA.  Chapter 6’s method enabled distance 
to be used as an explanatory, rather than a dependent, variable alongside other 
decision criteria to analyse PIRA’s target selection. A one kilometre increase in 
distance decreased the likelihood an area would be attacked by a factor of 0.61. 
The results support previous research that terrorist actors are more likely to attack 
within their awareness space.  
 
7.4.5   Illustrative Examples  
This section provides an analysis of terrorist incidents in the UK between January 
2013 and June 2018, to see if the factors put forward in the TRACK framework 
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were reflected in attacks. This starting point was chosen due to a notable increase 
of frequency and lethality in attacks in the UK.  
Inclusion Criteria 
The attacks included in this assessment had to result in injuries or fatalities in the 
UK between January 2013 and June 2018. For an attack to be considered 
tolerable there were low situational security measures present at the target, as 
well as a low risk of detection or apprehension before attack implementation. To 
be relevant the target was considered to be symbolic of the ideology of the 
individual, designed to send a message. Accessible referred to the targeted 
building or individual being in an easily accessible area of the city, i.e. adjacent 
to major roads. To be considered as close the target was within 10 miles of the 
perpetrator’s home address, based on chapter 3’s median split of data. In the 
case of more than one attacker, the mean distance was used. Evidence of 
previous history of the perpetrator(s) at attack location i.e. place of work, 
education, previous address, etc., or evidence of hostile reconnaissance was 
used to determine whether the target could be considered as known.  
Table 7.1. Illustrative examples according to TRACK framework  
 
 
Perpetrator(s) Date Target(s) T R A C K 
Michael Adebolajo, 
Michael Adebowale  
22nd May, 
2013 
Fusilier Lee 
Rigby 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Thomas Mair  16th June, 
2016 
MP Jo Cox Y Y Y Y Y 
Khalid Masood  22nd March, 
2017 
Westminster 
Bridge 
Y Y Y N Y 
Salman Abedi  22nd May, 
2017 
Manchester 
Arena 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Khuram Butt, 
Rachide Redouane, 
Youssef Zaghba  
03rd June, 
2017 
London Bridge Y Y Y Y Y 
Darren Osborne   19th June, 
2017 
Finsbury Park 
Mosque 
Y Y Y N N 
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Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale 
Tolerable: It can be inferred that Adebolajo and Adebowale did not directly attack 
within the barracks as they knew they would be unable to get on site due to the 
high security in place. However, the surrounding areas of the barracks would 
have offered several potential targets, i.e. soldiers travelling to and from the base.  
Relevant: Rigby was returning to the Royal Artillery barracks after working at a 
recruitment fair for the ‘Help for Heroes’ charity, when he was spotted by 
Adebolajo and Adebowale. ‘Help for Heroes’ is a well-known U.K. charity that 
provides support for armed forces veterans and their families. As he crossed 
Wellington Street, the road adjacent to the barracks, they noticed his military 
backpack and ‘Help for Heroes’ sweatshirt. Adebolajo and Adebowale told 
witnesses of the attack that they had selected a member of the British armed 
forces to avenge the killing of Muslims. He proclaimed, “We must fight them as 
they fight us. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”, and “The only reason we 
have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers. 
And this British soldier is one...”. Adebolajo told detectives they were determined 
to murder a soldier because they were "the most fair target", and that they 
attacked Rigby because "it just so happened that he was the soldier that was 
spotted first". 
Accessible: The barracks are immediately adjacent to a major road (A205). 
Rigby was returning to Woolwich barracks after working at the Tower when he 
was spotted by his killers in Wellington Street at around 2.20pm. CCTV shows 
Adebolajo and Adebowale driving around the barracks searching for a target for 
around an hour before the attack on Rigby.   
Close/Known: Adeboljo and Adebowale were both born in London: the former 
in Lambeth, and the latter in Greenwich. Adeboljo attended the University of 
Greenwich. Greenwich is approximately 3 miles from The Royal Artillery Barracks 
where Rigby was murdered. One report places Adebolajo as a regular volunteer 
at an extremist stall outside a bank in Woolwich High Street, where he would 
distribute Islamist propaganda. Woolwich High Street is less than 1 mile from the 
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barracks. Another witness states that Adebolajo had been seen outside a nearby 
community centre encouraging people to fight in Syria, which is around half a 
mile from the barracks. 
 
Thomas Mair 
Tolerable: Mair chose to attack Cox outside his local library where he knew she 
was due to hold a constituency surgery. He carried a firearm and bladed weapon 
on his person which may have increased fear of detection, but as he travelled a 
very short distance to commit his attack (around 1 mile) it was unlikely that he 
would have been disrupted. The attack occurred while Cox was on her way to the 
surgery.  
Relevant: Mair had links to far-right extremism, including the National Front and 
English Defence League. He believed individuals who were liberal and left-wing 
to be the ‘cause of the world’s problems’. A witness stated that Mair shouted “This 
is for Britain. Britain will always come first”. He targeted Cox as he believed her 
to be a “passionate defender” to the European Union and a “traitor” to white 
people.  
Accessible: The library is on the main road that runs through the centre of the 
town and connects it to the next town.  
Close/Known: Mair lived 1 mile away from the library where he attacked Cox. 
 
Khalid Masood 
Tolerable: Masood used a sport utility vehicle to drive into pedestrians on the 
pavement of Westminster Bridge in London, before driving into the perimeter 
fence of the Palace of Westminster. He was shot by an armed officer and died at 
the scene. It can be inferred that he did not attempt to directly attack individuals 
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inside the Palace of Westminster, or the building itself, due to the visible security 
including multiple armed officers. There were no restrictions in place for the hire 
or purchase of this type of vehicle, so the risk of detection through suspicious 
purchases or behaviour was low.  
Relevant: The Palace of Westminster is the meeting place of the houses of the 
Parliament of the U.K.: the House of Commons and the House of Lords. In the 
last ‘WhatsApp’ message sent before he committed the attack, Masood 
reportedly stated that he was waging jihad in revenge for Western military action 
in Muslim countries of the Middle East. He had also written a document named 
"Jihad in the Quran and Sunnah", which was sent to numerous contacts a few 
minutes before the attack. His photograph was on the front page and it contained 
multiple extracts from the Quran that could be seen as supportive of jihad and 
martyrdom. The attack occurred exactly 1 year after the bombings at Brussels 
airport and Maalbeek metro station in Belgium (22nd March, 2016), which were 
claimed by ISIS.  
Accessible: Westminster bridge is one of the relatively few public roads 
connecting the north and south of the River Thames.  
Close/Known: Three days before the attack, on 19th March, Masood conducted 
reconnaissance of Westminster Bridge in person as well as online. At the time of 
the attack Masood was based in Birmingham. He had previously lived in 
Eastbourne, Crawley and Luton (around 30 miles from the bridge).  
 
Salman Abedi 
Tolerable: Abedi attacked in the foyer of the arena once the concert had finished. 
At this point the bag checks were no longer being conducted so there was a low 
likelihood that the bomb would be detected before detonation. Old Trafford, the 
home stadium of the premier league football club Manchester United, is around 
the same distance as the arena from Abedi’s home address. However, Abedi 
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decided against Old Trafford due to situational security measures such as metal 
detectors. 
Relevant: Abedi had links to ISIS and regularly attended a mosque in 
Manchester that has links to the Muslim Brotherhood. The date of the attack was 
the four-year anniversary of Lee Rigby’s murder.  
Accessible: The arena is adjacent to the Manchester ring road that encircles the 
city centre. 
Close/Known: Abedi was born in Manchester in 1994 and lived 4 miles away 
from the arena. 
 
Khuram Butt, Rachide Redouane and Youssef Zaghba  
Tolerable: MI5 report that Butt was aware of operational security and took 
measures to avoid detection prior to the attack. As this was a run-over attack 
there was little chance that the van would be intercepted and searched before 
the attack. There were also no restrictions in place for the hire of the vehicle. 
Relevant: Butt’s wife's cousin, Fahad Khan, said Butt openly expressed extremist 
views at family gatherings. He stated that Butt watched propaganda videos made 
by ISIS, and wanted to travel to Syria. 
Accessible: Like that of Masood’s attack, London bridge is a public road 
connecting the north and south of the River Thames. 
Close/Known: Redouane lived in a Bedsit in Barking, London. It is believed that 
the trio made preparations for the attack in this location. Butt lived nearby, also 
in Barking. The area of Barking is 8.5 miles from London Bridge. Zaghba lived in 
Ilford, east London which is around the same distance away. One eyewitness 
reports that they saw Butt conducting reconnaissance of the London Bridge area, 
Trafalgar Square a
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night of the attack, the attackers conducted a ‘dry run’, driving over London Bridge 
9 minutes before they commenced their attack. Two years before the London 
attacks Butt and Redouane are thought to have carried out reconnaissance of 
several prominent locations for a possible attack in Ireland. 
 
Darren Osborne   
Tolerable: There were no security measures in place at the mosque or the 
surrounding areas. Like the other vehicular attacks, there were no restrictions in 
place for the hire of the vehicle. Staff at the company in Wales where Osborne 
rented the van said there appeared to be nothing unusual about the transaction 
and that Osborne was "polite and well-mannered". 
Relevant: The attack occurred during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic 
calendar, in which Muslims fast (Sawm) to commemorate the first revelation of 
the Quran to Muhammad according to Islamic belief. Osborne had accessed far 
right anti-Muslim material in the weeks leading up to the attack. He had also 
received at least two messages from Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen 
Yaxley Lennon), the far-right former English Defence League leader. Scotland 
Yard’s counter terrorism command stated that online material from Robinson 
played a “significant role” in Osborne’s radicalisation. Osborne was overheard 
telling drinkers at a pub in Cardiff that he was a “soldier”, claiming “all Muslims 
are terrorists”, and he would “kill Muslims”, the night before the attack. A 
handwritten note was found in the cab of the van after the attack. The note 
detailed complaints about terrorists on the streets and the Rotherham grooming 
scandal, and branded Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn a “terrorist sympathiser”. 
Accessible: In court, Osborne stated that road blocks had "thwarted" plans to 
attack the pro-Palestinian Al-Quds Day march in Mayfair, which was his intended 
target. This led to the attack on the mosque in North London later in the day. 
Finsbury Park Mosque is adjacent to an A-road.  
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Close: Osborne’s home was around 150 miles away from the mosque. He stated 
that he had initially hoped to "plough through" as many people as possible at the 
Al-Quds Day march and hoped it would be attended by Jeremy Corbyn, the 
leader of the Labour party. It could be that Osborne travelled so far due to the 
increased amount of potential value the march offered.  
Known: There is no evidence to suggest that the target area was known to 
Osborne.31  
 
7.6   Implications 
This thesis has demonstrated that paradigms from environmental criminology are 
useful in the study of terrorism and determined that target selection is the 
confluence of multiple factors that should be considered when assessing risk. 
The target selection framework proposed in the preceding section of this chapter 
provides a good starting point for more in-depth frameworks tailored to specific 
attack types. Most attacks studied in the illustrative examples demonstrated all 
elements of the framework, and all of them displayed the first three of the five 
factors: tolerable, relevant and accessible. This indicates that the first two SCP 
techniques, increase the effort and increase the risks, could be particularly 
pertinent for the prevention of terrorist incidents.  
The opportunity to commit an attack depends on finding a suitable target that is 
insufficiently guarded. Softer targets, for example areas where people are likely 
to congregate, should be target hardened to increase the effort required to 
execute an attack. Security measures such as barriers, gates and the increased 
                                                             
31 However, Finsbury Park mosque is a well-known mosque in the UK. It gained notoriety under 
the leadership of radical preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri, who became its imam in 1997.  The 
mosque became a ‘hotbed’ for radical Islamists and al-Qaeda operatives such as Richard Reid, 
Djamel Beghal, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Zacarias Moussaoui. In 2003 the mosque was 
temporarily closed after the arrest of seven men under the Terrorism Act 2000, removing Abu 
Hamza and his followers. The mosque reopened in 2004, and since then has not been associated 
with radical views. 
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presence of police officers may be effective tools in achieving this. There are 
several measures that can be implemented in a subtle fashion. Anti-ramming 
landscape features are now prevalent in the architectural design of London and 
other major cities. Reinforced concrete planters, bollards, and/or benches that 
can withstand vehicle-borne impact are placed in-between roads and important 
buildings, acting as a ‘standoff’ buffer zone. At London’s Whitehall (the centre for 
the U.K. government), steel sandwich bollards are used. Also in London, the 
Emirates Stadium (home to Arsenal football club) has several SCP measures in 
place. Large concrete letters spelling out the word ‘Arsenal’ at the stadium’s main 
entrance act as a barrier to vehicles. There are also concrete benches on the 
forecourt, designed to prevent a vehicle from weaving across, and giant ornate 
cannons form an obstacle for vehicles driving towards the stadium building. 
Access to populous areas could be controlled through checkpoints to increase 
the risk of interdiction. Levels of guardianship indicate an increased amount of 
risk, alluding to risk of apprehension and increasing fear in the offender. This 
conscious awareness of these objective security factors often leads to doubts 
and irregular behaviour that can be detected. It should also be considered that 
attacks will not always be in densely populated areas with the aim of causing 
mass casualties, which highlights the importance of protecting buildings and 
individuals that could be considered as symbolic, through increased physical 
security and surveillance.  
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